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Every immigrant has their story. It rests on the tip of their tongue; but stays secret. 
When you get them in the right space it spills out, as it has for many semesters in my 
Justice in World Migration course at Montclair State University. I’ve heard so many of 
these stories first-hand: a young woman whose family immigrated without documents 
from the Philippines, a woman in her mid-twenties who came to America alone from 
Georgia as a teenager and worked as a home health aide to bring her family to the 
States, a student from Albania suffering the tension between her family’s desire for 
tradition and her yearning for modernity, students from Palestine and Syria who came 
to America looking for a better life away from conflict, students from Haiti who couldn’t 
contain their excitement while expressing how enamored their parents were with the 
comforts of life in the United States. These tales of hope, hardship and family showed 
me for the first time who my students truly are: inspirational people who are fighting to 
achieve an audacious dream while also working to fit into a new society. 
There are other important immigrants in my life. My Dad came to America on New 
Year’s Eve 1969. His brother took him to see A Charlie Brown Christmas in New York 
City that winter. He went to a bunch of colleges in the Maryland area, finally graduating 
from West Virginia University as an electrical engineer. He went back home to Israel 
and met and married my Mom there in the late 1970s. They settled in Philadelphia, 
where I was born in 1979. 
My grandparents were also immigrants. They left generations of history and their 
possessions in Tripoli, Libya to move to Israel after World War II. They settled in 
refugee camps and immigrant cities. Their children fought in wars and found solace in 
religion, the military, education and science. Their grandchildren achieved the 
immigrant’s unspoken dream; a dream that’s mixed with existential fear so no one dares 
express it. We succeeded in school and work in our new lands while retaining our 
family’s identity and traditions. We ascended without losing our roots.  
Every immigrant knows that you need help in this life and you need to be self-sufficient 
when helping hands aren’t available. It’s been my goal to help others achieve their 
dreams since so many people have helped me.  
Our common humanity may seem irretrievably lost from the perch of news broadcasts, 
but I see it every day at my university, in my neighborhood and in my family. I saw it at 
our research team meetings preparing for this book. Great thanks to Timothy Cross, 
Nani Sulava, Elisabeth Gasson and Emily Ritter for their amazing research work. 
I would also like to thank all of the commenters at my home university and at 
conferences who made this work a better one. 
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Most importantly, I thank my family who has made our pandemic-induced home-
imprisonment into a special respite from hectic “normal” life. Talya’s art and Shai’s 
music (and mini-figures) filled the house. Lev found quiet spaces to imagine alien 
worlds. Ariel, the backbone of our family, has been the ultimate companion, motivator 
and work-out partner. 
This book is dedicated to my parents Shimon and Yehudit Rubin who painted a life in 
America that took imagination, diligence, sacrifice, confidence, creativity and passion. A 








Migration and Radicalization in the Age of Covid-19 
 
Abstract 
How do we flatten the radicalization curve? How do we quell the millions of people 
disaffected by their new societies or by the changes to their old ones? In 2020, with 
covid-19 running rampant, trends regarding migration and radicalization took a 
backseat. But migration and the reactions it causes in host-societies a critically 
important issues for our post-pandemic world. As migrants move to new lands, they are 
subjected to accusations of being radicals and criminals, and are blamed for extremist 
nationalist violence on the part of their hosts. The politics of migration have pulled some 
democracies into illiberalism and recent shifts in human geography have the potential to 
dramatically change many nation-states. Migration will continue to be a major factor in 
shaping democracies, defining conflicts and reshaping national characters. This book 
examines radicalization of migrants and their hosts. It traces the process of 
radicalization among migrants and hosts in multiple milieus (Ch. 2); it explores a 
broken system of world migration where hosts and migrants fight over rights to land 
(Ch. 3); it projects into the future, predicting how migration will affect the post-
pandemic world (Ch. 4); and it develops policy prescriptions for improving the current 
system of world migration (Ch. 5). This chapter sets the stage by laying out the debate 
on migration, the reasons for migration, and the effects of migration on hosts and 
migrants alike. All of these factors are considered against the setting of covid-19. 
Key Words: Migration, radicalization, covid-19, pandemic, illiberal democracy, far-
right violence, terrorism. 
In 2020, we sat at an unprecedented crossroads. The Indian writer Arundhati Roy said 
that during the pandemic: “We have a past. And we have a future. And right now we're 
in some sort of transit lounge. And there isn't any connection between the past and the 
future”1. Yet, the present, as always, was weighed down by the past and pregnant with 
the future. For instance, with climate change, historical climate degradation has led to 
mass extinction and global warming2. During the spring of 2020, that climate 
degradation was slightly reduced due to the social distancing mandated by governments 
in response to the covid-19 pandemic3, but it was still a reality as seen by California and 
Oregon wildfires run amuck and an unprecedented number of hurricanes forming in the 
                                                             
1 Wertheim, Jon, “What Will Be the New Normal after the Coronavirus Pandemic?”, CBS News: 60 Minutes, 18 May 
2020, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/coronavirus-new-normal-society-effects-changes-60-minutes/. 
2 Wallace-Wells, David. The Uninhabitable Earth: Life After Warming. (New York: Tim Duggan Books 2019). 
3 The Economist, “A New Opportunity to Tackle Climate Change,” 21 May 2020. 
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Atlantic in September 2020. The present contains a possible future where humans 
continue to treat the climate as they had throughout the 20th and 21st centuries or one 
where major change is made. The future is in our hands like it always has been, but it is 
much more malleable than usual due to the pause in life fomented by covid-19. 
The same can be said of immigration. Prior to the current crisis, the immigration debate 
centered on a “human rights-versus-security” dynamic that somewhat mirrored the 
debate around legislative responses to terrorism. Just like with the post-9/11 civil 
liberties versus security dichotomy4, pro-immigration activists claim to support human 
rights while nationalists claim to support order. Just like with terrorism, one side sees 
security as the critical value, the other views rights in the same way. With the 
immigration debate, concerns about cultural continuity are also endemic. 
This study seeks to explore the future of immigration using radicalization as a tool for 
predicting what will transpire. The issue of immigration has always brought with it 
racism, xenophobia, radicalization, hot tempers, and chauvinistic policies. One way of 
measuring how well immigrants are integrating and how hosts view those immigrants is 
by looking at radicalization on both sides.  
By definition, radicals are extremists, so their actions are not indicative of whole 
populations. Yet, extremism has support on the political spectrum. A few extremists will 
turn to violence often inspired by many more people who may support such actions or 
who raise anti-immigrant views. These extremists, while by definition rare5, frequently 
have outsize effects on societies through their acts of violence be they hate crimes, terror 
attacks, harassment or property destruction. 
Further, radicalization is part and parcel of the conflicts inherent in any society. It does 
not occur in a vacuum. Hanna, Clutterbuck and Rubin define radicalization as a 
“process whereby individuals transform their worldview over time from a range that 
society tends to consider to be normal into a range that society tends to consider to be 
extreme”6. It’s important to note that this definition does not include an assumption 
that radicals commit violence. As Brian Jenkins affirms, not all people who radicalize 
turn to violence. Instead, some radicals “go all the way” and become violent extremists 
while others “drop out” at various points in the process7.  
                                                             
4 See Rubin, Gabriel, Freedom and Order: How Democratic Governments Restrict Civil Liberties after Terrorist 
Attacks—and Why Sometimes they Don’t (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books 2011). 
5 A majority of people usually are not deemed “extremists” given that “extreme” implies holding beliefs on the tail 
end of a normal distribution. 
6 Hanna, Greg, Lindsay Clutterbuck, and Jennifer Rubin, “Radicalization or Rehabilitation: Understanding the 
challenge of extremist and radicalized prisoners,” RAND Europe: RAND Technical Report 2008, 
http://www.RAND.org/content/dam/RAND/pubs/technical_reports/2008/RAND_TR571.pdf, pg. 2. 
7 Jenkins, Brian. “Building an army of believers: jihadist radicalization and recruitment,”Testimony to the House 
Homeland Security Committee, RAND Corporation, 5 April 2007,  
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/testimonies/2007/RAND_CT278-1.pdf, pg. 4; Hanna, Clutterbuck 
and Rubin, “Radicalization or Rehabilitation,” pg. 3. 
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Since radicals sit on society’s extremes, examining radicalization trends is a method for 
seeing how significant problems with immigration have become. Viewing radicalization 
as a move toward an extremist viewpoint allows for viewing the phenomenon on “both 
sides” of the immigration issue. So both immigrants who radicalize and hosts who 
become extremists due to anti-immigrant views will be counted here. It should be noted 
that while anti-immigrant forces are normally dubbed reactionaries, here the use of the 
term radicalization (as defined above) is meant to show that the same processes work on 
those who support and oppose migration.  
This book will explore the future of immigration through the prism of radicalization by 
answering the following questions: 
*Why do migrants and hosts radicalize? 
*How does the present state system and migration regime affect this radicalization? 
*How will the economic pressures and border closures imposed by the reaction to the 
covid-19 pandemic affect the situation? 
*In light of what is found on immigration and radicalization, what might the future of 
migration look like? 
*Finally, what can be done to limit radicalization purportedly caused by migration and 
globalization? 
The book is organized around these five questions with each chapter focusing on at least 
one of them. This first chapter introduces the topic. Chapter Two explores the causes of 
radicalization among migrants and among hosts8. Chapter Three examines the role of 
the current state system in creating tension between natives (0r hosts) and migrants. 
Chapter Four predicts the future of migration and the implications of covid-19. Chapter 
Five illustrates some potential solutions to the issue of radicalization purportedly caused 
by immigration. 
The book’s findings are based on comparative case studies and legal analysis. As the 
final chapters project into the future, historical case studies are employed to ground the 
predictions. Many studies on terrorism and radicalization exist, but all suffer from the 
issue of overdetermination. For instance, many scholars and policy analysts see poverty 
as a cause for terrorism. Poverty may play a role, but the billions of poor people in the 
world would surely have destroyed everything by now if poverty led directly to terrorist 
violence. The same goes for other causal factors such as feelings of isolation in a new 
                                                             
8 I will mostly use the term “hosts” to refer to a nation’s non-migration population. Given the use of the term 
native for identifying indigenous populations and the fact that colonialism and conquest have greatly diminished 
the number of indigenous people in many countries, there is no perfect term for describing people who live in a 
country but are not migrants. Some might be citizens, but some might not be. Some might truly be natives, but 
others might not be. Some might be non-migrants, while others may consider themselves part of the country’s 
society even though they at one point did migrate to the country. For this reason, I will mostly use the imperfect 
terms hosts, but also employ native-born population, non-migrants, and natives, to distinguish between these 
people and incoming, new migrants. 
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society or feelings of humiliation due to being oppressed by a majority population 
group. These factors certainly play a role but radicalization and especially terrorism are 
exceedingly rare phenomena and explaining their occurrences with broad variables that 
cover huge swathes of society lead to overdetermined outcomes and unsatisfactory 
explanations. For the sake of this study, why a specific individual radicalizes is not as 
important as alleviating the root conditions that both harm migrants and cause some 
people to adopt extremist ideologies. 
Problem Framing: The Immigration Knot 
We live in an era of mass movement caused by large, coalescing structural factors. This 
doesn’t mean that every year will see record migration levels. But it does mean that the 
general trend will be toward increased migration in the future. 
Human migration works through countervailing forces: a push and a pull. There are 
factors that push people to leave and factors that pull people in to new lands. Push 
factors capture the reasons people want to exit the countries they live in. These reasons 
could include violence, instability, poor governance, or lack of economic opportunities 
in people’s countries of origin. Like with all human endeavors, these push factors do not 
affect all people in a country equally. Two people living in the same Syrian community 
may both feel the burdens of violence and instability, but one may choose to stay (to 
tend to elder grandparents, to stick with the comfort of a native culture, etc.) while the 
other chooses to leave. The choices of people to migrate are riddled with complexity and 
difficulty due to the uncertainty of what might transpire in whatever new land the 
potential migrant seeks to inhabit. Will one be accepted? Will a language barrier make 
life awkward and difficult? What economic opportunities will there really be? 
Pull factors are those variables that lead a migrant to select a specific new land. These 
are the variables that make one destination more attractive than another. Economic 
opportunity, political stability, peace, and a good education system are all pull factors.  
Push and pull factors form two sides of the same coin. But the world only includes both 
when there is enough inequality of condition in it. In other words, if every country had 
the same problems (or very similar ones) then moving wouldn’t be worth the trouble. 
Why move to the next street over if that street has just slightly smaller potholes and 
slightly less obnoxious neighbors? Moving one’s place of residence is a hardship even 
when it’s done within the same city, moving to a new country has the same emotional, 
economic and physical costs while also subjecting a person to a potentially new culture, 
language and way of life. This cost makes migrant’s consider moving to a new place only 
if their current situation is untenable or if their new potential situation is obviously 






Figure 1.1, Probability of a Person Migrating due to Push and Pull Factors  
     
 
    
  
 
As Figure 1.1 depicts, due to the costs of migrating, the probability that a person will 
leave their home country for another follows an exponential rather than a linear curve. 
At first, with few push factors, the person is unlikely to leave their home country. As 
push factors accumulate in number or intensity, as depicted on the x-axis, the likelihood 
that a person will seek to move elsewhere increases. The curve bends upward 
exponentially because as pull factors accumulate in number or intensity, the likelihood 
of a person migrating increases as well. 




















Table 1.1, Outcomes of A Person’s Migration Decision Under Varying 
Degrees of Push and Pull Factors. 
 High Pull Factors Low Pull Factors 
High Push Factors Person is highly likely to 
migrate due to bad 
situation at home and good 
situations elsewhere. 
Person is likely to migrate 
due to bad situation at 
home and acceptable 
situations elsewhere. 
Low Push Factors Person will consider 
migrating due to good 
situations elsewhere, but is 
also content at home. In 
this situation, an employer 
(for instance) could pay 
the costs of moving to tilt 
the scales. 
A person will very likely 
not migrate because there 
is little reason to leave and 
other options are not much 
better than their current 
situation. 
 
The second-largest wave of migration in human history, occurring in the 2010s, was 
caused both by push factors like war and poor governance and pull factors like economic 
opportunity and political stability. In sum, global inequality—inequality of economic, 
political and physical condition—drives immigration. In recent years, war and poor 
governance have sent migrants out of Syria, Eritrea, Libya, and elsewhere to Europe and 
the Middle East, from the Americas to the United States and from poorer South and 
Southeast Asian states to richer ones9. All of this movement has many causes including 
violence, economic inequality, a world system that values borders over free human 
movement, and environmental degradation10.  
The modern world system is one where goods and commerce can cross borders freely 
but people cannot. Humans are deemed “illegal” if they do not follow laws regarding 
legal entry into a new land. These people can seek asylum (or refugee status) in certain 
cases, but many countries have attempted to narrowly circumscribe who gets granted 
this status given the perceived moral hazard of accepting “too many” refugees. Barack 
Obama’s grappling with how many Central American children to accept presents one 
iteration of this thought process11. As Vaughan Lowe observes, asylum is a strange 
process given that one’s ability to petition for asylum is normally predicated upon 
irregular/illegal entry into a state12. 
                                                             
9 Jones, Reece. Violent Borders: Refugees and the Right to Move. (New York: Verso 2016). 
10 Jones, Violent Borders; Diamond, Jared. Collapse: How Societies Choose to Fail or Succeed. (New York: Viking 
Press 2005). 
11 Holland, Steve and Jeff Mason, “Obama tells Central American leaders most children will go home,” Reuters, 25 
July 2014, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-immigration-obama/obama-tells-central-american-leaders-
most-children-will-go-home-idUSKBN0FU1ST20140725. 




Migrants and hosts have competing demands. Host countries and their citizens seek to 
maintain some form of communal identity and solidarity. In addition to these cultural 
concerns, they also have economic, physical space, sovereignty, public order, and health 
concerns regarding migrants. Citizens in host countries want citizenship to mean 
something apart from residency and to gain some good from being part of a group. 
Coordinated and committed groups, after all, solve collective action problems in ways 
that loosely-identified individuals do not. 
From the perspective of migrants, host countries are seen as opportunities for improved 
life circumstances. International law enshrines some rights to treating people with 
dignity and to freedom of movement. There are also processes for achieving refugee 
status for those who are threatened in their home countries. Refugees, as defined by the 
widely ratified 1951 United Nations Refugee Convention, are people who leave their 
home country and are prevented from returning due to “a well-founded fear of 
persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social 
group, or political opinion.” Asylum seekers are people who migrate to a new country in 
the hopes of being recognized as refugees13. 
Rights of refugees are balanced by states’ rights to sovereignty (or control) over their 
given territories. These sovereignty rights largely override migrant rights for a number 
of reasons including that international organizations are made up of states (which act in 
their own interests, not the interests of unnamed migrants) and that states have 
domestic law enforcement abilities while international legal bodies and NGOs largely do 
not. International bodies, NGOs, publics and the media can seek to shame states into 
accepting migrants, but this shaming is not always effective. 
Moreover, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the United Nations’ version of 
America’s Bill of Rights, narrowly circumscribes an individual’s freedom of movement. 
The UDHR states in Article 13 that, “(1) Everyone has the right to freedom of movement 
and residence within the borders of each state. (2) Everyone has the right to leave any 
country, including his own, and to return to his country”. Article 14 of the UDHR allows 
for asylum-seeking but only for political reasons. Article 14 reads, “(1) Everyone has the 
right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution. (2) This right may 
not be invoked in the case of prosecutions genuinely arising from non-political crimes or 
from acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations”14. It is critical 
here to emphasize that there is no right to asylum, only the right to seek asylum from 
states—and enjoy asylum if it is granted15. 
On the side of non-migrants, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states in 
Article 15 that, “(1) Everyone has the right to a nationality. (2) No one shall be arbitrarily 
deprived of his nationality nor denied the right to change his nationality”16. To those 
living in the country of their birth or where they’ve resided for many years, nationality 
                                                             
13 Alba, Richard and Nancy Foner, Strangers No More: Immigration and the Challenges of Integration in North 
America and Western Europe (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 2015), pgs. 33-4. 
14 United Nations, “Universal Declaration of Human Rights,” https://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-
rights/, accessed 16 September 2020. 
15 Lowe, A Very Short Introduction to International Law, pgs. 98-99. 
16 United Nations, “Universal Declaration of Human Rights”. 
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means something. It comes with culture, history and language. Nationality is central to 
the identities of people residing in the nation, and even those living in its Diaspora, due 
to holidays, traditions and shared histories. Nationality, and the citizenship that comes 
with it, are endowments that provide those in the rich world with huge advantages that 
they personally did little to secure. For this reason, Ayelet Shachar argues that those 
with rich-country citizenship’s should bestow monetary “insurance” upon those less 
fortunate who are citizens of poorer countries. Shachar describes those with rich world 
citizenship as winning “the birthright lottery,” while those with citizenship to poorer 
countries presumably lost the same lottery17. 
Arguments for and against the rights of the migrant center on two sets of concentric 
rights: the rights and obligations of nations and the rights and obligations of individuals. 
Michael Walzer holds that communities have rights to order themselves as they see fit; a 
right which he links to a nation’s right to self-determination. Walzer holds that states 
are like clubs or neighborhoods and that the most important thing we can distribute to 
each other is membership in those clubs. States, he argues, are like private organizations 
not public ones and they can choose the character that they want for their community.  
Forcing states to accept members they don’t want is akin to taking away their power of 
self-determination to shape their state and communities as they see fit. Walzer says that 
we are obliged to help others when they cross our path in the wilderness, so we are also 
obliged to help others when we have space for them to live or, like refugees, they have no 
place else to go. But he says we have the right to construct our communities with rules 
that suit community members and to create our membership rules in the image of these 
communities18.  
In other words, the right of immigrants does not supersede the self-determination of 
states. Walzer holds that immigrants have an obligation to try to fend for themselves 
and only when they really cannot do so, states have the obligation to take them in. 
Walzer adds that states do have an obligation to take in people who they helped make 
into refugees—like Iraqis or Vietnamese people whose countries America invaded. But 
these obligations have limits. States do not have to accept people who are significantly 
different from the citizens of the state, such as accepting Communists into a democratic 
state. The racial or ethnic connotations of this argument could certainly yield racist or 
ethnically intolerant justifications for keeping people out. However, Walzer rests this 
conception, again, on the right to self-determination. An honest account of nationalism 
certainly also shows that it is racially and ethnically exclusive in many instances. After 
all, nationalism is the project of creating states for supposedly distinct peoples.  
Walzer underpins his work with social contract theory, which states that citizens all 
signed a figurative contract to join their state which binds them to the government and 
confers legitimacy on leadership. Walzer believes that there is no real contract, but 
rather that mutual acceptance of the government, communal association and a shared 
life and liberty make a country into a community. Walzer says that the borders that 
                                                             
17 Shachar, Ayelet. The Birthright Lottery: Citizenship and Global Inequality. (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University 
Press 2009). 
18 Walzer, Michael. Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality. (New York: Basic Books 1984). 
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communities create are “lines [that] establish a habitable world”19.  And that once these 
lines are crossed, the safety of the community is gone20. 
By contrast, Joseph Carens avers that, “Borders have guards and the guards have guns.  
This is an obvious fact of political life but one that is easily hidden from view—at least 
from the view of those of us who are citizens of affluent Western democracies.  To 
Haitians in small, leaky boats confronted by armed Coast Guard cutters, to Salvadorans 
dying from heat and lack of air after being smuggled into the Arizona desert, to 
Guatemalans crawling through rat-infested sewer pipes from Mexico to California—to 
these people the borders, guards, and guns are all too apparent.” Carens leaves us with a 
question: “What justifies the use of force against these people”?21  
The author answers his question by employing John Rawls’ theory of justice to propose 
an open border policy.  An open border policy is one where immigration is as free as 
possible, where anyone or virtually anyone can legally cross any border at any time.  
Carens pulls back at points in his article “Aliens and Citizens,” saying that for reasons of 
public order or national security, one might be able to justify not letting some people 
into one’s country.  But he still holds that morality demands that the borders of all 
countries be as open as possible.  
Carens derives this position from an accounting of how moral agents living under a 
Rawlsian veil of ignorance would select immigration policies. John Rawls proposes that 
fair moral rules can be derived from a fair circumstance. That circumstance is one 
wherein people do not know identifying factors about themselves; in other words, a “veil 
of ignorance” hides their identities from even themselves. By bracketing a person’s 
identifying factors, Rawls seeks to create a situation where objectivity takes hold.  From 
this position Rawls deduces three principles, which Carens applies to the situation of 
immigrants. John Rawls’ principles of justice contend that moral agents living under a 
veil of ignorance would choose to maximize freedom (Liberty Principle), create rules 
that make for fair opportunities to pursue better lives (Principle of Fair Opportunity), 
and, with all else being equal, maximize the position of the least well-off (Difference 
Principle) 22. Carens’ extension of these principles finds that objective individuals should 
want (and view as just) immigration systems that maximize individual freedom, allow 
people fair opportunities to pursue better lives and, with all else being equal, maximize 
the position of the least well-off. Carens believes that an open border system secures 
these goals23. 
While both of these theoretical approaches have merit, how they interact with the 
empirical world is critical. For instance, while communities of members who comprise 
“a people” exist theoretically, increasingly the world Walzer describes doesn’t exist. 
Instead, many nations are composed of multiethnic, diverse mixes of peoples where 
                                                             
19 Walzer, Michael. Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations, 4th ed. (New York: Basic 
Books 1974), pg. 55. 
20 Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, pg. 62. 
21 Carens, Joseph. “Aliens and Citizens: The Case for Open Borders,” The Review of Politics. Vol. 49, No. 2 (Spring, 
1987), pp. 251-273. 
22 Rawls, John. A Theory of Justice. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 1971). 
23 Carens,”Aliens and Citizens.” 
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many times majorities impose their vision of “the nation” onto minorities. These 
projections can have terrible consequences, for instance, when new migrants are not 
granted citizenship rights because of their ethnic origins such as is the case with workers 
in Gulf nations such as Dubai where 90% of residents are estimated to be non-citizen 
expatriates24.  
Carens’ description is also flawed because immigration is increasingly tied to security 
and secure borders are a good that citizens are willing to fight and die for. After all, the 
very immigrants who go through all manner of phantasmagoric hardship to arrive in the 
United States by crossing through the Sonoran Desert, do so because America provides a 
stable, orderly, secure and safe life for many25. 
These issues encapsulate the continuing argument about the meaning of the state, the 
nation and the people in an increasingly globalized world. In recent years, millions of 
new immigrants have made new homes in developed countries. Host countries have met 
these migrants with weariness and, at times, violence because the twin forces of 
immigration and globalization threaten the unity of the nation. In a world where one’s 
identity is tied to one’s state, an increasingly interconnected and multicultural state can 
be disconcerting. What does national identity mean if the nation keeps changing its 
stripes? What does national identity mean if the nation is subsumed by regional and 
global interests? 
Populist leaders like America’s President Donald Trump, Hungary’s Prime Minister 
Viktor Orban, Turkey’s President Recep Erdogan and others have stepped into this mix 
promising a return to traditional nationalism and an end to what they call “mass 
migration.” The covid-19 crisis has only exacerbated this mix as immigrants are now 
vulnerable to attacks for being potential disease vectors. These attacks on immigrants 
range from Chinese policies forbidding the movement of African migrants to American 
bans on travel from certain countries and harassment of people of Asian descent the 
world over26.  
In a world that seems to be shrinking, what is the future of migration? What 
immigration approach is reasonable in a world where, in 2020, a novel disease is 
endemic? And how will hosts and migrants alike react to the policies and movements of 
the present and near-future? Migration policies have inspired radicalization among both 
migrant and host communities in the past, so what can we expect in a future where 
migrants may be viewed as disease-carriers and where people may become increasingly 
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desperate to both defend their borders and to leave poor, unsafe or authoritarian-ruled 
countries? 
Before the year 2020, questions about the future of migration focused on the effects of 
climate change and inequality, the standing of human rights and the morality of 
borders. But, due to the global covid-19 pandemic, concerns about population 
movement have taken on a new tone. After all, if people, voluntarily or not, limit their 
travel and movement in order to reduce disease transmission, then human rights 
approaches to migration may be viewed as second-order concerns. Covid-19 provides 
ammunition for those who side with states against migrants, but it also raises legitimate 
issues for human rights advocates. Do citizens deserve to be protected from 
international travelers who may spread illness? Is it the state’s responsibility to help the 
unfortunate or oppressed when it is dealing with reduced budgets, job losses and a 
health crisis? Isn’t it the state’s role to protect those within its borders from the spread 
of disease? As Sarah Song notes, these pro-state arguments don’t just get uttered by 
conservative voices, but also by progressives like Bernie Sanders who seek to protect 
domestic workers27. 
So what happens to migrants and hosts when pressures are added due to high levels of 
migration, economic uncertainty, conflict and, now, disease? 
As both sides grow frustrated due to the complexity of the world’s current immigration 
system, more migrants and hosts are prone to radicalize. Their views may calcify around 
extremist perspectives as they try to navigate a changing world that seems to undercut 
their very identity. The Covid-19 crisis exacerbates these issues.  
This study defines radicalization as a process by which an individual or group adopts 
extremist political and/or social views. This definition allows one to see that 
radicalization is endemic to both sides of the immigration debate and has been for 
decades if not centuries. Unfortunately, the term “radicalization” has been glued to 
migrants but not hosts. Unwelcoming hosts usually are called “xenophobes,” but it is 
instructive to note that immigration policies and actions lead both hosts and migrants to 
extremism. For this reason, this study examines radicalization on both sides. After all, 
radical groups, such as those in Europe, carry out many anti-immigrant hate crimes. 
Further, a recent report details that in every year between 2015 and 2017, over 50% of 
French, German, Greek, Hungarian and Italian nationals were “migrant phobic”28.  
Host and Migrant Radicalization in a World of Covid-19 
While we do not know the lasting effects of the covid-19 crisis, we do know that it has 
already affected immigration radically. When the Ebola outbreak hit between 2013 and 
2014 in West Africa, Barack Obama’s administration never closed off travel from the 
region to the United States. Instead, incoming travelers were monitored. The thinking 
was that travel bans would lead to people hiding their illnesses, as happened when a 
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man traveled to Nigeria with Ebola29. In 2020, travel bans and quarantines, which 
radically hindered travel, became common not only between countries but also within 
them. It is hard to know how long this situation will last, but its potential effect on 
migration could be monumental. 
Policies that limit movement to quell the spread of a virus have put much greater 
emphasis on border security. They have also limited legal methods for crossing borders 
as many, in 2020, have been shut due to covid-19 concerns. Further, these policies have 
increased xenophobia (radicalization among hosts in the parlance of this study) as hate 
crimes against Asians in America and elsewhere have been coupled with a high 
incidence of covid-19 spread among low-income guest workers in places like Dubai and 
refugee workers in meat-processing facilities in the United States30. In sum, arguments 
against a human rights approach to immigration have been given increased legitimacy 
and urgency just like they did at the outset of the 21st century due to the September 11th 
attacks. 
As history has shown time and again, extremism is bred when pressures boil, economies 
crash and people feel desperate. The Great Recession, for instance, saw a rise in 
affiliation with white supremacist groups in the United States31. These pressures are 
boiling once again with the covid-19 crisis. Unfortunately, the term radicalization has 
been almost exclusively attached to Muslims who develop extremist views many times in 
non-Muslim lands. Research has shown that these people feel rejected by their host 
societies. For instance, in France, the system of laicite (secularism), has been found to 
hinder integration of religious minorities who, in certain cases, turn to extremism32. 
Alienated immigrants turn to extremist beliefs when they are targets for harassment and 
abuse. Disaffected newcomers then may turn to charismatic extremist mentors who 
them under their wing33. This is the process by which many people radicalize in prison, 
a context where alienation is endemic34. Radicalization, of course, is not a Muslim-only 
phenomenon as the white supremacist example shows. Economic pressures also lead 
                                                             
29 Wilson, Reid. Epidemic: Ebola and the Global Scramble to Prevent the Next Killer Outbreak. (Washington, DC: 
Brookings Institution Press 2018).  
30 See Cornwell, Alexander, “Gulf’s migrant workers left stranded and struggling by coronavirus outbreak,” Reuters, 
14 April 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-gulf-workers/gulfs-migrant-workers-left-
stranded-and-struggling-by-coronavirus-outbreak-idUSKCN21W1O8; Bauomy, Jasmin, “Covid-19 and Xenophobia: 
Why Outbreaks are Often Accompanied by Racism,” Euronews, 3 June 2020, 
https://www.euronews.com/2020/03/05/covid-19-and-xenophobia-why-outbreaks-are-often-accompanied-by-
racism; Reiley, Laura, “As coronavirus ravaged meatpackers, minorities bore the brunt; Now worker groups say 
Tyson and JBS violated the Civil Rights Act,” The Washington Post, 13 July 2020, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2020/07/13/coronavirus-meat-tyson-jbs-racial-discrimination/.  
31 Reitman, Janet, “US Law Enforcement Failed to See the Threat of White Nationalism; Now they Don’t Know How 
to Stop It,” The New York Times, 3 November 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/03/magazine/FBI-
charlottesville-white-nationalism-far-right.html. 
32 Bizina, Margarita and David Gray, “Radicalization of Youth as a Growing Concern of Counter-terrorism Policy,” 
Global Security Studies, Vol. 5, No. 1, Winter 2014. 
33 Sageman, Marc, Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the Twenty-First Century. (Philadelphia, PA: University of 
Pennsylvania Press 2008). 
34 Rubin, Gabriel, “Breaking the Prison-Jihadism Pipeline: Prison and Religious Extremism in the War on Terror,” in 
Finding Freedom in Confinement: The Role of Religion in Prison Life, edited by Kent R. Kerley (Santa Barbara, CA: 
Praeger 2018), pgs. 292-324. 
17 
 
host populations into the arms of anti-immigrant groups. The October 2018 Pittsburgh 
synagogue shooter after all murdered worshippers because the Tree of Life Synagogue 
had hosted an event for an organization that aids refugees35. 
A critical approach to explaining the incidence of radicalization examines power 
differentials in society and the wider world. Without looking at the broader societal 
picture, the reason why people turn to extremism can seem quizzical. Further, the exact 
form of their resistance—be it through jihadism or anti-immigrant hooliganism—cannot 
be well explained without looking at societal conflicts. People join movements and adopt 
forms of protest that exist in their societies. In some contexts, immigrants will not have 
strong protest or extremist movements to latch onto, in others they may. The same goes 
for hosts who feel pressured by migrants. Obviously, a disaffected migrant or host who 
can easily tap into an existing radical group is more of a threat than one who cannot. 
 
Tensions between native Europeans and late-generation Muslim immigrations have 
boiled throughout Europe for years. These tensions are nothing new as Algerian 
migrants to France committed terrorist attacks starting in the late 1950s due to the 
conflict between their homeland and its colonizer. Examples of Islamophobia in Europe 
are plentiful, they include: riots in Paris’ banlieus36, Switzerland’s constitutional ban on 
new minarets on mosques37, the banning of the veil in France and, potentially, 
Germany’s ban of the burqa38, the Netherlands’ ban on the export of halal meat39 and 
the rise of far-right groups across the continent40. The thousands of Muslim immigrants 
that came to Europe after World War II have not been well assimilated into European 
society41 and this shows in radicalization on both sides. Further, the Muslim 
unemployment rate in Molenbeek, the Belgian neighborhood described by media 
sources as an incubator for terrorism42, is 30%43.  
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While Europe and the United States have similar legal systems and are similarly 
developed, the problem of jihadist radicalization is greater in Europe due to a larger 
proportion of Muslims living there. The European Union now has a five percent Muslim 
population (though the percentage is about 8% in France and Sweden) while America’s 
Muslims account for one percent of the total population44. European Muslims are also 
poorer and less well-integrated into their new societies’ than American Muslims. 
European countries have been slower to adopt community policing practices (employed 
by some American police departments) and are also mostly white, making incidences of 
police harassment of Muslims by white officers more common in Europe45.  
 
Large disaffected minority groups, composed of recent or new migrants, are vulnerable 
to radicalization due to their treatment by the majority. Discrimination is a critical 
factor in the process. For Muslim migrants, religion can be employed as a form of 
protest against the majority culture. Religion also coheres groups, making it an 
attractive community-builder for newcomers. Religion has been employed in the Middle 
East to challenge authoritarian government. The rise of the Hamas movement among 
Palestinians and of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt serve as examples of this 
dynamic46. Western wars with Muslim countries don’t help the situation. While Polish 
immigrants to Great Britain face harassment, they do not turn as readily to violent 
groups because the relations between the UK and Poland are generally good47. France’s 
twenty-first century bombing of Mali and its conduct in Algeria in the mid-twentieth 
century exhibit the very real conflict between European and Muslim countries48. 
European powers were also involved in American-led wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.  
 
These wars contextualize the analysis of migrant radicalization host countries. Migrants 
may have been pushed out of their lands by the very people whose lands they now 
inhabit. Muslims and Christians don’t exist in a world where the two religions live 
together in perfect harmony. They live in a world where the religions view one another 
with suspicion. A world where ongoing and past conflicts breed grievance and division. 
 
Due to geopolitical, inter-religious conflict, this same dynamic of radicalization occurs 
among hosts. Illiberal democratic leaders such as Brazil’s Jair Bolsonaro, Israel’s 
Binyamin Netanyahu, Donald Trump and Viktor Orban have come to power due to a 
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wave of anti-globalist sentiment as citizens of democracies have felt “left behind,” as The 
Economist magazine put it, by globalization49. These leaders are vanguards in a debate 
about the future of democratic polities in an era where multinational corporations jump 
borders at will, cash transfers in the blink of an eye, jobs off-shore with ease, and GDP’s 
contend with Gini coefficients for importance. For instance, Israel in March 2020 went 
through a third round of elections due in no small part to Binyamin Netanyahu trying to 
avoid a corruption trial. Meanwhile, the country, ostensibly rich and thriving due to an 
ongoing tech boom, has seen the rise of a large protest movement centered on 
grievances including high unemployment, high cost of living, and an inability of the 
regular Israeli to make ends meet50. Immigrants from Russia and the Middle East are 
sometimes targets of these grievances as the state provides welfare schemes for 
newcomers. 
In a world where countries are increasingly multicultural and economically globalized, 
anti-immigrant sentiment has become a winning electoral strategy in places as diverse 
as the United States, Sweden, India, South Africa, Austria, Australia, France and the 
UK51. After years of Western countries decrying foreign terrorism, radicalization is now 
rife on both sides. Anti-immigrant violence in America and New Zealand as well as calls 
for “Poland for Poles” today outpace jihadism or violence committed by newcomers52. 
One might argue that the covid-19 pandemic could quell this dual radicalization by 
“flattening” immigration, but economic calamities and political crises do not often lead 
to increased tolerance of diversity and democratic values. In many cases, crises, such as 
economic downturns, have been used by leaders with autocratic tendencies to undo 
democracy53. 
Conclusion: Flattening the Radicalization Curve 
So how can we flatten the radicalization curve on both sides of the equation? Albert 
Hirschman holds that there are three ways people react to “systems in turmoil”: they 
can disengage (“exit”), they can protest or work for change (“voice”) or they can follow 
orders (“loyalty”)54. With immigration schemes, migrants are literally choosing to “exit” 
one community to enter a new one. When newcomers arrive, hosts may welcome them 
loyally or raise their voices to challenge the entrance of new migrants—whether they 
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enter legally or not. Migrants, in turn, can also look to fall in line becoming “model 
immigrants” through loyalty, to figuratively “exit” their new societies by sticking to 
ethnic enclaves or to raise their “voices” through constructive advocacy or through 
extremism. 
The view held by both hosts and migrants that they have received a “raw deal” and need 
to lash out at their society is strong evidence of an immigration system in need of 
reform. In the immigration debate, neither side is truly serious about solutions. One side 
looks at security, the other at human rights. Each rejects the other’s views outright. 
Security? Why should that be a concern? Why should a so-called citizen have 
preferential treatment over someone else? We’re all human after all, one refrain ends. 
The other side asks: Why should someone’s humanity alone give them entrée into my 
community? Shouldn’t citizenship, nationality and membership mean something? 
Aren’t some entries into my community authorized or legal and others illegal? And 
what about the security of our people? Isn’t a border warranted? 
A human-rights approach or a security approach alone won’t fix migration policy—and 
there is likely no way to stop humans from wanting to migrate, sometimes against the 
laws of the states they enter. But, today’s debate unnecessarily simplifies the issue. This 
simplification leads to radicalization on both sides: the side of the hosts and that of the 
migrants. Migrants feel rejected by host societies and sometimes turn to extremist 
views. Hosts feel erosion of their community identity or economic competition from 
migrants and may lash out in response. 
Studies have shown that some migrants (mostly second-generation or later) have 
endorsed terrorist violence particularly in Europe and that some terrorists have 
transplanted themselves in new societies in order to commit attacks (the so-called 
sleeper cell phenomenon)55. And while terrorism remains a rare phenomenon in the 
rich world, Western democracies are very concerned with terrorism as exemplified by 
their statements, defense policies and public polling data. Jihadist radicalization, a 
process of adopting extremist violent beliefs, has been a constant concern among 
Western governments and their citizens since at least the turn of the century.  
While hosts are not always fond of immigrants, views of immigration vary around the 
world. A recent Pew study found that over 60% of Canadians, Swedes, Brits and 
Australians view immigrants as a strength, while over 55% of Americans, Japanese, 
Mexicans, Germans, Spaniards and French-people said the same. In Israel, South 
Africa, Russia, Poland and Italy majorities said that immigrants were a greater burden 
than a strength. In Greece and Hungary, the numbers were even starker: almost three-
quarters of survey respondents held the view that immigrants were a burden not a 
strength56. 
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Jihadist radicalization and the entrance of extremist terrorists through legal or irregular 
migrant routes has become a bugbear for leaders such as Orban and Trump. Migrants 
are linked to violence by these politicians and their followers. Yet, the nativist terrorism 
seen in Russia, Poland, Germany and America is many times discounted by domestic 
politicians. Further, radicalization, which could be bred by an unwelcoming host 
environment, is ignored as migrants are seen as weapons whose arrival means dilution 
of, and possibly even violence against, the native population. 
The future, then, is a troubling prospect as Germany, Sweden, Turkey, Jordan, Lebanon 
and America deal with, in some cases, unprecedented numbers of newcomers. The 
Palestinian case in the Middle East provides a signpost for what could happen to Syrian 
refugees: generations of limbo. The Rise of the Neo-Far Right is also a troubling 
prospect. Integration, as evidenced in the American case, poses a possible positive 
future. A multicultural future, the domestic mosaic touted by liberal Europeans, could 
also provide a balanced path.  
Terrorism looms as both an issue for politicians to exploit and a potential outcome 
either of handling migration incorrectly or of migrant absorption systems becoming 
overburdened. While terrorism and migration are not necessarily linked issues (as the 
data will show in Ch. 2), solutions can be inclusive of both issues. For instance, bettering 
conditions in poor countries that export violence would reduce both export of 
nonviolent migrants and violent terrorists. Additionally, developing a more equitable 
approach to placing migrants in new countries (so as to alleviate the undue burden on 
the welcoming few), would make the lives of all people better and reduce the likelihood 
of excluded migrant communities overburdening domestic systems. 
Sarah Song breaks through the simplified debate on immigration by proposing a system 
of  “closed borders and open doors.” She believes that both the “ethic of membership,” 
which says that people are obligated to their fellow community members, and the “ethic 
of universalism,” which holds that people have obligations to their fellow human beings, 
should be followed. Following both paths entails restricting the movement of migrants 
“[w]hen the basic interests of prospective migrants are not at stake” but also adhering to 
democratic principles. These principles obligate countries to treat human beings equally 
and respectfully, to refrain from discriminating against people and to apply legal 
practices fairly and equitably through due process rights. To this end, tenure of 
residency, even for those inhabiting a state without papers should be an important 
factor in determining when states are justified in deporting people57. After all, long-time 
residents many times become part and parcel of “the people” that make up the 
democratic community58. Song argues, though, that a universal right to migrate 
anywhere and for any reason needs to be balanced against the countervailing arguments 
of hosts that may not want their countries to face the instability of not being able to 
control their communities59. Finally, she states that while refugees should be accepted 
by states, according to the international law obligations states themselves agreed upon, 
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“[a]ddressing the challenges of migration must be part of broader efforts to end the 
conflict, violence and deprivation that fuel migration”60. In sum, the needs of migrants 
and hosts need to be seriously examined and accounted for so that radicalization on 
both sides is limited. Respecting the rights and obligations of democratic communities 
alongside the needs of migrants presents a welcome start for a new world. 
Plan of the Book 
Every immigrant story begins with a plan, this book is no different. The next four 
chapters will lay out the current state of world migration and how it leads to 
radicalization of both migrants and hosts. Each chapter will answer a key question. 
Chapter Two evaluates the connection between migration and radicalization. Chapter 
Three examines the current state system and migration regime and its effect on 
radicalization. Chapter Four projects what the future of migration might look like given 
current trends. Chapter Five concludes the book by proposing policy prescriptions that 
could reduce the likelihood of radicalization by hosts and migrants. This book’s 
suppositions, predictions and conclusions would have been different in a pre-covid-19 
world and, at the time of writing, the long-term effects and longevity of the pandemic 
are unknown. How the pandemic affects migration and radicalization is surely only 
beginning to be understood. This book provides the first attempt at deciphering the 
ramifications of the pandemic on states, migration and the radicalization process. 
  
                                                             








Immigrant Extremists and Domestic Xenophobes:  
How Migrants and Hosts Radicalize 
 
Abstract 
Governments consistently justify reductions in and barriers to migration on national 
security grounds. Even pro-migrant authors such as Joseph Carens say that "public 
order" can be a factor in determining who is allowed to enter a sovereign nation. The 
recent connection between migration and terrorism has been ballyhooed by the media 
due to concerns of radicalism in Europe brought by new immigrants. Yet radicals are 
rarely new migrants. Instead, non-domestic terrorists in the West usually come from 
second- or third-generation immigrants who have become disenchanted with their new 
societies61. Those who view migrants as terrorists tend to ignore the vast amount of 
domestic—both far-left and far-right—terrorism that occurs in democracies and adopt 
the blinkered view that only non-Christians can be terrorists. The chapter will: (1) show 
that the connection between migrants or refugees and terrorism is tenuous at best; (2) 
describe how radicalization, the greater threat, happens; and (3) describe how 
radicalization of migrants and hosts occurs. 
Key Words: Migration, Immigration, Radicalization, Terrorism. 
 
Anti-immigration forces see a world where the historic movement of migrants in the 
2010s leads to a dystopian tomorrow replete with crippled Western economies and 
terrorist violence in host-city centers. Linking migration to national security has, since 
antiquity, been a move made by leaders seeking to control their populations and the 
flow of populations into their lands62. This “us vs. them” dynamic has been reinforced by 
violent, sensational though rare terrorism in the West such as the 2020 spate of attacks, 
including a beheading, in France63. These attacks by recent immigrants or minority 
populations have led some citizens and world leaders to link migration to terrorism 
implying that the solution to one, such as a border wall or visa restrictions, is the 
solution to both.  
This renewed hostility to migrants has come in many forms including rioting in Greece, 
fence-building in Eastern Europe, a proliferation of walls and fences all over the 
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world64, and hand-wringing about the “wave” of Mexicans, Syrians, Africans, Afghans, 
and any other peoples searching for a better life. 
 
The state of migration has gone from massive movement to a jarring stop due to covid-
19. Before the virus, there were more people being displaced by persecution or conflict 
than at any time since World War II65. As Joseph Chamie writes, “Among its many 
repercussions, this pandemic has greatly affected international migration, which has 
become a fundamental and essential component of the globalized economy. In their 
attempts to stem the spread of the virus, governments worldwide have closed their 
borders, issued travel bans, and severely limited human mobility. Those measures, 
however, have been largely ineffective in halting the virus’ spread”66. The virus wasn’t 
stopped but many people have been. These barriers to migration have been coupled with 
an anti-immigrant environment in many Western countries, which was spurred by 
populist leaders whose nativist policies are based on claims of national solidarity and 
economic security67. 
 
After the November 2015 Paris terrorist attacks, far-right parties in Europe called for a 
revision of migration policies while “leaders in Poland and Slovakia warned that the 
influx of migrants into Europe posed security risks”68.  The reaction to 9/11 focused 
Americans on aviation security and the visa process while more recent attacks have 
yielded similarly bespoke proposed policy solutions. For instance, the Bangladeshi legal 
permanent resident who set off a bomb in a New York City subway station in December 
2017 was granted his legal status as the nephew of a naturalized American citizen. 
Akayed Ullah’s immigration story led some in the White House to call for an end to so-
called “chain migration”69. Indeed, President Trump declared in January 2018 that, “the 
family reunification program—which he and other immigration opponents prefer to call 
‘chain migration’—opens the floodgates to ‘virtually unlimited numbers of distant 
relatives.’” Contrary to the President’s statement, “relatives other than spouses, parents 
and minor children are subject to annual caps and country quotas.” Further, President 
Trump called for a reassessment of the diversity visa program, which his Department of 
Homeland Security erroneously tied to terrorism despite a Cato Institute report that 
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“found that lottery visa holders actually killed only 8 of 3,037 Americans murdered by 
foreign-born terrorists since 1975”70. 
  
The heavy focus on foreign-born terrorists diverts attention from those who are 
radicalized at home including the far-right extremists who have committed many more 
terrorist acts against Americans than any other group has since 200171. This “exception 
is the rule” mentality seems to apply only when migrants commit violence as the same 
logic has not applied for school shooters or non-migrant terrorists. One explanation for 
this view is that the state can deport or limit migrants while it has fewer options in 
dealing with citizens. Still, right-wing domestic terrorism has been ignored in the United 
States in recent years to the detriment of national security72. 
 
This chapter employs a critical criminological perspective in arguing that in order to 
understand migrant violence and radicalization, the wider social and political landscape 
needs to be understood. It will be shown that the link between migration and terrorism 
is tenuous at best, but that there are real reasons why some immigrants to the West 
radicalize and that these reasons have to do with discrimination and worldwide conflicts 
between the West and Muslims. Violence committed by Islamic extremists will continue, 
particularly in Europe, until these very real conflicts are resolved. 
A renewed hostility to refugees 
Christopher Rudolph encapsulates the “problem of migration to nation-states” when he 
argues that, “by introducing large numbers of people of diverse ethnocultural and 
ideological backgrounds to a host-society, the globalization of migration represents a 
potentially significant threat to notions of stable national identities, cultures, and ways 
of life”73. He notes that 9/11 served to securitize migration after a period during the 
1990s when migration was seen as an economic win-win74. It bears emphasis that after 
9/11 fully 65% of Americans answering a November 2001 Fox News poll said that all 
immigration to the country needed to be stopped. Links between migrants, particularly 
unauthorized migrants, and terrorists were soon being bandied by officials all over the 
world75. 
Today’s version of the migrant-terrorist, the ISIS-member-disguised-as-refugee or the 
lone-wolf-Islamic-radical, is no less dire. As Felix Bethke writes, “there is a general 
consensus that the refugee influx increases the risk of terrorist attacks in the host 
countries.” Indeed, NATO commander Philip Breedlove claimed in early 2016 that the 
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refugee flow to Europe was “masking the movement” of ISIS terrorists who were 
“spreading like a cancer” among refugees76. Bethke notes that studies such as those by 
Choi and Salehyan77 and Milton, Spencer, and Findley78 demonstrate connections 
between hosting refugees and an increased incidence of terrorism in the host country. 
Bethke also stresses that poor conditions in refugee camps could lead to radicalization 
due to the fact that countries taking on large numbers of refugees, such as Kenya and 
Lebanon, lack the resources to properly care for these newcomers79.  
Alex Schmid, in a report that gathers extant evidence on the migrant-terrorism 
connection, highlights examples of radicalization in refugee camps with the emblematic 
cases being the Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon and Jordan and the Afghan 
refugees in Pakistan and Iran80. However, he also notes that refugees have themselves 
been the focus of xenophobic attacks81. Schmid believes that a poor handle on the large 
influx of refugees coming into both Europe and the Middle East could yield more 
transnational terrorism82. 
While the logic that poor conditions yields radicalized refugees makes sense, the 
economic argument only goes so far. There is no direct line between poverty and 
radicalization. Perhaps mistreatment is an exacerbating condition, but if being poor or a 
refugee was directly causally connected to violent radicalization then more violence 
would be seen in places like Malawi, in the refugee camps of Kenya, and in places like 
Bangladesh. While some violence does emanate from these regions, the poorest places 
in the world are not the most radical; poverty and radicalization do not cleanly overlap. 
Poor conditions alone do not explain the problem. 
One proposed solution for the problem of refugees or migrants radicalizing actually 
exacerbates the issue. That is: anti-globalization economic protectionism, which 
manifests itself in stricter migration policies and an unwillingness to join global trade 
efforts or treaties. Refugees and migrants are borne of a state-system that keeps people 
out. Nation-states provide internal security and other goods such as national identity to 
their citizens, but they do so at the cost of keeping millions of people from moving to 
greener pastures. When nation-states fail, their human contents spill out into a world 
that either ignores, condemns or mistreats them. These people crossing borders 
“illegally,” without asking, are metamorphed into criminals who are “trespassing.” As 
the world’s stable countries shut their gates, while the countries they have destabilized 
fester, the human cost continues to rise.  
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Civil Death and Statelessness: Migrants and Terrorists as the Ultimate 
Other 
The Western consciousness has inextricably linked migration and terrorism. Thomas 
Nail writes that migration is seen by some in Europe as a form of barbarian warfare, a 
“flood” of human beings meant to overwhelm any dam the European Union erects83. 
President Donald Trump’s descriptions of migrants as hardened criminals or potential 
terrorists have contributed to the view of migrants as invaders84. Sam Huntington’s 
depiction of the “Mexican immigrant invasion” of the American civilization in The Clash 
of Civilizations was picked up by then-candidate Trump who labeled Mexican migrants 
“rapists and murderers”85. 
Many in the US and Europe view migrants as “unequal to citizens”86. Like barbarians 
before them, Nail emphasizes that both migrants and terrorists are viewed as threats to 
the nation-state87. Nation-states have exploited both groups. Pakistan claims to 
distinguish between good and bad terrorists in its provocation of India. Ancient Rome 
took in barbarians under a deal where they joined the Roman Army and faced heavy 
taxes in the year 37688; juxtapose this ancient example with a modern one: Turkey 
accepting millions of Syrian refugees and granting citizenship to tens of thousands of 
them with the intention of using them as electoral support for the ruling AKP89. 
Like migrants and refugees, terrorists are viewed as non-citizen “barbarians” 
undeserving of rights. According to Human Rights Watch, since the 2001 terrorist 
attacks on American soil, 140 countries have passed anti-terrorism legislation that has 
increased executive power, reduced free speech, prolonged pre-charge detention and 
reduced the privacy of individuals, among other civil liberty abridgments. While many 
of these countries are not liberal democracies and so their citizens do not enjoy wide 
rights, liberal democratic rights have been significantly narrowed in response to 
terrorism. Practically all liberal democracies have passed anti-terrorism, liberty-
abridging legislation since 200190. A 2012 Human Rights Watch report exempts 
Norway, but Norway has since bolstered anti-terrorism legislation after the far-right, 
“lone wolf” attacks in Oslo and Utoya in 201191. 
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After 9/11, the phenomenon of people moving to or visiting a country with the express 
interest of carrying out an attack against their hosts rose to public salience as did the 
perception of Muslims as terrorists92. The 9/11 effect led to a redoubling of security 
efforts all over the world. One of the outcomes of this focus on security was a linking of 
previously concerning security issues with terrorism. For instance, port security was 
always important to keep out unwanted contraband but, after 9/11, terrorism was 
bandied as a reason to protect and surveil shipping containers, ship’s cargo and ports93.  
In the same way, migration—which always posed some security concern—was linked 
squarely to terrorism. In America, terrorists crossing the long, unguarded border from 
Canada became just one of many fears as the Immigration and Naturalization Service 
became the Department of Homeland Security’s Immigration Control and Enforcement 
and Customs and Border Protection agencies. President Donald Trump took these twin 
fears to new levels as he repeatedly linked migration to terrorism by stating that the MS-
13 gang was rife with undocumented terrorist migrants94.  
Definitions of both migrants and of terrorists have been manipulated for political 
purposes. Terrorists have traditionally been those seeking to commit violence to gain 
attention for a political cause95. But today politicians link terrorism to all manner of 
phenomena whenever it suits them96.  
Migration, or immigration in the common parlance, has also morphed. While 
immigrants have not always been welcome in their host countries, carefully separating 
asylum seekers from legal migrants from guest workers and so on is critically important. 
In today’s rhetoric in Europe and America, migrants are generalized to seem like they 
are all refugees or all “illegals” or all criminals. “Othering” migrants and foreigners has 
been a human trait for millennia97, but today’s dim view of migrants undoes recent 
progress that led to a more sanguine view of newcomers. Both migrants and terrorists, 
through the relegation of their human rights and sometimes citizenship rights, face civil 
death when they inhabit liminal spaces outside the body politic98. 
Citizenship is meant to protect the individual from the government by ensuring 
individual rights. In addition to the legal construct of the “citizen,” which entitles an 
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individual to certain rights and benefits, citizenship brings with it a sense of belonging99. 
Citizenship is the highest legal status one can hold in a state but it does have its limits. 
For instance, states can prevent dual citizenship100.  
Civil death occurs when citizenship is rescinded or hollowed out. As Audrey Macklin 
writes: “The core citizenship rights are the franchise and the right to enter and remain. 
Legislated felon disenfranchisement, both temporary and permanent, is still lawfully 
practiced in several US states”101. Countries may also prevent citizens from entering 
creating de facto stateless people102. Canada has done this with a number of citizens and 
America reportedly did the same when it confiscated the passports of US citizens of 
Yemeni origin103.  
Although the numbers are small compared to those whose civil death is caused by 
felony, in the UK citizenship revocation has become a practice targeting exclusively male 
Muslims. This practice is carried out not by legislation but by executive discretion. 
Macklin calls this phenomenon “political death” and states that “This ‘political death’ is 
a sibling to the historic practice known as civil death, whereby slaves and felons were 
denied legal personhood”104.  
The civil, or political, death of the alleged terrorist can quickly turn into death in actual 
terms. The British Bureau of Investigative Journalism reports that two British nationals 
whose citizenship was revoked were soon-after killed by US drones105. The same can be 
said of American citizens. Anwar and Abdulrahman al-Awlaki, American citizens, were 
killed by drone strikes. Since in the US citizenship is more strongly protected, the father 
and son suffered a political and real death while still holding American citizenship. In 
Canada and the US, prominent politicians such as Hillary Clinton have announced that 
citizenship is a privilege not a right106. 
International law dictates that a state may not reduce a citizen into an alien since  doing 
so would make the person “stateless”107. For instance, Canada’s Bill C-24 allows for 
punitive citizenship revocation but is limited by the prohibition against creating 
stateless persons108. Additionally, some countries revoke citizenship after a person has 
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been out of the country for a prolonged period of time and others simply refuse to allow 
their citizens to reenter the country. 
In 2006, after the July 7, 2005 tube and bus bombings, the UK expanded its right to 
revoke citizenship under the British Nationality Act due to the “homegrown” nature of 
some of the bombers. Citizenship now could be revoked if the Home Secretary believed 
that doing so would be “conducive to the public good”109. Since 2006, 53 British 
nationals have had their citizenship revoked with all but one having lost their status 
while abroad110.  
In the US, losing one’s citizenship without consent is nearly impossible due to Supreme 
Court cases bolstering citizenship rights. America has not attempted to use its limited 
expatriation powers even in cases where a citizen was clearly planning against the 
state111. Instead, America has engaged in drone strikes against its own citizens. These 
included the targeted assassination of Anwar al-Awlaki, his son Abdulrahman al-Awlaki, 
Kemal Dawish and Sameer Khan in Yemen as well as Jude Kenan Mohamed in Pakistan. 
Another American, Warren Weinstein, was inadvertently killed by a drone strike. The 
US government—in a 2011 secret memo—detailed their legal justifications for these 
strikes112, yet surely democracy entails greater protections for citizens’ rights than the 
occasional secret memo clarifying extra-judicial killings. Oversight and transparency are 
critical democratic values that need to be upheld. The public simply does not know what 
to believe in these cases. For this reason, the American Civil Liberties Union and the 
Center for Constitutional Rights filed suit against the government for the killings of the 
al-Awlakis and Sameer Khan113. 
In Israel, on July 31, 2003, the Knesset passed the Nationality and Entry into Israel Law 
(Temporary Order) – 2003, which “prohibits the granting of any residency or 
citizenship status to Palestinians from the 1967 Occupied Palestinian Territories … who 
are married to Israeli citizens.” Thousands of families are affected by the mandate.  
Though it was originally slated to last just one year, Knesset has extended this law every 
year since114.   
Some citizenship rights were temporarily abridged in the UK due to the Prevention of 
Terrorism Act (2005) and Civil Contingencies Act (2004) and in America due to the 
USA Patriot Act (2001)115. Laws such as these have diminished due process in America 
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and produced weak citizenship116. In the UK, Lee Jarvis and Michael Lister’s focus group 
studies found that Asians and Blacks have felt a great loss of rights and a reduction in 
their identification with the United Kingdom due to anti-terror laws117. Counterterror 
laws have redefined citizenship for the worse. Western governments eliminate 
citizenship rights through a two-part process: first, strip the individual’s citizenship and, 
second, “deport the newly-minted alien”118.  
Another form of civil death is the prolonged detention-without-charge of terror 
suspects. Law enforcement and governments defend the practice by describing it as a 
necessary tool for thwarting terrorist plots. Yet untold numbers of people around the 
world end up losing bedrock citizenship and human rights such as the right to see a 
judge and to know the charges being brought against them. Detained people accused of 
terrorism are also frequently tortured. Protections against using force on detainees slide 
away as the imprisoned are alleged to be enemies of the state. 
The George W. Bush Administration routinely subverted power from the judiciary in the 
name of counterterrorism.  It did so with the creation of secret CIA detention facilities 
abroad119, and with the prolonged detention of prisoners at Guantanamo Bay120 and of 
those who were declared enemy combatants without charges being brought against 
them. Some inmates collected by President George W. Bush still remained in 
Guantanamo Bay under President Trump, who sought to continue the detention center’s 
use for housing terror suspects121.  
In Israel, many Arab prisoners are dubbed “security prisoners,” which is a similar 
categorization to the US’ “enemy combatant.”  Security prisoners do not have the rights 
of a regular prisoner, but they are afforded Geneva Convention protections122.  Even so, 
Israel employs tactics such as sleep deprivation and stress positions on Palestinian 
prisoners, which can be defined as “torture”123.   
A staggering number of Palestinians are being held in Israeli jails.  Btselem, an Israeli 
human rights group, estimated in 2006 that 8,085 Palestinians were imprisoned in 
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Israeli civilian jails, 2,384 of them without charge124.  In August 2015, that figure had 
shrunk to 5,373 security detainees and was down to 4,207 in August 2020125. As of 
August 2020, 355 Palestinians were being held by Israel under “administrative 
detention,” two of them minors. This figure has been as high as 847 in the 2007126.  
According to Btselem, “Administrative detention is detention without charge or trial, 
authorized by administrative order rather than by judicial decree.”  Much like America’s 
“enemy combatants,” Israel has held Palestinians, “in prolonged detention without 
trying them and without informing them of the suspicions against them. While 
detainees may appeal the detention, neither they nor their attorneys are allowed to see 
the evidence”127. As Btselem notes, “due to the substantial injury to due process inherent 
in this measure, international law stipulates that it may be exercised only in very 
exceptional cases – and then only as a last possible resort, when there are no other 
means available to prevent the danger”128. 
In France, a judicial order can lead to up to a six day detention without charge for a 
terror suspect. In the UK, terror suspects can be detained for up to 14 days—down from 
the 28 days passed by Gordon Brown—but a much higher figure than most liberal 
democracies allow129. America’s indefinite imprisonment of Guantanamo detainees—
today dwindling in number to only 40 (from 112 in 2015 and a high of 779)—is a form of 
political death all its own130. 
Laws that discriminate against Muslim populations are emblematic of a wider war 
against Muslims and migrants. Both the migrant and the terrorist are viewed as Others 
that can lawfully be extracted from society or the body politic and whose lives have less 
worth than those of “real” citizens. Migrants, like terrorists, are detained in large 
immigrant detention centers and refugees feel a form of statelessness that is many times 
tantamount to civil death.  
While citizens who turn radical can be slated for civil death, migrants are unfortunately 
labeled as threats before they even enter the state. Stories from Europe about migrant 
terrorists are easy to find in the popular press131. Yet, systematic, scientific studies have 
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repeatedly shown that there is no connection between immigration and terrorism132. 
Immigrants do not readily turn into radicals and, when they do, it is because of a mix 
between the environment they encounter in their new countries and the state of the 
world. As Bichara Khader aptly summarizes (mirroring the main arguments of this 
book): 
“My arguments are that Muslims are settling permanently in Europe, that the 
vast majority want to live in peace, that European integration policies have been 
erratic and inconsistent and that only a tiny minority of Muslims are engaged in 
radical activities. I also argue that in addition to faith-based radicalisation 
(religiously-motivated groups or individuals), there is an identity-based 
extremism (far-right parties), which is no less dangerous, and Europe should 
confront both problems by drying up the ideological sources of extremism. 
Finally, I make the point that Islamist radicalism in Europe remains marginal. 
This radicalism is not the result of failed integration, but rather local-global 
connections, which are linked to identity rupture and the exposure of young 
European Muslims to the unbearable images of destruction and violence in many 
Muslim countries, mainly those in the Middle East”133. 
Alleged Connections Between Migrants or Refugees and Terrorism 
The post-9/11 discussion on migration centered on the fact that all of the terrorists 
involved in that attack entered the US on valid visas134. Martin and Martin, highlight the 
post-9/11 obsession with stopping unauthorized immigrants, fixing the visa system, 
thinking twice about accepting refugees, and incorporating all other manner of national 
security apparatus to the policy of US immigration135. Previously difficult to imagine 
policies, such as the proposal of a national identity card system or the USA Patriot Act’s 
granting the government power to detain terror suspects without charge for up to seven 
days, became possible in the environment of hyper-vigilance that existed in the years 
after the 9/11 attacks136. Steven Camarota, writing about one year after the 9/11 attacks, 
harped on the US visa system and attempted to distinguish between legal immigrants 
and the temporary visa holders and lawful permanent residents he saw as the real 
problem. His contention was that the visa and permanent resident systems needed 
stronger vetting in the wake of the 1993 and 2001 World Trade Center attacks137. Still, it 
should be noted that even in Americans’ state of alarm, the national ID card, meant to 
“thwart terrorist-aliens,” received little public support138. 
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Dreher, Gassebner and Schaudt’s study of the connection between migration and 
terrorism finds little evidence for the proposition that terrorism travels with migrants. 
The authors point out that many studies exploring the immigrant-terrorism link select 
on the dependent variable by only researching immigrants who turned to terrorism139. 
They also observe that many studies in this area are based on anecdote or opinion rather 
than systematic data140. This may be because terrorism is rare and the few notable cases 
rise to public consciousness via the news media, which makes the acts of terrorists 
salient but not emblematic of the wider population.  
In their study, which examines all manner of immigrants to OECD countries, Dreher, et 
al. find that relatively highly skilled migrants are significantly less likely to commit 
terrorism in their new countries than lower skilled migrants141. They note that 
qualitative evidence—which is necessary in this case due to the complexity of the 
radicalization process—points to a majority of “foreigners committing global terrorism 
[having] lived in the country they attack for an extended period of time rather than 
entering and immediately engaging in an attack”142.  The authors further find that strict 
laws that limit immigrant rights or prevent integration of migrants have the opposite of 
their intended effect as they serve to alienate, and perhaps radicalize, migrants143. 
In contrast, Bove and Bohmelt argue that “immigrants are an important vehicle for the 
diffusion of terrorism from one country to another” through the mechanisms of social 
bonds that lead to the transfer of extremist beliefs. The authors, however, find that 
blocking immigrants provides no panacea. Their statistical findings support liberal 
migration policies144. In fact, they find that countries that welcome more migrants 
actually have lower levels of terrorist attacks145. 
Relatedly, Milton, Spencer and Findley argue that poor treatment of refugees could lead 
to increased transnational terrorism. After 9/11, many nation-states increased 
restrictions on refugees and their movement146. Moreover, people with refugee status 
were already not treated humanely as “refugees far too often occupy unsanitary and 
isolated camps, which lack access to basic resources and health care”147.   
The mechanisms for turning refugees into radicals are highlighted in Ben Rawlence’s 
City of Thorns wherein al-Shabaab militants offer work to poor, struggling refugees who 
fled al-Shabaab in the first place. In one chapter, failure on a UN employment test is 
equated with joining al-Shabaab since refugee employment prospects are so dim148. 
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While in City of Thorns, and in the case of refugee camps in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo, radicals are present to indoctrinate migrants, the implication in some terrorism 
studies is that deprived conditions alone lead to radicalization in some sort of 
spontaneous generation borne of frustration. The isolation of refugee camps, in addition 
to the economic vulnerability of refugees, makes the camps potential petri dishes for 
terrorism as happened in the Dadaab camps149. The isolated and dehumanized state of 
Palestinian refugees in Lebanon and Jordan serves as another case in point150. It’s 
important to note, however, that poverty or isolation alone did not cause extremism in 
either case; instead, refugees are actively recruited by radicals in both. While only 10% 
of modern cases of large groups of refugees crossing borders have resulted in civil 
conflict, Milton, et al., citing Sageman, worry that negative refugee experiences may lead 
to radicalization. After all, radicals normally come from people whose “personal 
experience resonates with the propaganda of the terrorist organization”151. 
Employment opportunities are critical for the integration of migrants and refugees. Yet, 
refugees are usually barred from entering the labor markets of their host states, with 
Uganda being one of few exceptions, due to fears of them taking jobs from citizens152. 
Unemployed refugees are vulnerable to radical appeals. While Darfuri refugees 
described by Jessica Alexander seemed immune to radicalization, other persecuted 
groups are described in academic and lay literature as being particularly vulnerable153. 
This is why Betts, et al. argue for more inclusion of refugees in labor markets154. A study 
by Philip Verwimp, cited in Bethke, “reveals that the gap in youth-employment between 
nationals and migrants is correlated with the number of fighters” that join the conflicts 
in Syria and Iraq coming from those countries. Verwimp notes that Belgium has the 
highest such gap in employment155. This points to the power of economic factors in 
pushing people to terrorism. Such factors include the relative deprivation hypothesis, 
which states that people turn to violence when they believe they cannot attain the 
necessary goods for competing fairly in society. The key to relative deprivation is 
fairness and a comparison between groups. If everyone is deprived in society, then there 
is little reason to feel anger at one’s condition. But, if one group is promoted over 
another, the deprivation of the worse-off group is acutely felt which can lead to anger, 
frustration and violent outcomes. 
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For all the concern on radicalization and immigration’s links, researchers have found 
little correlation between the two in the United States. A report by the Cato Institute’s 
Alex Nowrasteh shows that zero Americans were killed in terrorist attacks carried out by 
nationals of the seven countries singled out in Trump’s “Muslim ban” between 1975 and 
2015156. Further, Nowrasteh shows that refugees historically have posed no threat to 
Americans. Since 1975, “twenty out of 3.25 million refugees welcomed to the United 
States have been convicted of attempting or committing terrorism on US soil, and only 
three Americans have been killed in attacks committed by refugees--all by Cuban 
refugees in the 1970s”157. According to the New America think tank, “every jihadist who 
conducted a lethal attack inside the United States since 9/11 was a citizen or a legal 
resident” and many were second-generation immigrants158, a fact which points to 
problems of assimilation and integration rather than the transport of a virulent terrorist 
ideology that comes part and parcel with the migrant.  
There is little link in Europe or America between first-generation migrants and 
terrorism, but research shows that second- and third-generation immigrants are more 
likely than their parents to turn to terrorism159. The issue may be that focusing on 
immigrants and refugees is easier than highlighting the complicated radicalization of 
recently-arrived domestic populations. Further, making visa policies more rigid may 
detract from international students, foreign workers or tourists—all major economic 
buoys to nation-states. Immigrants and refugees carry the accusation of being security 
threats with little evidence to support the claim. 
Radicalizing Migrants or Radicalizing Domestics? 
Economic conditions aside, the radicalization process needs to be better understood in 
order to understand what factors lead people living in the West to embrace terrorist 
violence or causes. Some evidence of the radicalization process makes it appear 
incredibly idiosyncratic. Sayyid Qutb, the famed Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood theorist, 
was radicalized by his time in Colorado where he took issue with women and men 
dancing with one another in church160. If the quotidian experience of living in a Western 
country alone transforms a person into an extremist, as has been said of the experiences 
of Qutb and 9/11 ringleader Mohammed Atta among others, prevention likely falls more 
along the lines of psychological than social interventions. Like picking out school 
shooters, over-determination makes it highly difficult to select which newcomers will be 
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the very few who radicalize due to common factors such as alienation, depression or 
cognitive dissonance.  
Marc Sageman’s evidence emphasizes how terrorists since 9/11 have been radicalized 
domestically rather than exporting their beliefs. He notes “an Atlantic divide” separating 
poorer European Muslim migrants and refugees from richer Muslim migrants to 
America161. This divide has exacerbated in recent years “as returnees from Syria with 
links to Daesh members have coordinated raids” in Paris and Brussels. Meanwhile, the 
US has seen “homegrown plots carried out on behalf of Daesh162,” but not actually 
coordinated by the organization, such as the 2016 Orlando and 2015 San Bernardino 
shootings163. 
Sageman traces the process of radicalization as it moves from political protest to an 
embrace of political violence. This escalation of an individual’s propensity for violence is 
normally due to a corresponding escalation of conflict by the state against people with 
whom the individual feels an affinity. Other factors leading to radicalization include the 
protesters’ growing dissatisfaction with non-violent means and an incident causing 
moral outrage. These stages finally lead to the birth of a new martial identity164.  
Sageman finds that, in the 10 years following 9/11, only 14% of the jihadist terrorists 
targeting the West came from abroad—the other 86% were radicalized domestically165.  
This is why Sageman argues that closing borders to migrants or putting more 
restrictions on refugee flows won’t stop the terror threat, in the US at least. With so few 
terrorists coming from abroad, the worry actually should be radicalizing domestic 
Muslims through the ham-handed implementation of biased migration or law 
enforcement policies. Moreover, fighting Muslims abroad may lead to more jihadist 
sympathizers both at home and abroad, which aids jihadist recruitment and further 
worsens the problem166. 
Skillicorn, Leuprecht and Winn contend that a major problem with studies of 
radicalization are that they select on the dependent variable167. Indeed, even the best of 
these studies tout their credentials by citing the radicals that they interviewed. 
Skillicorn, et al.’s Ottawa Radicalization Survey shows that those who are dissatisfied 
with their own lives in addition to being dissatisfied with the moral and religious world 
“become more overtly religious in ways that involve high-frequency and small-group 
religious activity, and they show a willingness to admit to supporting organizations that 
fight oppression even if they break the law”168. To this end, the authors note that social 
welfare alone may not scupper radicalism among migrants and that assuaging a 
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migrant’s compunctions with the religious and moral world may be a quest outside the 
ambit of the modern state169. 
Ekaterina Stepanova argues that the facile link made between large-scale terrorism, 
radicalization and immigration needs to be further scrutinized. She highlights that, “an 
excessive focus on the problems associated with the integration of migrants tends to 
depoliticize terrorism and downgrade the importance of the broader international 
political agenda to European Islamist terrorists”170. She notes that those who point to 
inequality and segregation-fueled rioting in France’s banlieus and similar discontent in 
Europe’s “grey suburbs” as evidence of a terrorism and migration link are wrong-
headed. After all, she argues, these acts were not carried out by terrorists so they should 
not be forwarded as proof of a link between migration and terrorist radicalization. 
Further, Stepanova, like Sageman, argues that many European terrorists, unlike Russian 
terrorists, have been well-integrated, second-generation citizens171. 
How Migrants and Hosts Radicalize: Comparative Cases in Britain, Russia 
and France 
Comparing xenophobic attacks in Russia to violence committed by Muslim radicals in 
France to the treatment of Polish immigrants in Britain reveals common factors. While 
non-violent, Polish immigrants in Britain face discrimination, marginalization and 
exploitation172. A 2019 survey of 1,000 Eastern European students whose parents 
immigrated to the UK (most of the respondents were Polish) found that a staggering 
77% said they were victims of racism or bullying. Telling quotes from the respondents 
included one saying: “At my last school someone made xenophobic comments about my 
nationality and tried to burn my hair. Last year, in my current school, a group followed 
me around chanting ‘Ukip’ and that I should fuck off back to my country.” Another 
declared that, “I was bullied from the age of six to the age of twelve. I had rocks thrown 
at me, vile rumor spread about me, my possessions stolen – I was mocked and verbally 
abused simply because I’m Polish”173. Newcomers are subjected to taunting and attacks 
everywhere. Poles in Britain provide a good backdrop. Brits do not welcome Poles, but 
Poles also don’t commit serious violence against Brits. The Russian case differs in 
degree on both sides.  
The fall of the Soviet Union led to an economic collapse and identity loss that left many 
Russians feeling alienated, abandoned and desperate. Far-right nationalism, including 
neo-Nazism, flourished in this environment. Immigrants became a target. In 2009, 
Russia was “home to half the world’s skinheads, average[d] several dozen fatal attacks 
on ethnic minorities yearly, and ha[d] seen local ordinances and pogroms intended to 
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reverse the access of immigrants to Russian markets”174. By 2018, however, analysis by 
Moscow-based human rights group SOVA, xenophobic violence had markedly 
declined175. Still, government attempts to staunch this violence have sometimes 
backfired as arrested far-right radicals have gained notoriety176. A 2018 study found that 
xenophobia in Russia was actually concentrated in Moscow and that rural areas 
exhibited less xenophobic attitudes177. The decline in xenophobic crimes could be due to 
the benefits of immigration. Muslim immigrants are revitalizing flagging Russian 
villages that fell hard after Communism. These immigrants fill low-wage jobs that are 
not attractive to ethnic Russians. Yet, they still face discrimination178.  
So what changed between 2009 and 2018? Russian GDP and the price of oil (a key 
Russian commodity) were actually higher in 2009 than ten years later. Further, 
immigration actually went up after 2010. The simplest explanations for a reduction in 
xenophobic attacks on migrants don’t hold. Instead, government rules standardizing 
work permits, giving legal status to illegal immigrants and making it easier for migrants 
from former Soviet countries to gain access to the Russian labor market (through visa-
free travel), shaped migration so that the great majority of migrants come from the 
former Soviet bloc179. As Mirovalev reports, Russian villagers prefer to have Muslims 
from ex-Soviet countries migrate to their regions rather than Chinese immigrants180. 
Further, Vladimir Putin has worked to quell xenophobic violence. Asked in 2003 about 
campaigns using “Russia for Russians”, Putin’s response was unequivocal: “Either they 
are people with no sense of decency who don’t understand what they’re saying, in which 
case they are just stupid, or they are provocateurs, because Russia is a multi-ethnic 
country”181. In 2006, Putin criticized the police for failing to contain xenophobic crime, 
and in 2008 declared that “[m]ilitant nationalism, xenophobia and appeals for violence 
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and ethnic hatred have always been, and will remain, a time bomb under our 
statehood”182. 
Still, the reduction in xenophobic attacks in Russia from the first decade of the 21st 
century to the second is not a straight line. The conflict in Ukraine in 2014 fomented 
xenophobic sentiment as did the 2013 Moscow mayoral race. Marina Kingsbury finds 
that the Russian government and mass media has twisted xenophobia for their own 
purposes when seeking to divert attention from internal social problems such as 
corruption, lack of freedom and economic crisis183. Moreover, Chechen violence against 
Russia was most pronounced in the first ten years of the 21st century and has since 
declined as the Chechen Wars have receded. Chechen terrorism still occurs in Russia but 
is more sporadic and concentrated in Chechnya and Dagestan so it is less of a concern of 
the Russian public184. The Russian case clearly shows the role of economic and social 
upheaval in anti-migrant radicalization as well as the role of elite incitement. Policy 
changes and elite statements countering nationalist radicalization quelled xenophobic 
attacks on migrants. Further, a reduction in the broader conflicts between Russian and 
migrant laborers and between Russians and Chechens, reduced xenophobic tensions. 
The Russian case deviates significantly from the case of Muslims in France and Britain 
whose radicalization has become a sort-of framework for how the process happens. 
Margarita Bizina and David Gray find that young Muslims in France and Britain many 
times live in impoverished conditions and find themselves in separate, parallel societies 
compared to their hosts. Bizina and Gray write that charismatic community leaders can 
then turn these marginalized youth to radicalization because they have been disaffected 
by their wider society185. Andre, Mansouri and Lobo track the difficulties young French 
Muslims have in integrating into a society ruled by laicite, a system that promotes 
“Frenchness” and secularism above other identities. The authors find that religious 
leadership is critical in steering Muslim youth toward an Islam based on observance and 
faith rather than on external manifestations of their faith some of which are not allowed 
in certain French spaces. This conundrum has been exacerbated by a rise in 
Islamophobic attacks in France that occurred in response to the 2015 Charlie Hebdo 
killings. While most French Muslims do integrate, many struggle and Andre, Mansouri 
and Lobo emphasize that religious leaders play a critical role in moving French Muslim 
youths toward or away from radicalization186. Bizina and Gray find that French Muslims 
have less trouble in their laicite-ruled new society than British Muslims do in a 
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multicultural system that leaves many Muslims living in completely segregated ethnic 
enclaves187. 
Muslim Radicalization In and Out of Prisons 
Like migrants or refugees, prisoners throughout history have radicalized in ways that 
emulated outside radical movements. Like all prisoners, radicalized prisoners seek to 
address their concerns about injustices both in the prison and in the wider society188.  As 
Michael Welch states, “the inmate social world is shaped by the personal characteristics 
that convicts import into prison”189. Muslim prisoners inhabit societies that are in 
conflict with Muslims. This is why conversion to Islam is seen as an act of rebellion or 
radicalism by inmates. Inter-religious conflicts range from uneasy relations within civil 
society to violence and even wars. For instance, heavy discrimination and profiling 
against Muslims in France has led to higher incidences of French Muslim inmates 
radicalizing190. In general, Europe has done a worse job than America in assimilating 
Muslim populations and radicalization of Muslims in Europe has been more prevalent 
for this reason191. Tensions in society naturally spill over into prisons. 
 
Critical criminologists explain the incidence of crime by examining power differentials 
in society. Contextualizing radicalization in this way allows for a much more specific 
understanding of the radicalization process. For instance, pressures and tensions in 
prison and society lead people to radicalize, but without seeing the wider picture how 
those people radicalize and what forms their radicalism take cannot be properly 
understood.  
 
Radicalization in prisons is a form of protest against power differentials in society. So a 
Black prisoner may turn to Black nationalism or Islam as a protest against treatment of 
Blacks in America. A Muslim prisoner in France may turn to extreme ideologies due to 
the treatment of his or her people in France. The prisoner could also radicalize due to 
vicarious outrage or vicarious humiliation in response to events outside of the inmate’s 
immediate society192. For instance, the plight of the Palestinians could lead a Muslim in 
Germany to radicalize. 
 
In Europe, tensions between Christians and Muslims have been boiling for decades. In 
2020, Austria and France, among others, saw radical violence committed by Muslim 
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extremists193. While attacks by Muslims such as the November 2015 shootings and 
bombings in Paris receive international media attention, the failures of European 
countries to integrate Muslim populations achieve less notice. Not only have far-right 
groups radicalized Islamophobes across Europe194, but government policies have also 
institutionalized racism in Europe by banning new minarets on mosques in 
Switzerland195, banning the export of halal meat in the Netherlands196, and banning 
Muslim garb in France, Norway and Germany197. Riots Paris’ banlieu further evidence 
tense intercommunal relations198. 
 
The millions of Muslims who moved to Europe after World War II have not been well 
integrated into European society199. In Molenbeek, Belgium, a neighborhood described 
by media sources as a terror incubator200, the Muslim unemployment rate is 30%201. 
There is also a greater proportion of Muslims in Europe than in America. Only one 
percent of Americans are Muslim compared to five percent of Europeans adhering to 
Islam202. Europe’s Muslims are also poorer than Muslims in America. After all, it takes 
less money for people from the Muslim world to get to Europe. European policing 
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practices are also more reliant on profiling and less reliant on community policing. For 
this reason, tension between white officers and Muslim civilians is more common in 
Europe than in the United States203.  
 
Just like rising migration rates lead hosts to radicalize, harassment and discrimination 
lead migrant or minority groups to radicalize. Prisoners, by definition, have been 
rejected by society and, in turn, are apt to adopt extremist views. Religious extremism 
has served as a reaction to brutal secular governments in the Muslim world for decades. 
The failure of Arab secular, socialist governments further exacerbated the issue. 
Muslims turned to religion as a form of redemption in response to losses in wars against 
Israel and a realization that Arab socialism had not improved the lot of Middle 
Easterners and North Africans204. Support for Hamas, for instance, grew among 
Palestinians as the failures and corruption of the Palestinian Authority accumulated205. 
In Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood, where al Qaeda’s leader Ayman al-Zawahiri cut his 
teeth, grew in power in reaction to peace accords with Israel in the late 1970s. The 
mujahideen’s successes against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan and al Qaeda’s attacks 
on America added to the prominence of religious extremists in the Muslim world206. 
Muslims turned to religious radicalization as a protest against brutal secular 
governments or as a reaction to anti-Islamic actions by Western governments. The 
presence of organized and successful religious extremist groups in the Muslim world 
helped the cause207. 
 
Muslims radicalize for very real reasons. Israel’s invasion of Lebanon led to the creation 
of the Shia group Hezbollah. The 2003 Iraq War led to the creation of the Islamic State, 
which was initially called al Qaeda in Iraq. Thousands of lives have been destroyed by 
drone strikes in the Muslim world. While Western publics don’t feel the impact, these 
strikes grievously harm communities208. Many Americans don’t realize that, at 
minimum, hundreds of thousands of Iraqis have been killed due to the American 
invasion in 2003209. France’s actions have also led to radicalization and terrorism in its 
former colonies Algeria and Mali210. 
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Conditions in prisons merge with conditions in the outside world to forge radicals. In 
the Middle East, prisoners have few rights and are often tortured211. Groups like the 
Islamic State recruit and organize in prisons. According to Weiss and Hassan, “Whether 
by accident or design, jailhouses in the Middle East have served for years as virtual 
terror academies, where known extremists can congregate, plot, organize, and hone 
their leadership skills ‘inside the wire,’ and most ominously recruit a new generation of 
fighters”212. A prison term can aid one’s reputation in the world of criminals and 
radicals. For instance, Ayman al Zawahiri gained “global notoriety” while 
incarcerated213. Prison served to educate other inmates in the tools of revolution. Weiss 
and Hassan state that, “Prison was [Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’s] university”214. Former 
ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi used his time detained by US forces to recruit fighters 
for his war against Americans and Shia Muslims215. This process of organization and 
recruitment behind bars is not unique to jihadists. All criminal organizations and gangs 
engage in this behavior. 
 
The methods by which prisoners organize and radicalize are instructive for 
understanding radicalization among migrants and refugees. Prisoners and migrants 
alike radicalize due to real grievances in the outside world. These grievances could be 
experienced personally by the individual or felt vicariously through media reports or the 
pain of one’s religious community. Both migrants and prisoners are cut off from their 
loved ones and broader communities. They may feel isolated and alone, they may feel 
unstable. This isolation and instability leads people to seek refuge in any community one 
holds dear. It also causes increased sensitivity to grievance and injustice in the wider 
world. The experience of prisoners, for this reason, helps us see why migrants radicalize. 
 
How Radicalization Happens 
As the previous sections have found, migrants and hosts radicalize for similar reasons. 
Both are spurred by economic conditions, dubbed here “lack of opportunities” to 
encapsulate economic crisis and economic competition. Both are also driven by broader 
conflicts. Inter-religious wars yield inter-religious tensions between migrants and hosts. 
For hosts, elite incitement plays a critical role that leads them to turn to nationalism and 
potentially join up with radicals. This is seen in cases where nationalist fervor has 
yielded anti-immigrant violence such as in Russia, the United States and Kenya. Elites 
can also tamp down xenophobic attitudes as was discussed in the Russian case. 
For migrants, the dynamic works slightly differently. Exclusion from the new society 
works in tandem with broader conflict and a lack of economic opportunities to lead the 
newcomer to reject their new society. This process can then lead to a migrant, be they in 
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prison or outside it, to join with radicals and become radicalized. The existence of a 
radical group to latch on to (online or “in real life”) is critical. 
Note that each step is discrete. The process does not work like a waterfall. One can 
strongly subscribe to nationalism or strongly reject one’s new society without further 
radicalizing. Part of the process of radicalization involves meeting or joining radicals. If 
one doesn’t seek these people out, the process stops. If one can’t find such people, the 
process stops. Of course, “lone wolves” do exist but many of these people are radicalized 
online rather than in person, so the term is a bit of a misnomer216.  
 
 
Figure 2.1, How Hosts Radicalize. 
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Figure 2.2, How Migrants Radicalize. 
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Disconnecting Migration from Terrorism 
While a connection between terrorism and immigration remains anecdotal, perceptions 
can play a large role in reality. Popular press and elite rhetorical narratives about 
radicalized foreigners assaulting citizens play on the sensitivities of those in the West 
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who feel helpless in the face of globalization217. Martin and Martin emphasize that 
“Elected public officials at the federal, state and local levels played an important role in 
deflecting anger that may have otherwise been directed at immigrants.” For instance, 
after the 9/11 attacks, “President Bush, Mayor Giuliani and other officials quickly 
distinguished between the vast majority of law-abiding immigrants and the very few 
terrorists who had attacked the country.” Public officials visited mosques and met with 
Arab and Muslim community leaders in the quest to show the public that Muslims and 
terrorists were not one and the same218.  
Contrast this behavior with that of President Trump who said “Islam hates us” and 
tweeted warnings of Muslims infiltrating migrant caravans219. Resurgent 
ethnonationalists in Europe and America in 2020 opposed immigration and saw no 
need to distinguish between Muslims and terrorists. In fact, these groups and leaders 
like President Trump seek to emphasize the “radical Islamic” nature of the terrorism 
they oppose—and ignore the radical nature of the white supremacist and far-right 
terrorism dubbed “domestic.” 
Felix Bethke emphasizes that this rejection of migrants leads to violence against 
refugees, an oft-ignored factor in discussions of terrorist violence. He calls for more 
compassion for refugees entering Europe and the West as a means for reducing 
radicalization. He also proposes increasing aid to terror-prone countries to build their 
security and social capacities so that they too can better serve their populations220. 
Radicalization and terrorism are a two-way street. State violence against and oppression 
of Muslims, especially in Europe, has led some migrants to turn to terrorist violence. 
This violence cannot be explained by material conditions alone, but must be placed in a 
wider landscape that includes the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians, human 
rights abuses in the Middle East and the cynicism of Western state support of the oil 
industry, Gulf monarchies, and colonialism. With these compass points in mind, the 
connections between migrants, refugees, radicalization, and the rare terrorist violence 
committed in Western countries can be seen.  
 
The present political context in the West, where some world leaders denigrate migrants, 
where drones continue to strike tribal people221, where the proxy war in Syria takes new 
forms222, and where an impasse continues to fester in Israel-Palestine, is not conducive 
to the integration of millions of African and Middle Eastern migrants into Europe and 
the Middle East. Scholarly evidence shows that the vast majority of these migrants will 
not radicalize and, on the contrary, that many of these migrants will face violence and 
discrimination at the hands of domestic populations.  
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The next chapter examines the state system and land rights claims as systemic causes of 






























Native and Migrant Land Conflicts:  





Artificial borders and boundaries form a map that reinforces divisions between people. 
Justifications for these divisions are usually based on history, the outcomes of conflict, 
ethnicity, narrative myths, and nativity. This chapter, evaluates these—and other—
justifications for land ownership with two main questions in mind. First, "Who Owns 
Land?" In other words, what normative justifications for land ownership are valid and 
which are not? Second, "What Justifies Keeping People Out?" In other words, do 
reasons of nativity, security, coherence, ethnicity, etc. justify keeping migrants, refugees 
and others out of certain lands? Case study analysis of land claims made in Israel-
Palestine will be employed to further explore the topic. In the end, it will be argued that 
that nations and nationalism and their concomitant justifications for ownership and 
exclusion are the great barriers to a more just land distribution and system of human 
migration. 
Key Words: Land Rights, Land Ownership, Native Rights, Migration, Exclusion. 
 
We live in boxes. Each box is said to contain a “people,” that is: a type of human. These 
people can be linked by culture, language, skin color, history, religion, or anything else. 
We teach our children about the box we live in. How the box came to take on its current 
mix of human contents. Why that mix is the right mix.  
They also learn about the boxes nearby. How they contain different humans with 
different experiences. 
This world of boxes has a certain beauty to it. We can look at a picture of all the boxes 
stacked atop one another and marvel at the diversity of humanity. We can feel safe that 
bad people, wars and disasters are contained within faraway boxes. 
The news tells us about these events. In one box there’s a famine. In another there looks 
like a genocide may happen. In another: disease. We read about these boxes and watch 
what happens in these boxes. They move us in some ways, in others it just feels good to 
be informed. After all, our box is what really matters. 
Today, people don’t attack other people’s boxes as much as they once did. Instead, we 
fight within our own boxes and worry more about the people within our boxes than 
those outside of them. 
Lately, though, the whole system of boxes has looked like it might fall apart. 
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People have been spilling out of some boxes and rolling into others in huge droves. 
Some boxes have become too cramped. Some contain too much internal violence. 
Others are too hot, too cold, too dry, or too wet.  
The people who move boxes say: there should be no system of boxes! People should just 
be allowed to live wherever they want! 
The people who stay in their boxes say: the box system keeps us safe! The contents of 
our box made sense before you came! Maybe you should get out! 
********************************************************************************** 
If we ask anyone today ‘who owns land?’ The answer that comes back will either be the 
people or the state. The problem is that while states work for many people in the rich 
world, they are failing many people in parts of the world plagued by poverty, war, 
environmental degradation, and predatory governments. As these people move from 
their boxes into those of others, the human community needs to reevaluate how land 
ownership is justified. Simply stating that something called a nation-state legally 
controls the territory within certain borders is not enough in a world where the nation-
state system has failed so many. This question of ownership goes to the root of the issue 
of a just global normative order for migrants. It also deals with radicalization: how 
people perceive the justness of the world they live in affects how they react to events 
within it. 
Arguments about migration center on land. Who deserves it? Who gets to live on it? 
Who gets to move to it? These arguments deal primarily with rights: rights of 
movement, rights of ownership, citizenship rights, residency rights. 
The world of boxes is at a turning point. People are spilling out due to desertification, 
flooding, state failure, gross economic inequality and war, among other reasons. Though 
the covid-19 pandemic has stemmed migration temporarily, these causal factors remain. 
These factors are also connected. Environmental degradation links directly to human 
conflict. As Jared Diamond shows in Collapse, climate change is an underlying factor 
just about wherever war occurs today223. 
As food, land and water resources dwindle, particularly in population dense places like 
Rwanda and Burundi, conflict ignites. These resource conflicts serve to exhume the 
extant problems in the state system. In this system, people are tied to their governments 
and given limited rights to cross international borders into new lands even when 
circumstances are dangerous in their home countries. This is despite an international 
human rights regime that claims to enshrine a right to asylum, a right to move freely (at 
least within borders), and a right to citizenship or nationality224. States, particularly 
poor and authoritarian ones act as “boxes” that hold in people and problems until they 
“explode”—as Syria did in 2011—and undermine the security of their neighbors. 
Where does radicalization fit in? Radicalization, and the terrorism it breeds, acts as a 
causal factor in pushing people out of dangerous countries and as a consequence of state 
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failure. Radicalization is also a fact of life in an unequal world where, as Ayelet Shachar 
establishes, those born in the rich world gain an enormous birthright inheritance that 
gives them far more wealth, power and freedom of movement than those in the 
developing world225. Radicalization arises out of inequality as it is a product of grievance 
and derives from a desire to make substantive change. It also comes about when hosts 
feel the burden of (perceived) competition and cultural change in response to migration.  
On a deeper level, then, deciphering native and migrant rights is central to solving the 
problems of the future where presumably millions of migrants will continue to seek 
greener pastures in safe and prosperous states. Fixing a system that doesn’t work for so 
many people will also alleviate radicalization. Within the state, people are divided into 
various units: the individual or the collective, natives and migrants. The arguments of 
natives and migrants will be examined to see whether one group has a clearer moral 
claim to land than the other. In the end, it will be shown that a new system and way of 
viewing land is needed in a world where so many people are looking to change locations. 
These conclusions will be elaborated upon in Ch. 5. 
A New Land Ethic: Higher Morality and Land 
Joshua Greene in Moral Tribes argues that the world would be better if it were 
populated by moral utilitarians. This is because, he believes, utilitarians would reach out 
to groups wider than their “tribe” and seek justice on a more global level226. Greene’s 
argument is that doing the greatest good for the greatest number of people means in the 
least giving our excess goods to others in need. To this end, land conflicts would need to 
be solved not by historical justification, which will be explored below, but by a higher 
moral code. 
A new land ethic is needed for reconciling the rights of natives and migrants. The 
current system of states and territories works well for many people—those in successful 
units—but works very poorly for others. Those for whom it works poorly includes people 
living under harsh governments that extract goods from them like North Korea, the 
Democratic Republic of Congo, and Sudan227. It also works poorly for people living in 
countries whose governments are failed or fragile like in Yemen, Libya, or Somalia. With 
civil wars becoming the near-exclusive form of war in modern times228, people in places 
like Syria, South Sudan, parts of Mexico, and northeastern Nigeria also do not benefit 
from the current state system. Finally, environmental changes have made life in places 
like Bangladesh and the Maldives229—and perhaps soon the Persian Gulf230—
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increasingly difficult. In many places, like in Yemen or Sudan, war, failed governance 
and environmental factors overlap to make life incredibly hard for many people. 
The choices for these people are limited: stay or move somewhere else to try to find a 
better life. As Joseph Carens argues, if we put ourselves in their shoes through Rawls’ 
original position thought experiment, we would realize that anyone would want to move 
to safer ground if put in such dire circumstances231. After all, as Ayelet Shachar 
evidences, our life opportunities are greatly determined by the lucky circumstances of 
our birth which bequeath some of us with membership into prosperous nations and 
others of us with membership into predatory or impoverished nations232. In a world 
where humans are boxed-up into these “bounded membership communities,” global 
inequality is inevitable233. 
Here land rights will be explored as a way of seeing what justifies the current state 
system. The question of who deserves to own land is central to the questions of 
migration, citizenship and native rights. All of these issues revolve around moral 
concepts of distributive justice: in other words, who should get what. The contention in 
this chapter is that the very system of divvying up the Earth into separate boxes 
perpetuates problems by sealing people into unsafe spaces and by creating a logic for 
keeping needy people out of desirable territories. This logic also needs to be examined in 
light of the 2020 global pandemic, which has justified some uses of land rights for 
keeping people out and which has great future ramifications. 
Migrants who want to join the rich world face the twin problems of private property and 
the nation-state. These concepts moor people to certain lands and justify their 
placement on those lands. The state-sized equivalent of private property is the 
conception of sovereignty which provides the government of a bounded territory with 
free reign to rule in that territory as they see fit just like individuals can, within limits, 
do what they see fit on their private lands.  
As migrants continue to move from Syria, Afghanistan, Eritrea, Libya, and other 
troubled spots into a weary Europe, the question of who deserves what land and how the 
world’s territory should be distributed has become an acute one. The topic will be 
explored with a focus on the tension between natives and migrants.  
Who Owns Land? 
Land conflicts riddle the planet and human history. From Israel and Palestine to 
Northern Ireland to South Africa and Zimbabwe to Australia and New Zealand. Too 
often these conflicts are reduced into the differing peoples or views that encapsulate the 
conflict: a war over religion, an ethnic conflict, a battle of races. Yet what unites conflicts 
the world over is a patchwork of laws, customs and histories involving land rights and 
ownership.  
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The way that humans come to own land, like the simple answer to the question “Who 
owns land?,” is varied. There is no one unifying law over land. Court cases document 
land contestations such as in the domestic American setting over eminent domain or oil 
drilling rights or in the international setting over native rights, borders, or maritime 
rights. Conceptions of who has rights to land differ greatly across the planet and have 
changed throughout history. Communist countries see the land as owned by the 
collective or by the government (as a proxy for the collective), capitalist countries view 
land as (mostly) privately owned by individuals, monarchies see the land as owned by 
the king or queen, nomadic tribes see the land as owned by no one (or by “nature” or 
“gods”), and religious people see the land as owned by God (and sometimes view 
themselves as God’s representatives on Earth). 
Further, methods of land acquisition vary widely, leading to divergent claims to rightful 
ownership. Some of the world’s land has been acquired through purchase, some through 
conquest, some through “discovery” (for instance, humans crossing the Bering Strait 
into non-human populated land), and some through settlement (for instance, when 
Europeans “settled” America). With all land conflicts, history is a tool of those who 
make claims. So are land titles (versus oral claims), claims of improving land (versus 
“doing nothing” with it), claims of being peaceful (versus being violent), claims of 
winning wars fairly (or unfairly), claims of needing land for defense (or for aggression), 
claims that God (or a King or Queen) bequeathed land, claims that the government owns 
all land, claims that land is needed to extract certain resources (or to preserve them), 
and claims of being there first. On top of these multifarious claims, the edifice of law 
about land was erected by “state” governments who claimed huge tracts of land for 
themselves and who made agreements to respect and recognize each other’s plots. It is 
important to note too that land laws have been used to “reform land use” usually 
through some sort of “more equitable” redistribution and to justify current land 
holdings. These land reforms, such as in China or Zimbabwe, are contentious to say the 
least. 
The focus here will be on who should own land and, by extension whether and how we 
can justify excluding others from land. Ultimately, the tension between migrants and 
hosts rests on this issue. Further, conflicts that lead to migration and exacerbate 
radicalization rest on land disputes. These conflicts can have to do with land where 
natives share land with settlers like Zimbabwe, land where natives share land with 
settlers that claim that they are the real natives like Israel-Palestine, land where settlers 
control land in which some natives remain like Australia and the United States, and land 
where poor drawing of borders and a history of colonialism create conflicts between 
peoples like in Africa and the Near East. A rigid international border system that 
promotes border fixity over human geography doesn’t help matters234. 
These conflicts have come to a head in the twenty-first century as a huge influx of 
refugees from Iraq, Syria and Africa have migrated to neighboring places like Lebanon, 
Jordan and Europe. Refugee supporters ask: What gives anyone the right to keep out a 
person in need, especially one who has a great risk of dying if not let in?  
                                                             




At the same time, arguments that support native rights are frequently bandied to 
condemn settlers and colonizers, and to propose just solutions to land conflicts. The 
natives were there first. Settlers and colonizers stole land. Theft is a crime; land theft a 
crime against humanity. The issue is presented as a cut-and-dried one. While in some 
cases colonizers, as the Spanish conquistadors did in Cajamarca235, came specifically to 
steal and plunder, other issues are more complicated. Israel-Palestine, with the Jewish 
history of the Holocaust and connections to the land, is not simply a story of settlers or 
colonizers stealing from natives—though that is certainly one valid narrative236.  
Today’s Australians, New Zealanders, Americans, Canadians, and South Americans may 
be descendants of conquerors or settlers but so are some inhabitants of today’s France, 
England and Russia. Should we punish the descendants of these conquerors 
considering, for instance, how many Southeast Asians now live in Australia, how many 
Central Americans live in the United States (not to mention the descendants of Black 
slaves), and how many Ethiopian and North African Jews live in Israel? Is there even a 
just way to punish the wrongdoers so many generations later? In Israel-Palestine the 
wrongdoing is current so the answer is more immediate, but in Australia the brunt of 
the damage occurred in the past (though, of course, mistreatment of natives continues 
to this day). Aboriginals have some rights but their country is controlled by newcomers 
and it was taken hundreds of years ago. The same can be said for Native Americans, 
Canada’s First Nations and Alaska Natives.  
A great give-back to natives makes moral sense but is impractical. After all, “finder’s 
keepers” and “we were here first” are simple, just, effective rules for governing human 
interactions. Yet with land, the issue of need arises as well. Is it right for natives to 
effectively cut their land off from anyone who needs safe harbor? Do native rights 
supersede all other claims to land? Human rights concerns have imbued the migration 
debate, but if native rights are paramount then there isn’t much to argue about. 
Land Ownership through the Ages 
Since the dawn of Homo sapiens sapiens (and before), humans have formed groups, 
packs, clans, or tribes. At first, human groupings were small—the size of “bands”—but, 
as human populations grew and expanded, these bands became clans and then tribes. 
Jared Diamond divides human societies into four main groupings: bands consisting of 
dozens of people, tribes consisting of hundreds, chiefdoms consisting of thousands, and 
states consisting of over 50,000 people237. As societies grew, they became more complex 
in their methods of governance, food production, and land distribution.  
For the vast majority of human existence, the species has organized itself into tribes of 
hunter-gatherers. As Joshua Greene explains it, if an extraterrestrial visited Earth every 
10,000 years over a 100,000-year span leading up to today their field notes would 
denote nine visits where humans number less than 10 million hunter-gatherers using 
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primitive tools and one final visit where there were over 7 billion humans organizing 
themselves in sophisticated societies238.  
Hunter-gatherers live off of the Earth and, for this reason, their belief-systems usually 
imbue the Earth, the trees, the animals, and the land with “spirits” or mystical powers. 
As Walter Echo-Hawk notes, “In primal cosmology, only a thin line exists between 
humans and the animals and plants that live in tribal habitats—and everything, 
including the land itself, has a spirit”239. Contrast this with the settler mentality where 
land is viewed as a resource or as territory to be subjugated and conquered240.  
For this reason, private property was not an invention of hunter-gatherer tribes. 
Instead, to them the land was owned by gods or nature. Humans could not own land—
and they didn’t need to; nomadic or semi-nomadic tribespeople may have inhabited 
certain territory but they had no great need to own a particular sphere of land. As 
Jeffrey Herbst shows in the African case, due to low population densities in most of the 
world and a lot of available land, land contestations were largely unnecessary for most of 
human history due to the ability to simply move to an as-yet-uninhabited space241. 
This changed with the advent of farming as farmers are dependent on specific plots of 
land for their crops242. The Torah is littered with phrases regarding farming. The 
shunned Esau hunts and craves game; Noah plants a vineyard after the flood. The Book 
of Leviticus exhorts the people on what types of domesticated animal to eat, the Book of 
Deuteronomy lists rules about farming, and the Book of Exodus discusses rotating 
fields. 
Farming yielded the need to control a certain parcel of land. Pre-farming humans 
needed to be nomadic due to the itinerant nature of hunting and gathering. The farm 
changed their way of life as food, animals and plants are readily available on 
domesticated plots. The importance and recency of this change cannot be overstated. 
Farming yielded the need to fence off land from “the wild”: from undomesticated animal 
intruders and from thieving humans. Anyone who has planted a garden understands 
how insects and small mammals can ravage one’s “crop.” The need to protect the farm 
led to a series of successive changes in how humans viewed their relationship to land. Of 
course, not all humans moved to farm-based societies and many still hunt and gather 
today though their numbers have precipitously dwindled. 
A typical hunter-gathering tribe sees land as owned by gods or nature and views the 
Earth as imbued with spirits. Each animal and plant is revered for it is needed for food. 
Hunting and gathering requires patience and some luck. While the same attributes help 
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farmers, less luck is required if farming is done right. The numerous prayers for rain in 
Biblical texts are evidence of this fact. With rain, a farm produces food—not much else is 
required. 
Farming led to the walling off of land plots and to a sedentary human population. This 
sedentary population was worried about its security. James Scott describes the image of 
the barbarian that “urban” or “civilized” societies create. The “hills people,” the “people 
of the interior,” the barbarians are people that view the Earth much differently than 
those who live in “the center.” They are nomadic or semi-nomadic, they value freedom 
greatly, and, for this reason, Scott argues they flee government control243. In the East 
and West, humans worried about such people pillaging their towns, stealing their 
women, and eating their crops. A friend, Josiah Seale, described to me once how tribes 
in the North Rift region of Kenya raided each other to steal cattle; good raiding abilities 
equated to male sexual prowess among the tribe’s women244. Farming and the anxiety 
that it induced (a sedentary people may have lost the ability to hunt and gather) 
generated the need for increased security in the form of fences and centralized 
governments. As Jared Diamond contends, farming created an excess food supply which 
allowed people to specialize in the fields of religion, writing, and other trades245. Yuval 
Harari similarly sees farming as a huge sea change in human life, but one that may not 
have been worth the trouble. Harari argues that while farming built wealth for human 
societies, it degraded the life experiences of most human individuals who now had to 
toil for their food and consumed fewer calories on average than their hunter-gatherer 
brethren. This state of affairs lasted until modern times, when farm yields have grown 
substantially246. 
Andro Linklater traces things a bit differently. He sees the idea of private property as a 
revolutionary concept that changed the world247. Linklater argues that North America is 
truly the first private property territory as, for instance, Queen Elizabeth granted all the 
land discovered on St. John’s Island off of Newfoundland to the discoverers she 
chartered. Of course, natives had been fishing in these territories for centuries but they 
had not conceived that land could be owned outright by individuals248. 
Peruvian economist Hernando De Soto agrees that property itself is an idea.  He writes 
that, “[P]roperty, like energy is a concept; it cannot be experienced directly. …. [N]o one 
can see property. … The proof that property is pure concept comes when a house 
changes hands; nothing physically changes.  Looking at a house will not tell you who 
owns it”249. De Soto writes that, “Over decades in the nineteenth century [the century of 
nationalism in Europe], politicians, legislators, and judges pulled together scattered 
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facts and rules that had governed property throughout cities, villages, buildings, and 
farms and integrated them into one system.  This ‘pulling together’ of property 
representations [was] a revolutionary moment in the history of developed nations”250.   
De Soto asserts that property rights in the West were created “for the mundane purpose 
of protecting property ownership”251.  I contend that John Locke’s ideas about property 
rights led to the property title revolution in Europe in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries252.  Evidence for this proposition comes from Alexis de Tocqueville.  In The 
Old Regime and the French Revolution, Tocqueville writes that shortly before the outset 
of the Revolution an Intendant found that, “Everybody insists on having his share of the 
land, with the result that estates are broken up into innumerable fragments, and this 
process of fragmentation is going on all the time.”  Tocqueville further observed that, 
“Then, as in our own day, the peasant’s desire for owning land was nothing short of an 
obsession and already all the passions to which possession of the soil gives rise in 
present-day France were active”253.   
 
This desire of the peasants to own property came to them via the Lockean idea of 
universal property rights. To Locke, anyone can own land, it’s just a matter of acquiring 
it first and improving it254. De Soto asserts that, “By transforming people with property 
interests into accountable individuals, formal property created individuals from masses. 
People no longer needed to rely on neighborhood relationships or make local 
arrangements to protect their rights to assets”255. Further, “By making assets fungible, 
by attaching owners to assets, assets to addresses, and ownership to enforcement, and 
by making information on the history of assets and owners easily accessible, formal 
property systems converted the citizens of the West into a network of individually 
identifiable and accountable business agents”256. In the developing world, elites have 
coopted the desires of individuals for property rights, placing in front of them 
bureaucratic red tape.  In fact, at the time of De Soto’s writing in 2000, it took as many 
as fourteen years to achieve legal property status in Egypt and up to nineteen years to do 
so in Haiti257.   
 
Louis Hartz, in The Liberal Tradition in America, underlines America’s “national 
acceptance of the Lockian creed”258.  Locke conceives of property as a pre-political right 
and, therefore, sees the liberal rights that government enshrines as necessary in order 
for the government to remain viable. Under Locke’s theory, if the government does not 
preserve property, then people have no duty to follow the government259.   
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Under feudalism, the “landlord” controlled property and the peasants or serfs could live 
on it. When capitalism undid this system, the landlords became landowners and the 
peasants and serfs were thrown off the land260. The idea that a lord can own property 
came from the idea that God owns the land. The logic goes that God owns the Earth and 
the King or Queen is God’s representative on Earth, so the land is owned by the noble 
family and they can bequeath plots to others. By some measures the Queen of England 
owns one-sixth of the land on Earth and, in so-called Crown lands such as the UK, 
Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, she has the legal right to seize land without 
providing compensation261. 
To be sure, conquest underwrote the creation of the private property system in the so-
called New World and, in many ways, in the Old World where feudalism ruled. As Jared 
Diamond notes, centralized governments take much more for themselves than tribal 
governments do262. A private property system might be fair if it were based on fair initial 
acquisition and fair transfers, but that cannot be said for the systems that exist today. 
The inequality that private property created led to the anti-private property movement 
supported at various times by anarchists, Communists, natives, and environmentalists. 
Clearly there are some historical and theoretical hurdles to establishing a just system of 
land ownership and land rights. Conquest, “discovery,” different theories about who 
owns what and about who can own what all muddy the topic. We now turn to two main 
arguments, the argument of the native and of the migrant, to try to narrow things down. 
These arguments underpin many of the claims made today about the modern system of 
immigration and, as such, affect future migration and radicalization. 
Arguments for the Native  
Absent historical and cultural connections, there are two bases for the natives’ argument 
for owning land. The first is rather simple and easy to understand: we were here first. 
The people that settled a land first deserve to live on it. Why? Because they are the 
original claimants and there are no previous claims. The second argument, relatedly, is 
John Locke’s labor-mixing argument. Locke argues that since each person owns their 
body, they own the output produced by their body’s work. In cases where no one else 
has a previous claim, he posits that “mixing your labor” with an object yields ownership 
of that object or area of land. It is unclear if measurement or walling off land is sufficient 
to meet Locke’s concerns263. Perhaps building a home on the land is necessary—Locke 
does not make this clear. Robert Nozick pokes fun at Locke’s argument stating that one 
could pour a can of tomato juice into the ocean and thereby own the ocean according to 
the labor-mixing theory264.  
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Nozick makes an important note in this section: those seeking private property need to 
show how they came to own that property, while those seeking collective land rights 
need to show why they deserve these rights265. As Nozick writes,  
“We should note that it is not only persons favoring private property who need a 
theory of how property rights legitimately originate. Those believing in collective 
property, for example those believing that a group of persons living in an area 
jointly own the territory, or its mineral resources, also must provide a theory of 
how such property rights arise; they must show why the persons living there have 
rights to determine what is done with the land and resources there that persons 
living elsewhere don't have (with regard to the same land and resources)”266. 
Nozick contends that a just theory of land appropriation and of land transfer needs to be 
established and he believes that a free market system achieves this goal267.  
Competing claims to Antarctica—with as many as ten countries staking claims to the 
land—show how even uninhabited, virtually uninhabitable land can be contested by 
state-units that seek resources or future opportunities. A treaty that expires in 2041 
presently reserves Antarctica for scientific purposes, but the issue remains of how such a 
land might be acquired aside from “discovery,” flag-planting and “making claims”268. 
The issue shows that dividing up land is actually made more complicated by the lack of a 
human presence, the native claim that “we are here and we need the land” circumvents 
other distributive justice considerations. 
The native argument is beautiful in its simplicity and logically consistent. A people 
“discovered” a land and “conquered” it from non-human animals and nature. Or else, 
they came to share the land with the original, non-human animal discoverers of the 
land. As Jack Page writes, the first human Americans “were people who felt akin to 
other creatures in a way that few people alive today can imagine”269. They settled the 
land and created a home there. They mixed their labor with the soil and should enjoy 
the fruits of that labor. Shouldn’t these people have airtight rights to ownership of the 
land? 
There are a few countervailing factors here to explore. First, is who are “the We” that 
claim to be original owners. Surely, some tribes killed and conquered others throughout 
history and many original inhabitants have died off. Then, there is the issue of 
minorities within minorities270, which today is sometimes captured by those who study 
intersectionality. Specifically, within each group exist sub-groups which could also be 
disenfranchised by the main group. Moreover, groups may have merged or split or 
consolidated or comingled. Saying with certainty that my ancestors have a claim to this 
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land is exceedingly difficult to do in the modern age—and, of course, modern courts 
have used this argument against natives271. Perhaps people like you owned land like this, 
but it would be hard to link one’s lineage to a certain piece of territory without 
documentation or archaeological or genetic evidence. As land rights have moved from 
collective to individual claims, a contradiction has arisen: collective tribal groups 
making claims of private (individual) property ownership. 
The native claim can also be attacked historically. Were you truly the first natives here? 
Do you truly own this land? The questions of “we” and the questions of “when” 
comingle. From a naturalistic perspective, humans “took” land that is meant to be 
owned by all of nature. From a related animal rights perspective, humans took land that 
animals treaded on before—often this led to the extinction of animal species272. 
Finally, the native claim can be attacked by shifting the basis for land ownership. This 
can be done legally: by saying, for instance, that title is necessary to own land. Or it can 
be done politically, by conquering land. And usually it is done through both means: new 
rulers require a new way of viewing land, which usually means bad news for the original 
inhabitants. Of course, changing the rules does not make the conquest of land moral. 
All that said, in a vacuum, native claims are difficult to morally counter. If they were 
there first, they deserve the land. We would want the same respect. If extraterrestrials 
came to Earth, we would not think that they have a viable, moral claim over our planet 
regardless of their intelligence, intentions, needs, or strength. Earthlings are the natives, 
not them. We were here first. And, more than that, we need and deserve the land. 
The qualifier here is that humans do not live in a vacuum. They live in a world of 
competing claims. In some cases, multiple groups claim to be native for different 
reasons. In others, multiple groups have claims over land based on different arguments. 
For instance, today’s Anglo-Australians could be said to have stolen their land from 
aboriginals on the basis that perhaps their great-grandparents did the stealing. In that 
case, perhaps we can say they are at fault. Yet what about the Chinese-Australian family 
that purchased a home from a Sri Lankan-Australian family who purchased the same 
property from an Anglo-Australian? Is this just the transfer of stolen property or does 
the muddying of evidence against these successive owners dilute the natives’ land claim? 
A pro-native argument would say: transfers of land to successive people definitively do 
not dilute the natives’ claim. If I steal your purse and it gets sold to four different people 
over a series of years, is it not still your purse? Perhaps we can say that the fourth-string 
buyer is not a criminal (or as criminal) as the original thief, but ownership of the purse 
should not be in question. 
This opens a new topic. Is land different from a purse? All humans need land to live on. 
They do not need purses (though they may need money). People are also bound to 
certain territories by governments and borders. They also may be citizens of a certain 
land. Telling a citizen of Australia to clear out so that aboriginals may retake the land is 
not as simple as telling someone that they are in possession of a stolen purse. The native 
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argument also falters when we consider migrants, whose claims are explored in the 
following section. 
Arguments for the Migrant 
People decide to leave the land they were born on for a variety of reasons. These include 
war and conflict, resource depletion, environmental degradation, the spread of disease, 
medical reasons, financial opportunities abroad or lack of opportunities at home, family 
reconnection, political reasons, educational pursuits, and persecution in their home 
lands. In addition to these reasons, we may not want to live in a world where movement 
is overly circumscribed. The ideal world is certainly one where we can physically move 
to pursue opportunities or avoid threats. Being forced to stay on a certain territory limits 
opportunity and makes us vulnerable. As Daniel Dennett shows, movement is the 
central innovation of animals. Plants can gather energy while staying in one spot, but 
have virtually no defenses if someone were to approach them with bad intentions. 
Animals need to move around to accrue energy (food), but can avoid threats273. 
Saying that humans must live on certain pieces of land is an exceedingly strange 
proposition in the modern world. Air travel makes physical movement across the Earth 
fast and affordable. The Internet connects people—economically, financially, socially, 
romantically—across the globe. In many circles, cosmopolitanism, the belief that we are 
one human family, is on the rise274. And instances where people are forced to stay on 
certain territories, such as Palestinians in Gaza or people living in dictatorships like 
North Korea or Uzbekistan are condemned and seen as extremely undesirable. In some 
traditional societies, women are forced into domestic roles but such a proposition is 
seen as backward, inegalitarian and unjust in the modern world.  
To stretch the concept further, natives became indigenous to all places except for East 
Africa because they travelled. Across islands to get to New Guinea and Australia. Across 
the Bering Strait (or, truly the land bridge known as Beringia) to get to the Americas275. 
Natives, like all humans, want the right to move around too. They just have a special 
claim to land that migrants might not. 
But if natives were justified in their pursuit of better lives, then aren’t today’s migrants 
justified in their movements too? 
This question turns on the difference of entering “virgin,” uninhabited land versus 
entering inhabited land. The great conquerors of the Americas are still presented as 
“discoverers” of “new land” to schoolchildren in America. If they discovered a new land, 
then taking it as their own is justifiable. But, obviously, America was no more 
“discovered” by Columbus than Israel was discovered by the Zionists or South Africa by 
the Boers. Perhaps the land was new to them but the land had already been discovered 
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and populated by the indigenous peoples living on that land. Taking from those people 
moves a person from the category of migrant to one of a settler or colonist. 
A migrant is anyone who moves from one land to another, the term also carries the 
connotation that the traveler is willing to live under the established order of the people 
of their new land. A doctor who moves her family to a new country for work is an 
example of a migrant.  A settler is a migrant who seeks to transport not only herself, but 
also her way of life to a new land in the form of a settlement. Settlers do not intend on 
living under anyone else’s established order. The Dutch, today called Afrikaners, who 
moved to South Africa were settlers. Colonists seek not only to establish their way of life 
in a new land, but also seek to conquer, or colonize, the new land and its people. 
Colonizers may not be migrants at all, they may simply be people seeking to profit from 
the wealth of a certain land, settling the land may not be their concern.  
On this spectrum, colonizing land is the most difficult action to morally defend, settling 
land a little less difficult, and migrating is the easiest action to defend. Morally 
defending colonization would mean having to take on the belief that one people is, for 
some reason, more deserving of land (or the resources that land holds) than another. 
Even if such a proposition could be shown to be true, the primacy of the claims of the 
original inhabitants weigh strongly against viewing the colonists as rightful owners. One 
potential moral justification is that the land needs to be colonized because either the 
native people are living under a terrible government, the natives are not “developing” 
the land or because the colonizers were forced to leave their own land. These reasons 
may provide some motivation for colonization but don’t meet modern moral standards. 
Freeing people from a terrible leader is a worthy goal, one that Michael Walzer says can 
be the basis for a just war276, but colonizing them afterward is certainly morally 
indefensible. Human populations may have to move for a variety of reasons, but 
conquering their new hosts is not justifiable in such a situation. 
Creating settlements, like the British did in Jamestown, is a more moral proposition 
particularly when a settlement can be created in an area of land that is presently 
uninhabited. Having the permission of the current inhabitants makes settlement 
building a consensual and justifiable practice. There are Chinatowns the world over 
where Chinese people maintain their culture and live with their co-ethnics (and with 
other East Asian peoples), but none were forcibly established. With the permission of 
their hosts, these become ethnic enclaves and not settlements. Religious minorities, 
such as Mormon offshoot-groups, may set up settlements in the southwestern United 
States and these settlements are morally permissible to the extent that they are accepted 
by their local communities and governments. Of course, in Palestine, settlements have 
been forcibly erected. While contentions over certain pieces of land may present issues 
in some of these cases, these projects are immoral to the extent to which these 
settlements are established through force and conquest. 
Migration provides a strong counter to the native argument. The pro-migrant individual 
asks: who are you to tell me that I cannot traverse borders? Who are you to shoot or 
                                                             
276 Walzer, Michael. Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations, 4th ed. (New York: Basic 
Books 1974), chs. 4-7. 
63 
 
detain me if I move to this land? Why must I live a poor life because I had the dim luck 
of being born in an impoverished or war-torn land?277  
Rights derived from primacy do not necessitate rights to refuse others, such as refugees 
who must leave their land for reasons of survival. Joseph Carens argues from the 
perspective of John Rawls that migrants should be allowed to go virtually anywhere they 
want. He begins with Rawls’ mechanism of the veil of ignorance and the original 
position. The original position is our position before “the state of nature,” one of the 
simpler ways to think of it is our position before we were born. Behind the veil of 
ignorance, we are ignorant to who we are or will be. Rawls argues that fair rules for 
society can only be created if we eschew our biases. Thinking of ourselves in the original 
position, behind the veil of ignorance eliminates our bias. If we don’t know who we are, 
or who we will be in the future, wouldn’t we want to create a world that’s fair for 
everyone? Further, wouldn’t we want to “buy insurance” for ourselves by making the 
ideal world one where the worst-off have a decent life?278 Rawls creates an ideal society 
where liberty, fair opportunity, and a decent life for the worst off are foundational 
principles.  
Carens applies this idea to migration. In the original position, wouldn’t we find keeping 
out migrants immoral in all but the most extenuating national security situations? 
Carens’ argument implies that liberty, fair opportunity, and a decent life for the worst-
off would be best achieved in a world where people can freely (or mostly freely) traverse 
borders279.  
By contrast, Michael Walzer argues that states are like private clubs and that, as clubs, 
these communities can exercise their sovereignty and right to self-determination by 
concocting their own laws of inclusion and exclusion. To Walzer, sovereignty has little 
meaning without the right to exclude. Indeed, in Spheres of Justice, Walzer argues that, 
“the primary good that we distribute to one another is membership in some human 
community. … Men and women without membership anywhere are stateless 
persons”280. Walzer’s argument in essence asks: would you want outsiders to be able to 
overrun your neighborhood without your consent? He also notes the importance of 
being part of a community and of being able to form the character of that community281. 
The human desire to pursue a better life is universal, and even children understand the 
rights of the “me-first,” original owner. Conflict arises where the native and migrant 
arguments collide—and this is where radicalization takes hold on both sides. The 
colonization of Australia and America do not perfectly fit this bill, but perhaps the 
conflicts in Israel-Palestine or in Liberia do. These are cases where worthy people 
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(meaning needy people, displaced persons or refugees) with some claim to the land they 
migrated to, came into conflict with natives. In Liberia, freed African-American slaves 
became colonizers of an African land282; while in Palestine, Jewish refugees sought to 
create a safe haven through colonization and settlement of a land with which they have 
religious ties. In both cases, a simple rule that grants total control to the current 
inhabitants, or to those who are or claim to be indigenous, erases too much nuance and 
shunts the complexity of competing claims. 
Comparing Arguments about Rightful Land Ownership and Redistribution 
in Zimbabwe, Palestine and Israel 
In Zimbabwe, land reformists who sought to kick out white farmers make the claim that 
whites (or their ancestors) stole African land and so they may not own it in the 
present283. This is a classic native argument just like the one that aboriginals deserve 
land in Australia. The problem in Zimbabwe was that farms were taken from white 
farmers and then the land reverted back to the bush284. The push against white farmers 
in Zimbabwe also did the country no favors with international trade as it led to an 
erosion of property rights throughout the country285. Still, these facts alone do not 
change the moral claim of Black Zimbabweans to land and are, in fact, ironic given the 
history of white colonialism and the control of whites over much of the international 
market. Large corporations and other monied interests did not want to do business in a 
place that seemed to capriciously take land from long-time owners—even if there was 
justification for doing so.  
After the fall of long-time leader Robert Mugabe, Zimbabwe agreed in 2020 to repay 
white farmers for lands that were expropriated from them and given to Black 
families286. This restitution is meant to undo a domestically divisive, racially-motivated 
policy enacted by Mugabe. It’s also meant to bring the country into compliance with 
world standards. What’s interesting about the Zimbabwe case is that an attempt to 
rectify past wrongs led to international opprobrium and ostracism due to the need to 
entrench predictable property rights and rules of land transfer in the world capitalist 
economy. Investors could not confidently move money into Zimbabwean projects 
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without knowledge that their investments would be protected from being upended by 
the redress of historical grievances. 
By contrast, in Israel and Palestine competing claims to land mirror one another. Both 
sides make religious claims that God or His prophets gave this specific land to a specific 
group of people (and both groups claim to embody that specific people). These claims 
are supported by religious documents. Of course, to the non-religious, these claims 
could be dismissed. An ardent atheist might say that one can create a mythical god that 
then grants one’s group any set of lands and then, through circular reasoning, claim that 
land. Of course, such an argument ignores the reality of religious life for many people 
and the history that religion captures. Muslims, Jews, and Christians did not post facto 
invent their religious connection to the land of their prophets, rather their religions 
imbue certain lands with symbolic meanings due to historical connections. While non-
native Liberians may not have strong connections to the specific land of Liberia, people 
of the Abrahamic religions all have connections to cities like Jerusalem and Bethlehem. 
These historic, religious and symbolic connections are the same types of connections 
that natives in America or Australia might hold up as evidence of their right to land. 
Another argument is based on international law. In the modern age, United Nations 
recognition is the primary way by which a new state is formed. States that do not have 
UN recognition, like Kosovo and Somaliland, suffer from a lack of legitimacy that brings 
with it financial, security, scientific, and other drawbacks. Being recognized as a state by 
the UN means that the other UN member-states view that state as real and legitimate 
and are willing to do business with that state on an equal platform. Israel’s creation by 
UN recognition in the late 1940s, just like Pakistan’s, provides one argument for its 
ownership of land. That said, of course, the United Nations is a political not a moral 
body and its decisions on their own do not constitute normative justifications. The 
Palestinians emphasize the 1947 UN partition plan that would have partitioned the land 
into Arab and Jewish states. 
A related argument involves the British. Both sides claim that the British colonial 
administration gave them the land, through either the 1917 Balfour Declaration or the 
1939 White Paper. Again, the British colonial administration’s actions might explain 
motivations for Jewish migration but the British colonizers did not serve as moral 
arbiters nor did they have any rightful claim over the land. As such, the gift of the land 
from the British to Jews or Arabs does not prove who is the morally appropriate owner—
it only proves that one body transferred ownership to another. The same can be said of 
land that was transferred from the British to the Hashemites and Saud families that 
created Saudi Arabia and Jordan. These royal families have some connection to the 
land, but their ownership of their countries is not necessarily moral or legitimate.  
A fourth set of arguments that are proffered regard war and human rights. Specifically, 
the Jewish side in this conflict claim that they won wars against the Arab side and that 
the land they conquered is thus fairly theirs. Of course, whether the wars constituted 
crimes of aggression, as defined by Michael Walzer, is an important piece for 
determining whether this reasoning makes any sense287. Even if war can be justified as 
self-defense, conquest and capture may not be justified. Israel makes claims that these 
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conquests were necessary for security reasons or for future land-for-peace swaps but 
such claims emphasize a temporary, war-time need for land capture. An argument based 
on temporary need is a flimsy one when trying to divine who is the rightful possessor of 
land. Of course, temporary security needs many times become permanent ones288. 
Further, both sides claim that the other has committed human rights abuses through 
massacres or terrorism or crimes against humanity. Recent competing court cases are 
testament to this fact. In 2015, the Palestinian Authority was found guilty of terroristic 
crimes in an American court and fined $218 million289. Meanwhile, the PA has 
submitted evidence of war crimes committed by Israelis to the International Criminal 
Court in The Hague. In light of Palestinian-provided evidence, the ICC, in 2019, opened 
an investigation of Israeli war crimes, pointing to three specific incidences that occurred 
during the 2014 Gaza conflict290. The attempt to prosecute Israeli General Ariel Sharon 
for the Sabra and Shatilla massacre is also testament to the legal battle that this conflict 
has spawned291. Human rights claims tie themselves to land claims as they attempt to 
show that “the other side” is undeserving or unworthy of land since they are aggressive, 
intolerant and abusive. They also support a view that the opposing side commits wanton 
violence or criminal acts against peaceful natives or rightful landowners. Of course, each 
side sees itself as acting in self-defense. 
Still another argument turns on whether the Jews who came to Palestine were refugees, 
migrants, settlers or colonizers. My own grandparents came to Israel as refugees. But 
many Jewish settlers came before them. The Zionist project of the European Jews was 
conceived of as a settlement but, like the European settlement of North America, it took 
on colonial tones. As Ari Shavit notes, the Jewish settlers willfully ignored the Arab 
villages around which they were about to settle292. Palestinian sources strongly view 
Jewish settlement as colonization, particularly because it came from Europe and came 
with a state-building plan293.  
Jewish sources prefer the terms settlement or migration. Both sides can agree that the 
Jews did not migrate with the goal of being controlled by the British or by the local 
Arabs, there was at least a settlement goal in mind294. The Jewish side extrapolates upon 
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this argument by dovetailing it with the need for the Jews to find a homeland due to 
global anti-Semitism in general and the Holocaust in particular295.  
In this case, unless one counts the Jews as natives due to their living in Ancient Israel 
during antiquity, the Palestinians do have a native claim. But just like other native 
claims, this moral certitude leads to legal limbo due to the current international legal 
system and the fact that millions of Jews live in Israel-Palestine. In a “white farmer” 
scenario, future Palestinians could redistribute land away from Jews, but such an action 
would trade native rights for migrant rights and seek to erase modern history. Israel 
exists not as an idea, but as a living state and the same goes for Palestine. Unfortunately, 
the impasse in resolving Palestinian concerns and the two sides’ competing claims to 
land leads both sides to radicalize and view one another as enemies pitted in a zero-sum 
contest. In 2020, Gaza was still controlled by Hamas, Palestinians still fruitlessly sought 
legal recognition and Israel’s Binyamin Netanyahu continued his prime ministership 
without any inclination of seeking to resolve disputes with Palestinians. 
Finally, there is an argument that those that improve the land should own it. This 
follows from an extension of John Locke’s labor-mixing argument. Locke holds that 
adding value to land is necessary in order to own it296. Locke held that “the natural right 
to land was established by use and occupancy”297. Puritans in America accepted this 
logic in stating that “landed property depended on their own efforts in improving the 
ground, not on English law”298. Zionists who saw themselves as people who “made the 
desert bloom” followed the same logic. Law was one thing, but those who improved the 
land should own it. This argument buttresses the claim that governments can take 
private property under eminent domain in order to improve or develop the land. It also 
has some validity in the sense that doing something with land (living on it, growing 
crops on it, building villages on it) has more human value than planting a flag in it.  
The improvement argument rings true in some contexts, for instance, natives in North 
America improved the land by “clearing plots of land, diverting streams, creating 
irrigation channels, building huge mounds, [and] burning large areas to encourage new 
vegetative growth”299. The problem with this argument comes when it diminishes native 
claims by, for instance, claiming that natives do not deserve their land because “they did 
nothing with it.” Such an argument supposes that Anglo-Australians built Sydney and 
Melbourne so they “deserve” the land or the Anglo-Americans built up the island of 
Manhattan so they “deserve” it. Deciphering how one can tell that land has been 
improved is a concomitant problem300. Is destroying nature to create a huge city an 
improvement or not? It may be for some human communities, but not for others. 
The related issues of use and occupancy are tough ones. Jewish settlers bought large 
tracts of land in British Palestine through the Jewish National Fund, Palestinians claim 
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that these purchases we made from absentee landowners who in many cases neither 
used nor occupied the land301. Insofar as land was bought, and only parts were, the 
Jewish side has a valid claim of a just transfer of land. Still, the related issue of land title 
is a hotly contested one. Palestinians frequently argue that fraudulent or incorrect land 
titles were used in Jewish land purchases. And in native-versus-settler disputes the 
world over, land title (in other words, paper) is used to legalize and leverage the 
settler/colonizer/migrant’s claims and discount native oral histories.  
To conclude, there are many justifications in addition to migrant-need and native-desert 
that are made in land rights claims. Religious connections may be thrown out by the 
non-religious, but when they coincide with historical connections to the land they 
should be taken seriously. The transfer of land by international bodies may be seen as 
valid insofar as such bodies are objective and legitimate. Transfers made by colonizers is 
less valid. War conquests cannot be justified—though they account for a lot of territorial 
ownership today. And while human rights abuses sully the parties involved in land 
disputes, the ones that matter most in land disputes are those that involve land theft. 
Whether migrants can be categorized as refugees, settlers or colonizers is critical in 
determining moral right. Palestinians seek to define Israeli Jews as colonizers, Israeli 
Jews prefer settlers and, of course, many really were refugees. Finally, improving the 
land and using it (by living there) certainly help one’s claim to land. 
Conclusion: Supporting Natives and Migrants 
A new land ethic is needed to deal with contested land situations and, relatedly, to 
inform a new global migration scheme302. Without a new land ethic and without a new 
process for welcoming migrants equitably, radicalization of those who see themselves as 
natives and those who are viewed as non-natives will continue unabated.  
Viewing land rights differently does not mean open borders, an end to private property 
and an end to the nation. As Sarah Song states we have “mutually constraining” 
obligations to both societies’ existing members and to humankind as a whole. 
Supporting members and migrants may sound contradictory, but it is the tightrope that 
democratic countries, committed to “equality and antidiscrimination” as well as “norms 
of fair play and social membership,” walk303. A commitment to human rights coupled 
with one to democratic membership obligates people to respect the rights of migrants 
and the boundaries of existing native or host groups. 
We live in a world where people view land in vastly different ways. India, to Hindu 
nationalists, is seen as a Hindu goddess just like Israel is viewed as sacred and inviolable 
land by religious Jews. Such views of land make any changes or accommodations nearly 
impossible. 
The right to migrate comes down to a human’s right to self-preservation. Having the 
misfortune of being born in an unsafe place or as a persecuted minority somewhere is 
not the fault of the threatened individual, family or community. Angela Merkel’s 
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gracious policy of helping the various migrants and refugees that seek sanctuary in 
Germany speaks to this ethic. As a haven for the world’s Jews, the creation of Israel 
followed the exact, same logic. 
Cultivating refuges becomes problematic when those refuges harm current residents. 
Hosts, like natives, forward important arguments about membership. Host countries 
also hold the leverage in the migration debate: they can direct resources into accepting 
or rejecting migrants. 
Pandemic, economic recession, war, poor governance, and deteriorating environmental 
factors will continue in some combination into the foreseeable future. Consequently, 
patchwork answers to migration are not sufficient; they won’t help hosts or migrants or 
alleviate native-migrant disputes.  
The state system that partitions the Earth between a set of different governments turns 
land claims into a zero-sum game of “Us” versus “Them.” Claims to land and desires for 
societal cohesion are not all borne of racist intentions. Instead, migrants and natives 
employ the biased fairness that humans of all stripes suffer from. That is, we are biased 
toward our in-groups and ignore or oppose claims made by out-groups304. Arguments 
about who should live where end up boiling down to what side the arguers were born on. 
Claims that migrants or natives always should have their rights promoted over anyone 
amount to oversimplifications. People have real, historical connections to land. 
Refugees have real needs and rights; often their survival depends on outside assistance. 
The moral justification for people living on conquered lands is flimsy at best—but going 
back to times before these conquests is impossible.  
The UN partition of Palestine into Jewish and non-Jewish-Arab territories in 1947 sadly 
sparked a regional conflict that continues to this day. Assigning blame is secondary to 
what can be done to solve the problem. The issue is complicated by land purchasing, 
historical connections on both sides, and the attempts to solve the problem through 
international law (via UN resolutions and international courts and investigations).  
The UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples calls for native peoples to be 
respected and for their cultures to be protected305. Conquered lands should be returned 
where doing so is possible (for instance, no cities are built on the land) and reparations 
should be given where doing so is impossible. A 2020 US Supreme Court decision did 
not “return” half of Oklahoma to natives, but rather affirmed that most of eastern 
Oklahoma was, by dint of treaty, Creek Indian land306.  Decisions of this kind provide a 
roadmap for a more fair and equitable land distribution in post-colonized states. 
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Reparations should be paid to indigenous groups and formal apologies made; Canada’s 
incipient attempts to rectify past abuses of the First Nations serves as one example307. 
American Indian tribes have had varying success rates with litigation to gain 
recompense for stolen lands. The Penobscot and the Passamaquoddy of Maine, for 
example, “won 300,000 acres of land, $27.5 million and recognition as ‘Indian tribes’” 
in 1980308. Still, the United States is one of many states where the theft of land from 
natives has not been justly resolved. 
A new land ethic requires us to view all of humanity as the stewards of our planet and to 
balance historical justifications to land use and ownership with present realities. Doing 
so will certainly be difficult but the current system of recriminations and claims in cases 
of territorial disputes such as Israel-Palestine has not led to resolution. The covid-19 
crisis could provide renewed focus on land disputes as the pandemic has both 
reemphasized the importance of ownership of land and the human yearning for 
movement. 
International recognition of new territories needs to be bolstered by the creation of 
more objective international bodies that, for instance, do not have a stake in the political 
outcomes of certain territories. Where land disputes occur, objective bodies (insofar as 
objectivity is possible) should attempt to rectify them. The peace processes in Northern 
Ireland and South Africa are testament to the ability of human beings to settle long-held 
disputes over land in a way that most see as equitable. The United Nations, with its 
current Security Council veto powers, may not be the appropriate venue for such 
resolution. The International Criminal Court, though still finding its footing, or an 
independent body like it, could be more objective but would have problems with 
enforcing any broad, political decisions309. 
Andro Linklater states that, “the way you own the earth requires the agreement of your 
neighbors, the society you live in, and the government of your country. In a very 
fundamental way, it is the glue that holds community together”310. Land rights are 
important to nationalists, homeowners, tribe members, and refugees alike. The need to 
have rights to land, if not ownership, is necessary for human existence. As Article 17 of 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states, “(1) Everyone has right to own 
property alone or in association with others; (2) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of 
their right to property”311. 
Viewing the world as a collection of boxed-off states reinforces a quasi-feudalistic 
system wherein land is owned by some and not others. Under capitalism, those who own 
land have benefitted greatly—“real estate” wealth stems from land viewed as both 
property and investment—but the spoils from real estate wealth have been showered on 
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the few. Inequality has grown to untenable levels particularly due to the covid-19 
pandemic and its attendant economic hardships312. 
The state system along with the human population boom have tilted land rights away 
from the migrant and strongly in favor of the person presently sitting on the land. 
Migrants should be allowed to cross borders where doing so does not displace natives. 
Natives should be able to make rules that exclude migrants only on the basis of resource 
scarcity and security (including public health “security” reasons), preserving cultural 
integrity is also important but cannot be a limitless right. In sum, natives have a primary 
right to land but they also have a duty to respect the rights of migrants.  
The state system was built on the concept that different peoples should live in different 
boxes. As the contents of those boxes shifts, the logic behind the system needs to be 
reevaluated. Land rights, private property and sovereignty maintain the present 
system—a system that is codified by laws written by those who benefit from it.  
We need to create a more inclusive order. This system should begin with the states that 
already function well then needs to move on to the people in the states that function less 
well. More objective international bodies, ones that like NGOs are not based on state 
membership, need to be created through reform or from whole cloth to help alleviate 
land rights issues. Natives and migrants will have to learn to coexist in a world where 
movement from one’s home will prove necessary or desirable to ever-increasing millions 
of people. As humans continue to pour out of their boxes, it is time that we created a 
system where the box you were born into is not a death sentence and where people are 
valued over lines on a map. 
This is especially so in 2020, when borders have closed in order to stop the spread of 
covid-19. Clearly, borders have some use. They can act as barriers to the spread of illness 
or crime. The system of bordered nation-states, unfortunately, is much more mature 
than the present system of migration—which is organized in some ways (“legal 
migration”) and chaotic in others (“illegal immigration”). In our world, migration is 
viewed by too many as a privilege and not any sort of right. Radicalization takes hold in 
states where migration numbers spike because migrants know they deserve human 
rights and nationalists know they deserve rights to self-determination. A better 
organized system of world migration will help alleviate the issue of radicalization of 
those who move and those who stay.  
These big-picture, systemic issues will be explored further in the next two chapters. Ch. 
4 presents a series of potential future outcomes for the medium-term relations between 
international migrants and their nation-state hosts and Ch. 5 develops some potential 
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Idealism, Integration or Illiberalism?: Global Futures for Immigration after 
Covid-19 
Abstract 
This chapter explores possibilities for the future of migration given current trends. 
Predicting human future behavior is difficult, but probable outcomes can be outlined. In 
that spirit, this chapter examines a future of open borders, a future of lockdown, a future 
of illiberal democracy, a future of integration and a future of conflict. Each future will 
derive from existing trends. The future sketches establish premises for evaluating 
policies in the final chapter. 
Key Words: Future of Migration, Illiberal Democracy, Integration, Lockdown, Open 
Borders, Refugees.  
 
If we are to believe current prognostications, the world has a serious migrant-
integration problem that is only going to get worse. In The Strange Death of Europe, 
Douglas Murray laments the loss of a white, Christian Europe. Murray writes that two 
forces will bring about the end of a Europe composed of distinctive French, Swedish, 
British, Spanish, Greek and Italian people. “The first is the mass movement of peoples 
into Europe. In all Western European countries this process started after World War II 
due to labor shortages. Soon Europe got hooked on the migration … The result was that 
what had been Europe—the home of the European peoples—gradually became a home 
for the entire world”313. The second factor bringing about the “end of Europe” is that the 
continent “lost faith in its beliefs, traditions and legitimacy”314.  
Tim Marshall, discussing migration in South Asia, arrives at a similarly alarming and 
commonly held conclusion. Marshall reports that, “Many parts of the world are already 
seeing ‘climate refugees,’ and tens of millions more are destined to be, heading mostly 
for urban areas, as even small changes to climate can have catastrophic results for local 
populations.” Marshall highlights desertification in Africa and flooding in South Asia. 
He then adds that, “When you apply this predicted future to a country such as 
Bangladesh, where modern health care is scarce and education levels are low, if a fifth of 
the land is flooded, and some of the rest is no longer fit for agriculture, then obviously 
huge numbers of people will move”315. 
In “The Hispanic Challenge” and his book Who Are We?, Samuel Huntington contends 
that the American creed is “under assault” due to the rise in Hispanic immigration. The 
problem, Huntington posits, is that Hispanics differ culturally and linguistically from 
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Anglo-Protestants. Additionally, they are supported by new ideas about 
transnationalism, identity politics, multiculturalism and diversity that cut against the 
typical American Dream story of success and assimilation. Huntington writes that, “the 
single most immediate and most serious challenge to America’s traditional identity 
comes from the immense and continuing immigration from Latin America, and 
especially from Mexico, and the fertility rates of these immigrants compared to black 
and white American natives”316. Huntington dismisses those who celebrate the 
“Americano dream,” contending that “there is no Americano dream. There is an 
American dream created by an Anglo-Protestant society. Mexican-Americans will share 
in that dream and in that society only if they dream in English”317. 
When radicalization and terrorism are added to the equation the case for a dystopian 
future brought about by uncontainable migration is all-but guaranteed. Sasha Polakow-
Suransky in Go Back to Where You Came From catalogs some of the shocking attacks 
that occurred in Europe in 2015 and 2016: the Charlie Hebdo killings, the shootings in 
Paris, the bombing of the airport and subways in Brussels. Polakow-Suransky writes 
that, “Across Europe, terrorist attacks have been exploited by the far right as 
opportunities to stoke anti-Muslim sentiment; too often, journalists and intellectuals 
have played along”318. But the process is a bit more nuanced than simply one of 
overreaction. Polakow-Suransky avers that, “rapid immigration is bound to provoke a 
xenophobic reaction, especially when newcomers compete with locals for jobs, housing, 
and welfare benefits. Likewise, terrorist attacks tend to pit security concerns against 
basic liberties and test the resilience of democratic institutions. When the two occur at 
the same time—and the terrorists belong to the same ethnic and religious group as the 
new immigrants—the combination of fear and xenophobia can be a dangerous and 
destructive force”319. 
The pandemic adds yet another layer to fears about the future of immigration. Will 
migrants spread disease? Will virus shutdowns melt into stricter border policies in the 
medium-term? Will shutting the valve of migration lead hosts to value migrants more or 
see that they can do well without globalization? 
Migration is an issue intertwined intimately with the future. Countries extrapolate from 
current migration patterns about how they will look in the future and how many more 
people they can take in. Migration comes in trends. It tells us about the present state of 
our world. But there is always a reason for people to move: economics, war, climate 
change, disease.  
Immigrants seek a better future while hosts wonder what the future holds for them. Will 
their culture be maintained? Will good-paying jobs still be available when migrants 
undercut the labor market? Will migrants bring crime or disease or instability? 
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Rapid migration exacerbates these issues as hosts have little time to acquaint 
themselves with migrant cultures and feel disconcerted by the numbers of people 
quickly entering their countries. Muslims make up around 5 percent of the population in 
European countries, with the exception of France where the number is closer to 8 
percent. Marshall writes that while these numbers are small, Muslims “are far more 
vocal about religious issues than any other community and are therefore more 
noticeable through media coverage.” More important is the fact that Muslims are 
concentrated in urban areas: “Approximately 20 percent of Stockholm is Muslim, 13 
percent of Amsterdam, 15 percent of Brussels, and 12 percent of Cologne”320. Migrants 
prefer to move to urban centers where there are more job opportunities and where they 
can live in neighborhoods with their co-ethnics. This makes their presence more visible, 
and makes them seem more plentiful, than they may actually be.  
Thomas Malthus predicted that natural human growth would lead to great misery due to 
overpopulation and the Earth’s inability to sustain so many people. When Malthus 
wrote his Essay on the Principle of Population, the Earth held one billion people. Today, 
there are close to eight billion. “Yet we don’t starve,” Gregg Easterbrook observes. 
“There is sufficient food that obesity is a public health problem not just in rich nations 
but in parts of the developing world. Today there are twice as many people who are 
overweight as the total number who were alive when Malthus said there were far too 
many mouths to feed.” Instead of having too little food for so many people, food 
supplies actually exceed demand321. During the covid pandemic in America, in April 
2020, farmers dumped millions of gallons of milk and destroyed hundreds of thousands 
of eggs as they simply had no one to sell all those perishable foods to due to school, 
restaurant and business closures322. 
Projections about human society are notoriously difficult to make even for the near-
term. No one in 2018 could have predicted that a global pandemic would shutter the 
world two years later. Like Malthus, humans are apt to make linear predictions: perhaps 
the weather will get hotter by a degree each year or our children will grow by two inches 
each year or our bank accounts will grow by $10,000 each year. But we know from 
experience that the future moves in fits and starts. The world may get much hotter one 
year and colder the next, children grow linearly and in spurts and bank accounts move 
up and down with the economy and the inconsistency of unexpected expenses. 
As Yuval Harari explains in Sapiens, “History cannot be explained deterministically and 
it cannot be predicted because it is chaotic. So many forces are at work and their 
interactions are so complex that extremely small variations in the strength of the forces 
and the way they interact produce huge differences in outcomes.” Human society is a 
level two chaotic system. The weather, a level one chaotic system, does not react to 
predictions we make about it: the clouds don’t decide not to rain just to confound 
weather reporters. Level two chaotic systems react to predictions we make about them: 
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heaping praise on a young student’s brilliance could yield complacency and future 
failure or empowerment and future success—either way the prediction affects the 
behavior. As Harari remarks, “A predictable revolution never erupts”323. Leaders either 
subvert revolutions or get caught off guard by them. Either way, human behavior gets in 
the way of making accurate predictions. Harari concludes that, “history is not a means 
for making accurate predictions. We study history not to know the future but to widen 
our horizons, to understand that our present situation is neither natural nor inevitable, 
and that we consequently have many more possibilities before us than we imagine”324. 
While making prediction is more art than science, it is still useful to model our future. 
Covid-19 prediction tools, such as those created by the University of Washington’s 
Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluations, help us see where the pandemic is going, 
evaluate how our present behavior could affect the future and develop mitigation 
plans325. As Inga Holmdahl and Caroline Buckee emphasize in The New England 
Journal of Medicine, “Unlike other scientific efforts, in which researchers continuously 
refine methods and collectively attempt to approach a truth about the world, 
epidemiologic models are often designed to help us systematically examine the 
implications of various assumptions about a highly nonlinear process that is hard to 
predict using only intuition. Models are constrained by what we know and what we 
assume, but used appropriately and with an understanding of these limitations, they can 
and should help guide us through this pandemic”326. 
Families budget for the future in order to plan when to spend and when to save. 
Assuming present income-levels, present expense-levels and mild inflation, a family can 
produce a budget adding in anticipated costs like house fixes, bar-mitzvah costs and car 
payments. While the predicted budget will not mirror the future exactly, models help us 
see what different futures might hold and plan accordingly. In the least, one could see 
that, without a lot more saving, you won’t be able to afford that Tesla for a long time or, 
at current savings rates, you’re on track to be able to pay for college for your children. 
Returning to migration and radicalization, policies affect future outcomes. When Angela 
Merkel opened Germany’s doors to migrants in 2015, over one million people moved to 
the central European country327. Policies also change in reaction to events. A dramatic 
reduction in migration to Britain, for instance, let’s say due to Brexit, could lead British 
voters to elect a more immigrant-friendly government that would change migration 
policies. 
This chapter presents a suite of possibilities for the futures of migration and 
radicalization. As stated at the outset, many see migration and climate change leading to 
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ecological and governmental collapse328. Others worry about the future of democracy 
either because of migrants329 or because of the reaction of hosts to those migrants330. 
Obviously, the future will be different in different places. The following sections attempt 
to predict the future of migration based upon current trends. 
Predicting Radicalization 
The likelihood of radicalization of hosts and migrants is predicated on a few factors 
including the speed and size of immigration flows, the level of acceptance of the host-
public toward newcomers, national immigration policies and the differences between 
the host and migrant communities.  
Table 4.1 depicts some potential outcomes for radicalization given the interaction of two 
important variables: immigration policies and the speed of migration. If migrants are 
not accepted due to strict anti-immigration policies and sentiments, as in South Africa 
and Australia, radicalization is highly likely on both the parts of migrants and hosts in 
the face of rapid immigration. Rapid immigration still causes issues when migrants are 
welcomed as newcomers and natives struggle to acclimate to one another and forge a 
renewed democratic society together. Gradual immigration with anti-immigrant policies 
produces less radicalization though, as seen in the American case, anti-immigrant 
sentiment can still boil under the surface as America saw with the explosive xenophobia 
of the 2016 Donald Trump Presidential campaign. Gradual migration with welcoming 
policies, seen in Sweden between about 1980 and 2012, produces the least 
radicalization. After 2013, immigration to Sweden spiked with over 100,000 immigrants 
in 2014 alone (compared to less than 60,000 combined in the 12 years before) and 
Sweden has since had trouble with integration331. Terrorism, though still uncommon in 
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Table 4.1, Will Migrants Radicalize?: Predicting Radicalization by 




Rapid Immigration Merkel Model. Host 
countries seek to accept 
migrants but struggle with 
speed of migration. 
Radicalization is likely on 
both sides as migrants and 
hosts struggle to realize 
ideals of an open society.  
French, South African 
and Australian Models. 
Hosts and migrants both 
struggle with migration. 
Migrants may be targeted 
for violence. Radicalization 
on both sides is highly 
likely. 
Gradual Immigration Swedish Model pre-
Arab Spring (1980-
2012). Migrants integrate 
into host societies with 
little radicalization333. 
United States’ post-
9/11 version of 
“Prevention through 
Deterrence.”334 Host 
countries have more time 
to acclimate and react to 
migration. Radicalization 
is more likely on side of 
hosts due to anti-
immigrant policies. 
 
The Merkel Model and Open Borders 
Given the probability of publics clashing under anti-immigration policies, Angela 
Merkel’s model of open borders and acceptance holds appeal. German Chancellor 
Angela Merkel promised in 2015 “to welcome any Syrian, regardless of whether they’ve 
already been fingerprinted in Greece, Hungary, or any other EU country”335. To be clear, 
in the face of humanitarian crisis, Germany did not open its borders completely under 
Merkel, but the country did open their borders to Syrian asylum seekers. Merkel 
defended the plan by saying that Europe “must move and its states must share the 
responsibility for refugees seeking asylum. … If Europe fails on the question of refugees, 
its close connection with universal civil rights will be destroyed”336. A future where the 
Merkel Model, or a wider-conceived open borders scheme, is more widely adopted 
would be one of freer movement, tolerance, and presumably reduced nationalism.  
As Chancellor Merkel stated, such a model would be predicated on a human rights 
approach. Open borders would be justified in light of democratic and humanitarian 
values and the values of cosmopolitanism, which states that all humans are endowed 
                                                             
333 “Sweden and Migration,” https://sweden.se/migration/#1980, accessed 4 December 2020. 
334 De Leon, Jason. Land of Open Graves: Living and Dying on the Migrant Trail (Berkeley, CA: University of 
California Press 2015). 
335 Kingsley, Patrick, The New Odyssey: The Story of the Twenty-First-Century Refugee Crisis (New York: Liveright 
2017), pg. 263. 
336 Murray, The Strange Death of Europe, pgs. 80-81. 
79 
 
with equal rights and all are deserving of respect regardless of where they were born. 
The rights of migrants would be secure and the world would no longer be stuck in a 
system of closed-off boxes and nationalist squabbles over who owns what would 
diminish337.  
But Merkel’s Model has its downsides. For one, countries that act alone in adopting this 
model, especially during a migration crisis, stand to become magnets for migration. 
Asylum seekers will look to travel to these destinations. As Patrick Kingsley reported in 
2017, “When I’d previously asked Syrians where they wanted to end up, I drew a range 
of answers: Holland, perhaps, or Sweden, Austria or the UK. Now almost everyone says 
they just want to reach Germany”338. Indeed, “During 2015 around 400,000 migrants 
moved through Hungary’s territory alone. Fewer than twenty of them stopped to claim 
asylum in Hungary”339.  
Further, public opinion has turned against Muslim migrants to Europe. A 2017 Chatham 
poll of Europeans found that in eight of ten countries surveyed a majority of 
respondents agreed with a statement that “All further migration from mainly Muslim 
countries should be stopped”340. The proportion of Germans who don’t believe that 
Islam belongs in their country went from 47% in 2010 to 60% in 2015 and 65% in 
2016341. The rise of Pegida (People against the Islamization of the West) and the 
victories of the AfD (Alternatives fur Deutschland) political party highlight the very real 
consequences of a welcoming strategy in the face of rapid migration342. 
Merkel’s ostensible immigration goals are to create a stronger nation through the 
injection of hundreds of thousands of migrants and to increase the number of young 
people in Germany. Merkel’s plan could subvert the demographic threat brought about 
by low population growth and “graying” populations in many developed countries. 
Though cynics contend that she is just looking to bolster her party’s electoral outlook—
an accusation also levied at Turkey’s Recep Erdogan. 
For Merkel’s strategy to work a lot needs to go right. The economy needs to provide jobs 
for most of the newcomers, xenophobic sentiments need to be kept at bay, some 
integration needs to occur, and immigrants and refugees need to be carefully placed 
around the country so as not to overwhelm labor markets or public services in specific 
localities. If these factors are not carefully considered, small but significant numbers of 
migrants could turn to terrorism as they may feel alienated, underemployed and 
unwanted—an outcome seen in Belgium and France. Merkel herself stated that while 
she believed her migration policy was “absolutely right,” she regrets not having done 
more to prepare her country for the influx of migrants that came in 2015343. 
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Open borders are celebrated by authors such as Joseph Carens who rightfully 
emphasizes the morality of welcoming refugees and migrants344. But we are far from a 
cosmopolitan world where people see themselves as world citizens. As Polakow-
Suransky records, “All modern states distinguish between members and 
nonmembers”345. Globalization has created a lot of concern among the so-called “left 
behinds” who feel rooted in a place and don’t relate with elite talk of being unfettered by 
state and nationality346. Fast change can worry anyone. It particularly worries people 
who don’t feel plugged-in to elite circles347. 
Open borders, as seen in the German case, will create demographic shifts that come with 
cultural shocks to host countries and migrants alike. Workers need to know they are 
supported, not that they are interchangeable with people willing to work for less in a 
country halfway across the world. Nationalism and illiberalism are rising due to the very 
real concerns of citizens in rich countries about the effects of change348.  
To open borders and global justice theorists, the most sanguine world would be one 
where increased globalization creates more tolerant publics. Migrants are welcomed and 
hosts are respected. Citizenship’s power erodes and is replaced with people holding 
multiple citizenships or some kind of global citizenship. As Jacqueline Stevens observes, 
“the nation’s borders are regulated through the use of force in order to circumvent free 
movement”349. Stevens argues that birthright citizenship imposes heavy costs on people: 
“Birthright-citizenship rules help in subordinating people living outside their countries 
of origin.” She remarks that while nation-states no longer enslave their opponents in 
war, human trafficking and the treatment of undocumented workers “facilitates an 
illegal slavery through birthright citizenship”350. 
As Nathan Smith argues, opening borders would reduce worldwide poverty, increase 
liberty, speed economic growth and forge a more efficient labor market351. Tim Marshall 
worries that open borders would lead to mass movements of people from poor countries 
and regions into rich ones. Such large movements of people may lead to retrenched 
nationalism and host radicalization352. 
A world of more open borders could be a much fairer world. But the transition to getting 
there will be messy. The migration from Syria and elsewhere into Europe after the Arab 
Spring led to dejected migrants adopting extremism and the radicalized nationalism of 
hosts. Open borders make moral sense. It isn’t fair that individuals benefit enormously 
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from the inheritance of the citizenship they are conferred by the accident of birth353. But 
there are real consequences to rapid migration and, as long as states retain their 
sovereignty, they can switch to more anti-immigrant policies in the face of problems 
with immigrant integration. The Merkel Model has its positives, but it comes at a great 
cost to democracy as the next section illustrates. 
Illiberal Democracy 
In Developing Democracy, Larry Diamond defined illiberal democracy as a form of 
electoral democracy where civil liberties are not widely respected and human rights 
abuses persist.  According to Diamond, this limits the stability and legitimacy of the 
ruling regime for three reasons: first, it fails to fulfill people’s expectations of economic 
and physical security; second, the military remains an unaccountable, reserve domain of 
power; and finally, human rights victims tend to come from racial or ethnic minorities 
most likely to rebel. Diamond, writing in 1999, noted that few of the world’s 
democracies fulfilled both their liberal and democratic aspirations. Yet, he concluded by 
positing that an anti-democratic reverse wave was unlikely because military 
establishments, discouraged by past failures, had become reluctant to take power; 
publics showed little appetite for a return to authoritarianism; and no anti-democratic 
ideology had arisen to challenge democracy’s ideological hegemony354. 
Twenty years later, Diamond’s predictions appear quaint in light of the recent, 
worldwide erosion of democracy. Democratic backsliding, to use Aziz Huq and Tom 
Ginsburg’s term, has most clearly occurred in Poland, Hungary and Brazil where leaders 
have centralized executive power, reduced the powers of the press and diminished 
judicial checks on power355. This trend can also be seen in Israel, India and Kenya, as 
well as in the United States where President Trump berated the press and courts alike. 
“Freedom in the World,” Freedom House’s annual report on the health of the world’s 
liberal democracies, found that worldwide democratic values declined for a fourteenth 
consecutive year in 2019. Troublingly, the organization found that electoral processes 
were the component of democracy that eroded the most in the past four years as 
governments have limited access to voting and diluted the power of the vote356. 
Freedom House’s 2019 Freedom in the World report entitled “Democracy in Retreat” 
catalogues a litany of bad news for proponents of liberal democracy. The report states 
that Poland’s conservative Law and Justice party (PiS) has “laid waste to the country’s 
legal framework in its drive to assert political control over the entire judiciary”357. In 
Hungary, Viktor Orban and his Fidesz party have “presided over one of the most 
dramatic [democratic] declines ever charted by Freedom House within the European 
                                                             
353 Shachar, Ayelet. The Birthright Lottery: Citizenship and Global Inequality. (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University 
Press 2009). 
354 Diamond, Larry, Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press 
1999). 
355 Huq, Aziz and Tom Ginsburg, "How to Lose a Constitutional Democracy," UCLA Law Review 65: 78 (2018), 
https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=13666&context=journal_articles. 
356 Freedom House, “A Leaderless Struggle for Democracy: Freedom in the World 2020,” 
https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2020/leaderless-struggle-democracy. 
357 Freedom House, “Democracy in Retreat: Freedom in the World 2019,” 
https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2019/democracy-in-retreat, pg. 19. 
82 
 
Union”358. In Turkey opposition leaders have been imprisoned and “freedoms of 
association, assembly and expression” have been curtailed359. In Tunisia, democratic 
consolidation “continued to sputter” while in Israel the residency of Palestinians in 
Jerusalem was revoked and the status of Arabic as a national language was 
downgraded360. In Bangladesh, security forces “intimidated and arrested” opposition 
supporters prior to parliamentary elections361. While in the Americas, Venezuela’s 
Nicolas Maduro continued his authoritarian rule after a presidential election that 
banned opposition parties and Jair Bolsonaro was elected to the Brazilian presidency 
despite rhetoric that was “steeped in disdain for democratic principles”362.  
Mass world migration has become a common scapegoat for the current “reverse wave” 
of liberal democracy. Migration could link to democratic backsliding in three ways. 
First, the Cultural Defense Narrative holds that large flows of migrants threaten host 
populations leading the hosts to worry about the future of the society they made 
together. Too many outsiders leads to a concern, in other words, about cultural 
preservation363. This concern, then, translates into a desire to limit migration. The anti-
immigrant push, then, gets transmogrified into an anti-liberal turn because liberal 
universalism opposes nationalism364. Liberal universalistic values are founded upon the 
importance and equality of all human beings and do not privilege one group over the 
other. Host groups, then, turn to nativism and nationalism as a way to counter the 
dilution of their culture and their worries about societal change.  
Second, the Competing Moralities Narrative is based upon the ethics of the immigrants 
themselves. Liberals base their morality on the ethic of autonomy: the centrality of the 
individual and the need to provide that individual with an interference-free space to 
operate. New immigrants, especially those coming from non-democratic societies, may 
adhere more strongly to the ethic of community, which emphasizes the centrality of the 
family or ethnic group. This communal ethic may be coupled with an ethic of divinity, 
which posits that certain actions or objects are sacred or pure and others are impure or 
degrading365. Liberals do not value communal ethics because they seek to highlight 
abuses to individuals within communities, particularly those who are less powerful or 
part of minorities. These abuses can easily occur in systems that are based on group 
rights366. Further, religious or divinely-inspired morality does not speak to liberals 
because they support pluralism and choice whereas an ethic of divinity presupposes that 
one religious group’s values need to be respected or adhered to in all cases.  
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These competing ethics lead liberal host societies to push for anti-immigrant policies 
and to, paradoxically, support nationalism as a means of retaining the liberal character 
of their societies. New Atheist and secular arguments in Europe against Muslim 
practices—some of which have led to discriminatory laws—are a case in point367. Liav 
Orgad states that the “illiberal practices” of new Muslim migrants to Europe, such as 
female genital mutilation, foment tensions between modern, host societies and 
immigrants who adhere to traditional values. The clash between modernity and 
tradition, when coupled with Europe’s “demographic crisis due to the numerical erosion 
of its population” puts the issue of cultural preservation in stark relief368.  
The final narrative, based on Economic Fairness, links migration to economic and 
resource competition. More migrants entering a political space leads to more 
competition over jobs, which can create wage deflation. Further, poor migrants, like 
those coming from the Middle East and North Africa into Europe or from Central 
America and Mexico into the United States, may draw from the polity’s pooled resources 
such as hospitals, schools and welfare programs. These newcomers, in big enough 
numbers, are viewed as a weight on the country’s economy and an undue burden on 
taxpayers. The liberal conception of taxation is founded upon a redistribution of wealth 
within the polity, not on a redistribution of wealth to other polities—though foreign aid 
is tolerated in small doses. The Economic Fairness Narrative leads host communities to 
eventually push for nationalistic and illiberal governance due to their belief that 
immigrants are unfairly taking jobs, reducing wages and draining shared resources.  
All three of these narratives share the belief that a democracy is a circumscribed polity 
made up of a specific people. And, in reality, all three narratives—Economic Fairness, 
Competing Moralities and Cultural Defense—comingle within people and communities. 
Democratic theorists posit that a polity should be made up of a self-ruling and 
circumscribed group. Jean-Jacque Rousseau and modern deliberative democratic 
theorists such as Josh Cohen believe that polities should be small allowing for direct 
democracy369. Migration upends the intimacy of such states and challenges their 
conception of the polity.  
Paul Collier’s Exodus is fraught with concern regarding potentially out-of-control 
migratory feedback loops wherein Diaspora communities continually welcome ever-
more migrants into host societies370. As migration accelerates, it might be claimed, the 
sheltered small-society democracy erodes. Who, after all, are “the people” when a 
constant flow of newcomers fills the seats at the town hall? All of the narratives 
explaining why migration might lead to illiberal practices draw from this belief that 
democracies are built upon specific social components and that “opening the door,” so 
to speak, to anyone could diminish or destroy democratic culture and values. 
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Immigration has been a factor in the illiberal turn in many democracies. Donald 
Trump’s immigration platform was a major rallying cry in his election campaign and 
was a priority-area in his presidency. Syrian migration into Turkey could be a factor in 
pushing the country further toward authoritarianism. The same could be said of Greece 
whose center-right party took back power in 2019 and has criticized the welcoming of 
exiles371.  The rise of the far-right group Pegida in Germany and the anti-immigrant 
party Rodina (or “Motherland”) in Russia also was caused by host-resistance to 
immigration372. 
Migrants themselves need do nothing to become the totems that elites use to galvanize 
the masses against liberalism. Elite incitement characterized by anti-minority rhetoric, 
after all, was a key factor in genocides such as those in Germany, Bosnia and Rwanda373. 
The narratives that link migration to illiberal democracy are countered below to show 
that the future is not necessarily one where immigration neatly causes illiberalism, 
which implies that reducing immigration solves problem. 
Illiberal democracy is not about liberal or democratic values being preserved but rather 
about government executives gaining control. This trend accelerated after the 9/11 
attacks when civil liberties were reduced in many countries including in France, Canada, 
the United States, the United Kingdom and Israel. Government executives—whether 
presidents or prime ministers—have argued for decades that they need increased powers 
in order to quickly challenge potential threats374. Emergency laws in countries like Syria 
and the erosion of an admittedly flagging democracy in Russia show the end-result of 
these executive power-grabs: authoritarianism. Viktor Orban and Binyamin 
Netanyahu’s individual battles to stay in power as long as possible speak to their 
authoritarian tendencies, rather than to their stance of immigrants. As a Washington 
Post article on Hungary’s Orban and Serbia’s Aleksandar Vucic detailed, “Orban and 
Vucic have both moved to dismantle institutional checks and balances and centralized 
power in their own hands; they have also benefited from European Union support and 
ineffectual domestic opposition. But it is their domination of the media that has 
underwritten their success”375. Centralization of power around the executive links 
illiberal democracies to countries like Russia and China where government crackdowns 
on rights move in lockstep with increased authoritarianism376. 
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Elite incitement also plays a role by attempting to mobilize one portion of the 
population against another. The mobilized portion of the population is then given wide 
latitude in how they treat the besmirched group, which could be a religious minority, a 
social class or the LBGTQ community. In-group versus outgroup language builds a bond 
between the mobilized part of the populace and the elites who incite them. This bond 
has been critical to fascist mobilizations377. Elite incitement can be divorced of any real 
threat as was seen in cases of genocide and in anti-immigrant rhetoric in countries 
without much immigration378. As Katharina Natter shows in the Moroccan case, the 
salience of the issue of immigration in Morocco has risen despite extremely modest 
immigrant numbers (the share of immigrants in Morocco rose from 0.17% to 0.25% of 
the overall population from 2004 to 2014)379. 
Globalization and nationalistic reactions to it have also led to illiberal democracy. After 
all, migration was at a low ebb during the Great Recession that began in 2008 and, yet, 
far-right groups in Europe and the United States saw an uptick in membership during 
that period despite weak economies in the developed world acting as a deterrent to 
developing-world migrants380. Globalization gave the working class a case of 
Durkheimian anomie as their manufacturing and service sector jobs hopscotched 
different nations through waves of outsourcing and offshoring381. The Economist ran a 
cover article in October 2017 on those “left behind” by globalization who, the newspaper 
contended, needed to be accounted for and taken care of in a refashioned capitalist 
system382. This logic follows Karl Polanyi’s argument that capitalism run amuck leads to 
fascism as those “left behind” and without a social safety net seek to upend the system 
even if the system benefits the country in the aggregate383. Migration is a part of 
globalization, but capital and companies move much more freely across borders than 
people do in the modern world. Donald Trump’s “American carnage” inauguration 
homily spoke to those “left behind” by the economy, the so-called “forgotten men and 
women” who had been ruined by the capitalist class and cosmopolitanism384. 
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The opponents of liberal democracy have clearly attached their causes to those who 
oppose immigration and support xenophobia. After all, nationalism is a powerful drug 
and any in-group solidarity movement pairs well with an out-group to scapegoat. The 
realities of migration in Germany, Greece, Turkey, Jordan, Arizona and Texas cannot be 
denied. In some states and locales, migration has changed the landscape and may have 
become unmanageable for a variety of reasons. Cultural preservation, competing 
moralities and economic fairness become real concerns in these spaces.  
But preserving culture does not necessitate eroding electoral processes or quieting the 
free press. These illiberal actions might be justified as nationalistic, but they are simply 
brazen power grabs made by elites that seek to control governments. In countries where 
migration is a worry of the population, all the better for government executives who seek 
to exploit real or perceived concerns of their citizenry. Liberal democracy gets portrayed 
as universal liberal cosmopolitanism: a system that sees human beings as 
interchangeable and values the human rights of all regardless of where borders lie. In an 
atmosphere where the effect of growing migration and globalization is feared, universal 
liberal cosmopolitanism becomes an easy foil and one that allows illiberal forces to 
conflate liberal democracy with the death of the polity385.  
All nations, even those made up mostly of immigrants such as Australia, Israel, Canada 
and the United States, value their shared culture and view migration as a factor that 
needs to be regulated by the state. Regulating migration could mean anything from 
taking a log of who comes in to closing the border. When those who defend liberalism 
are conflated with those who reject this regulatory role, democratic values are in trouble. 
Crafty executives know this and use this logic to their advantage as they seek to loosen 
term limits and increase executive control. It is critical to add that, “North American 
democracies were the first to establish ethnic immigration selection criteria and the last 
to abolish them, long after most Latin American autocracies did so”386. This shows that 
immigrant-centric states with supposedly liberal universalistic values can fall prey to 
nationalism just as easily as other polities can. 
Mass migration could lead to a world of restricted rights and closed borders where 
migrants are shut out by radicalized hosts. Continued inequality and war could continue 
to buffet liberal democracy with increasing numbers of migrants. Hosts and migrants 
will radicalize in turn as integration efforts crumble. As Polakow-Suransky writes, 
“Liberal democracies are better equipped than authoritarian states to grapple with the 
inevitable conflicts that arise in diverse societies, including the threat of terrorist 
violence. But they also contain the seeds of their own destruction: if they fail to deal with 
these challenges and allow xenophobic populists to hijack the public debate, then votes 
of frustrated and disaffected citizens will increasingly go to the anti-immigrant right, 
societies will become less open, nativist parties will grow more powerful, and racist 
rhetoric that promotes a narrow and exclusionary sense of national identity will be 
legitimized”387. 
                                                             
385 Murray, Douglas, The Strange Death of Europe: Immigration, Identity, Islam (New York: Bloomsbury 2018). 
386 Natter, “Rethinking immigration policy theory beyond ‘Western liberal democracies,’” pg. 5. 
387 Polakow-Suransky, Go Back to Where You Came From, pg. 292. 
87 
 
Recent trends provide hope for at least a cyclical turn between populism and 
cosmopolitanism. In 2020, Hungary and Poland’s leaders were being heavily pressured 
by the European Union, Donald Trump lost the Presidential election and Jair 
Bolsonaro’s party lost municipal elections in Brazil388. Still, in response to 
radicalization, Emanuel Macron has restricted liberties in France389. The future, after 
all, is not monolithic and as long as democracies allow for power transfers, there will be 
a push-and-pull between forces that support and oppose liberalism. 
Lockdown: Severely Restricting Migration 
The covid-19 pandemic led to unprecedented border closures, quarantine rules and 
other travel restrictions across the globe390. Economic slowdowns and extensive job 
losses brought about by pandemic slaked any remaining thirst for new immigrants 
among those living in developed countries. The reality that migrants could now be 
covid-carriers did not help their cause. 
Many countries already support strict immigration-control regimes. Mexico “annually 
deports more people than does the USA” and, based on its 1974 General Law of 
Population, it can reject migrants if they disrupt “the equilibrium of national 
demographics.” Americans may find it ironic that Mexico has the toughest immigration 
laws in North America. In Mexico, undocumented people caught a second time can 
receive prison terms of up to ten years391. 
Australia subverts human rights law by placing asylum seekers and undocumented 
migrants on the islands of Nauru, Manus Island and Christmas Island. Immigration 
posters proclaim to migrants that there is “No Way” they will “make Australia home.” 
Australia’s strict policy has led to many deaths at sea. Almost 2,000 people died, 
according to the Australian Border Deaths Database, trying to get into Australia between 
2000 and 2015392. After trying to dissuade migrants from coming to their country with 
“inhospitable” onshore camps in 1999, Australia “upped the ante” by moving migrants 
to “hellholes” on Manus Island and Nauru where Australian rights did not hold393. On 
Nauru, human rights abuses piled up including rapes and denying migrants care394. 
Australia also passed a law that retroactively made “babies born to detained mothers” 
into “illegal maritime arrival[s].” This meant that children born on Australian soil were 
treated as if they had been apprehended on a boat395. In a strange turn, in response to 
                                                             
388 Crawford, Alan, “Air Runs Thin for World’s Populists,” Bloomberg, 27 November 2020, 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/newsletters/2020-11-27/air-runs-thin-for-world-s-populists. 
389 Nossiter, Adam, “Macron’s Rightward Tilt, Seen in New Laws, Sows Wider Alarm in France,” The New York 
Times, 25 November 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/25/world/europe/france-macron-muslims-police-
laws.html. 
390 Brumfiel, Geoff, “Countries Slammed Borders Shut to Stop Coronavirus. But Is It Doing Any Good?,” NPR, 15 
May 2020, https://www.npr.org/sections/goatsandsoda/2020/05/15/855669867/countries-slammed-their-
borders-shut-to-stop-coronavirus-but-is-it-doing-any-goo. 
391 Marshall, The Age of Walls, pg. 52. 
392 Jones, Reece. Violent Borders: Refugees and the Right to Move. (New York: Verso 2016), pgs. 64-66. 
393 Polakow-Suransky, Go Back to Where You Came From, pg. 94. 
394 Polakow-Suransky, Go Back to Where You Came From, pg. 94. 
395 Polakow-Suransky, Go Back to Where You Came From, pg. 246. 
88 
 
accusations of human rights abuses and illegal detentions, Australia announced that the 
Nauru camp was “open” and people detained there could leave freely396. 
Lockdowns and border closures sound like appropriate tools for managing the negative 
externalities inherent in globalization. A return to the local has its advantages, but 
rejecting and abusing desperate peoples searching for a better life just because a state 
can undermines the world of human rights and human dignity the United Nations-era 
aimed to create. The industrial age has seen cycles of internationalization followed by 
protectionism. The post-covid era may be no different. Even with a return to pre-covid 
levels of international movement, societies may seek to wall themselves off from others 
as best they can. The coronavirus pandemic is just one factor that could justify 
protectionism. Increased enmity between nations, as seen between America and China 
during the Trump Administration, could also lead to protectionism.  
The desirability of lockdown is questionable in the long- and medium-term. World 
prosperity is built on trade. Countries gain much from working together for mutual 
security and prosperity. International institutions such as the United Nations, the 
International Committee of the Red Cross and the European Union have brought 
prosperity to people all over the world. Further, isolationism has a dim history: the 
Great Depression and, to some degree, World War II were precipitated by isolationist 
stances. Further, global problems like migration, terrorism and climate change cannot 
be solved by isolationist countries working alone397. As Tim Marshall concludes, “history 
suggests that isolationism does harm the USA in the long term; whenever it has 
withdrawn into itself, it has always been drawn out again, and not always when it was 
prepared to be”398. 
Lockdowns and border closures may prove to be impractical strategies in a world of 
increased migration and connections. While the world builds more and more border 
walls, people can still cross borders with fraudulent papers or a tourist visa399. Attempts 
to seal one’s country from covid-19 have been counterproductive: the world economy 
requires openness, the virus travels discretely and isolationism leads to economic 
stagnation400. A recent University of Sydney study found that pent-up forces might yield 
large numbers of people to migrate when the pandemic ends401.  
More walls and harsher detention centers will lead to multiple problems. First, these 
tools are not as effective as policymakers make them out to be. In an unequal world, 
people will find ways to migrate to avoid threats or to pursue better opportunities. 
Second, harsh policies reaffirm nationalist radicalization and cause migrant 
radicalization as migrant groups feel unwanted. This was evident in Ch. 2’s discussion of 
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radicalization in prison. Finally, liberal democracies and the current international order 
are based on a respect for human rights that is severely undercut if countries engage in 
wanton abuse of migrants. While some seek to bracket the treatment of these people, 
reductions in human rights erode democratic values for everyone. 
Integration, Enclaves and Refugee Limbo 
In many cases, where incoming migration has already happened or where we might 
perceive it as an inevitability, the key to a better future will be integration. As Germany’s 
Federal Minister of Health Jens Spahn stated in 2016, “The best thing Germany can do 
now…is try to integrate as many people as possible so the financial burden is low.” 
Spahn noted that Germany had a need for skilled labor but that the Syrian refugees it 
accepted largely did not have skills that matched what the German economy needed. He 
said that the best case scenario was one where economic integration of the Syrians 
would lead to growth in the German economy402.  
Immigrant integration entails social inclusion. Integrated migrants become part of their 
new societies. They do not have to fully assimilate, but integration involves some give-
and-take: migrants adopt some identities from their new society and add some of 
themselves to their new vistas. Successful integration enriches both the migrant and the 
host. As Peter Schuck states, “Immigrants’ cultural impact on American society…is a 
function both of the values that they bring with them to the United States and of those 
they acquire here as they rub shoulders with Americans”403.  
The United States is known for being a “melting pot” where immigrants can quickly 
make homes and become Americans. In American Crucible, Gary Gerstle chronicles 
how the United States has long been viewed “as a divine land where individuals from 
every part of the world could leave their troubles, start life anew, and forge a proud, 
accomplished and unified people”404. Peter Schuck adds that, “the ease of acquiring 
membership in the American community has been striking. As early as the colonial 
period, citizenship was automatically conferred by birth within the colony; for those 
born elsewhere, that status could still be readily obtained”405.  
Yet, as Gerstle shows, America has long struggled between a civic nationalism based on 
liberal values and a racial nationalism based on white supremacy406. American racial 
nationalism is built on a racial hierarchy that many American whites strive to maintain. 
As Ibram Kendi charges, these people “define policies not rigged for White people as 
racist,” they view anti-racism as a struggle against white people, and they hold a deep 
nostalgia for a past where American minorities were powerless and less numerous407. 
Evidence of racial nationalism is plentiful: President Andrew Johnson called the Civil 
Rights Act 0f 1866 a “bill made to operate in favor of the colored against the white race,” 
former US solicitor-general Robert Bork in 1978 called affirmative action supporters 
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“hardcore racists of reverse discrimination,” and Rudy Giuliani in 2015 called the Black 
Lives Matter movement “inherently racist”408. Any move to erode American white 
supremacy is countered with accusations of racism against whites. 
Racial nationalism precludes integration. Immigrants from Cuba to America may 
“graduate to whiteness,” meaning they assimilate into the majority power-group, but a 
Haitian can never be white. In Europe, the problem could be worse. While far-right 
forces like to blame immigrants for failing to integrate, European “national identity is 
still largely perceived as being ethnically defined”409. France and Belgium produced “a 
hugely disproportionate number of” ISIS fighters due to their policies of forcing 
newcomers to choose between their heritage and their new land. As Polakow-Suransky 
emphasizes, “ISIS has a name for this strategy: eliminating the gray zone” and, too 
often, this overbearing assimilation policies lead migrants to reject their new societies in 
France and Belgium410. 
Integration is even tougher for refugees. Palestinians have been stuck in refugee camps 
for generations. In City of Thorns, Ben Rawlence chronicles the horrible conditions and 
constant pressure to leave inherent in the Dadaab refugee camps housing Somalis in 
Kenya411. In 2020, the governments of Tanzania and Burundi agreed to a secret pact 
stating that Burundian refugees should “return to their country of origin whether 
voluntarily or not”412. Burma’s Rohingya people have been denied entry to numerous 
countries due to their lack of citizenship papers413. 
Refugees are supposed to be granted temporary havens in their new lands. But, instead, 
repatriation rarely happens. Host countries grow tired of refugees, as in the Dadaab 
case, and try to push them out. Many other countries, like Saudi Arabia, avoid bringing 
in refugees in the first place. For every Turkey or Germany, there are multiple countries 
that vilify refugees or seek to prevent their entry. 
Without prospect for integration, many migrants create and join what Doug Saunders 
calls arrival cities. Arrival cities are usually known as “slums, favelas[,] shantytowns[,] 
urban villages [,] and barrios”414. These ethnic enclaves can benefit migrants and hosts 
or they can fail both. African American “arrival cities failed—because property 
ownership was unattainable in urban districts owned by indifferent or intolerant 
outsiders, because arrival-city residents were excluded from the economic and political 
mainstream by racism and bad urban planning, and because of the absence of 
government support and institutions.” Saunders worries that many of today’s arrival 
cities could also become “places of failed arrival”415. 
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As seen in the cases of Somali and Palestinian refugees, among others, large, permanent 
refugee populations frequently become restive and turn to violence given their lack of 
prospects. Without integration of migrants, failed arrival can lead to radicalization and 
violence. As Jens Spahn said, integration is the best hope for the future. 
But what outcome is probable? Most countries will not seek to absorb large refugee 
camps into their populations. Taking on so many new, and ethnically distinct, poor 
people could be destabilizing. Integration will be difficult to attain if the world continues 
to see inter-religious and cross-class conflict416. Failed regions, cities or camps will yield 
more radicalization and violence. James Piazza finds that failed or failing states are 
more likely to house, export and be targeted by terrorists417. 
Hope for integration in Europe is dim. A 2018 Pew Research report found that many 
Europeans agreed with the statement that newcomers “can never be one of us.” The high 
was in Belgium, where 48 percent of respondents agreed with the statement; the low 
was in Sweden, where 22 percent agreed. Three-quarters of Belgians and three-fifths of 
French people agreed with the statement that: “Our people are not perfect, but our 
culture is superior to others.” More than half of French people, but only one-fifth of 
Swedes thought it necessary to have a family background in their country to belong. A 
separate study found that, three-quarters of people in Turkey thought it was important 
for newcomers to believe that Turkey was superior to other countries. As De Conink, 
Ogan and d’Haenens aver, “negative attitudes toward refugees may be explained by the 
feeling that the new arrivals can never truly belong”418. The authors further found 
Sweden to be the most welcoming European country to migrants and highlight 
economic prosperity, effective integration policies and high educational attainment as 
important variables in determining whether hosts will accept migrants419. 
An integrated, prosperous future is possible for America, Germany and others. But a 
future of segregation, anti-immigration and chauvinism—marked by failed arrival cities 
and refugees stuck in limbo—is just as likely and must be guarded against. The final 
chapter (Ch. 5) will propose options for preventing that outcome. 
Civil and Inter-state Conflict 
Continued growth in migration and urbanization could lead to internal conflict in 
migrant-importing and –exporting countries. The vast numbers of Syrians who entered 
Europe in the mid-2010s could become disaffected. Post-covid economic downturns 
could leave these people shut out from the job market and vulnerable to anti-migrant 
harassment. Forcing people to stay in increasingly crowded, developing urban cities 
could also lead to civil conflict. 
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Civil conflict could take the form of riots as it did in the spring and summer of 2020 in 
America. It could take the form of radicalization and terrorism as it has in the twenty-
first century in Europe, Africa, and elsewhere. As Adam, speaking of the Syrian uprising 
he was a part of, explained, “What’s crucial in this whole process is that you don’t 
matter. You as an individual…mean absolutely nothing. And that’s when you understand 
why people get radicalized. I completely understand why somebody would join ISI or al-
Qaeda or the Assad regime or the Kurdish groups. You are in dire need for a narrative 
that can justify this futility”420.  
In the extreme, life in failed states could lead to the rejection of the Western system of 
state borders and the apocalyptic vision of the Islamic State421. A changed state system, 
brought about by separatist conflict, sounds grandiose until one considers what 
happened after the Arab Spring in places like Syria, Libya, Lebanon and Yemen. Given 
Western intervention across the world, and a desire for people displaced by war to move 
to developed countries, a future of interethnic conflict between hosts and migrants is all-
too easy to imagine. This is especially so in light of the rise of populist leaders in the 
West422. 
Walls could prevent future conflict as well as future migration423. But walling people off 
subjects them to human rights abuses and leaves desperate people little choice but to 
risk deadly sea- and desert-crossings424. Lockdowns also harm host-countries as they 
wall themselves off from economic opportunities.  
Inter-state conflict could be caused by strict anti-immigration policies in destination- 
states. As seen in recent conflicts in Syria and Yemen, in an interconnected world, civil 
conflicts easily shift into inter-state ones. Proxy forces garner air support from rich 
countries while inter-ethnic skirmishes spill over borders. 
Increased internal conflict in host countries is distinctly possible in a world where 
climate, rural decline and economic inequality conspire to push people to move to new 
lands. South Africa received more asylum applications than any other in the world 
between 2006 and 2011425. The crumbling of neighboring Zimbabwe, conflicts in 
Somalia and DR-Congo, and South Africa’s relative wealth compared to neighbors led to 
a crush of migrants and refugees looking to make it their home in the twenty-first 
century. South Africans, looking to find their feet post-apartheid, have reacted with anti-
migrant attacks and xenophobic sentiments426. Without integration, such outcomes are 
likely in many migrant destinations.  
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Predicting the future is difficult. The pandemic was unimaginable to most people, and 
even those who drew up a scenario like it did not know the timing or how the process 
would play out. Who would have thought that America, the country ostensibly most 
prepared for a pandemic, would suffer the most deaths of any country in the world?  
The future contains many possibilities, but those possibilities are controlled by policies. 
Martin Ruhs writes that high-income countries focus more on the potential negatives of 
migration (such as crime and social fragmentation) and “clearly continue to play a 
paramount role in influencing the scale and type of labor migration, conditions under 
which it occurs, and the rights of migrants after admission.” Despite great global 
inequality, migrants made up only 3 percent of the world population in 2010427.  
That said, the vast majority of countries protect the human right to leave one’s country 
of residence and return428. Further, even if migration is slowed considerably after the 
covid-19 pandemic recedes, there are already millions of newcomers in host-countries 
that need to be integrated. Providing a road to permanent residency and legal status is 
not only morally right but would also lead to future stability429. 
Policies will determine whether future migration leads to illiberalism, integration or 
radicalization. It is in this spirit that we turn to the final chapter where proposals for 
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Flattening the Radicalization Curve:  
How to Reduce Host and Migrant Radicalization   
Abstract 
This chapter proposes policy solutions to the current issues of migration and 
radicalization. These solutions include integration, a migrant and refugee clearinghouse, 
sharing the burden, reducing global inequality, resolving conflicts and improving 
human rights. While nothing will ever stop some people from becoming radicals, it is 
important to note that radicals make up a tiny minority of migrants and that there is a 
lot more that countries and the world can do to prevent radicalization.  
Key Words: Covid-19, Immigration, Policy, Radicalization, Refugees. 
Millions of people have migrated in recent years fleeing their homes in developing 
countries due to economic inequality, war, deprivation, and increasingly climate change. 
These newcomers are too often being greeted with xenophobia and nationalist populism 
as the world swings back to tribalism. 
This swing affects both hosts and migrants. Migrants are stuck, many times literally, in 
their statuses and spaces. After World War II, refugee status was created to help correct 
a situation wherein millions of people had left their home countries in pursuit of 
protection430. 
Today refugee status and asylum are being eroded. Refugees rarely repatriate and are 
rarely accepted by third-party countries. Instead they fester in camps or live in liminal 
spaces outside of main cities, living shadow-lives with sometimes-shaky statuses431. The 
mistreatment of migrants is well-chronicled: cages in America, camps outside Australia, 
children living on streets in Europe432. 
But what’s happened to the hosts is no less tragic. Hungary, Serbia, Brazil, Israel, India, 
America and other countries have embraced nationalist populism in response to 
migrant arrivals. The fear of hordes of migrants undoing cultural heritages, contorting 
national histories, upending job markets and changing landscapes galvanized host 
populations. Many sought out leaders who were all too eager to exploit rules that 
weaken democracy to stay in power433. Seeking to stem migration, these leaders rode a 
wave of xenophobia to pass policies that do just that. The covid-19 pandemic has 
seemingly worked in their favor. 
The world stands at an impasse. The reasons to accept newcomers rub against the 
reasons to reject them. Of course, the values we seek to uphold in liberal societies speak 
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to reasons to accept migrants. Migrants have been shown to augment the economies of 
host societies, and of course they augment the social offerings in those societies too434. A 
tolerant and pluralist society should want to accept others. Understandably, societies 
also want membership to mean something and want some control over the character 
and composition of their communities. 
From the migrants’ perspective, it is only fair to accept someone into a new space given 
the great inequalities in the world. The rich-world benefits many times over at the 
expense of the poorer-world. Resource and labor exploitation abound in developing 
countries, many times due to the influence of rich governments or MNCs. A birthright-
lottery vision of migration, which views life as a lottery and birth in a rich country as 
winning the lottery, maintains that the rich-world owes the lottery “also-rans” some 
recompense435. Freedom of movement certainly could be part of that—money transfers 
may also make sense, but they may not directly benefit people seeking better lives. 
Those who defend host societies’ rights to keep migrants out point to overpopulation 
and overcrowding, a limited ability to help newcomers especially if they arrive rapidly 
and in large numbers, the right to self-determination, the concomitant right of 
communities to form around self-selected visions, and the potential negatives that come 
with migrants ranging from crime to the spread of illness. 
Natural forces will continue to make more lands less habitable. Meanwhile, human 
factors will continue to exacerbate the inequality that makes people want to move. These 
are the physics behind the migration crisis. 
Another physics is already taking place inside many countries where newcomers are 
already changing things linguistically, culturally and socially. These newcomers are 
many times under- or un-represented in democratic governments, undereducated by 
public school systems and underappreciated by their host societies.  
These newcomers sometimes reject their host societies and even turn to violence when 
their opportunities for advancement are shunted. In response, prejudiced nationalists 
have also turned to violence in reaction to migration. As Farhad Khosrokhavar 
emphasizes, radicals of all stripes represent “a tiny minority”436. In the West, jihadist 
radicals provoke a “public anxiety” that far-right radicals, such as those that oppose 
immigrants, do not437.  
Radicalization is a process, it does not happen all at once438. The influence of “the 
imagined community to which jihadists belong” is critical. Attachment to a “new 
Ummah” resolves the anomie of the individual lost and disconnected in prison or in a 
new land439. Khosrokhavar finds that people radicalize when they feel that they have 
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been humiliated, victimized and that their people are “under assault.” Khosrokhavar 
says, “These three dimensions belong to the context of globalization and radicals have 
internalized them perfectly”440. Radicals feel “a profound sense of injustice” that cannot 
be remedied without drastic action441. 
Common sense dictates that welcoming migrants will prevent them from rejecting their 
new societies and prevent host societies from fanning the flames of exclusivist 
nationalism. The less sanguine flip side would be to simply close off all migration. While 
logical, integration is not a simple process and isolation is both difficult to achieve and 
comes with attendant negatives. This chapter makes policy proposals for improving 
world migration and, along the way, reducing radicalization.  
Domestic Policy Proposals 
Tolerance: Tolerance and acceptance of new populations through immigrant-friendly 
policies could reduce radicalization. Broadly conceived, such a strategy would likely be 
coupled with a regime that liberally accepts the entrance of migrants. A state-driven 
tolerant approach to migrants would likely subvert migrant radicalization but could 
yield xenophobic radicalization. Anti-immigrant rejectionists could subvert this strategy 
as could continual, rapid flows of migrants which would make it difficult to absorb 
people properly.  
General tolerance toward migrants has worked for America—as it has for other 
countries—but it normally comes with caveats. Not all migrants are welcome, and 
certainly not all at once. Restrictions need to be placed on migration at least for the 
maintenance of order, a point with which even open borders theorists concur442. That 
said, tolerance to new migrants would ring hollow if coupled with heavy immigration 
restrictions. 
In “The Emerging Migration State,” James Hollifield traces how “the settlement of large 
foreign populations” in Western Europe in the post-War period ignited anti-immigrant 
public opinion “giving rise to new social movements and political parties.” Governments 
and citizens worried about how to integrate the newcomers and feared “that disposed 
and disillusioned youth of the second generation would turn to radical Islam, rather 
than following the conventional, secular, and republican path to assimilation”443. 
Hollifield writes that even in the face of pressures to limit migration, liberal democratic 
rights, such as protections for minorities and non-citizens, served to “blunt the impact 
of nativist and xenophobic movements.” Courts rejected or watered down repressive 
laws such as “the 1986 and 1995 Pasqua Laws in France, Proposition 187 in California, 
or the 1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act in the United 
States”444. 
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A welcoming, tolerant approach is not a panacea. Tolerance presumably leads to the 
adoption of more modest forms of religiosity and ideology, but it may not help with the 
rise of illiberal democracy. Promoting moderate Islam was widely proposed after 
9/11445, and while moderation reduces radicalization it won’t stop democratic 
backsliding all on its own446. 
Tolerant elite messages go hand-in-glove with tolerant policies. Even welcoming 
policies, can get upended by the rhetoric of xenophobic leaders such as Donald Trump. 
Poland’s ruling PiS Party’s pro-immigration policies coupled with anti-immigrant 
rhetoric merge to create an intolerant environment for newcomers447. The Russian case 
is instructive here. Policy changes and elite statements countering nationalist 
radicalization quelled xenophobic attacks on migrants over time. Further, a reduction in 
the broader conflicts between Russians and Chechens reduced inter-communal 
tensions. 
Welcoming strategies may help rich countries at the cost of poorer ones. These policies 
will likely lead developing countries to suffer from brain and human capital drains. 
Their best and brightest will be helping already-rich countries prosper448. While there 
are downsides, policies that welcome newcomers coupled with more open migration 
regimes work together to limit radicalization of hosts and migrants. A goal of such 
policies: integration, is taken up in the next section. 
Integration to Reduce Radicalization: In Strangers No More, Richard Alba and Nancy 
Foner write that one of the key issues with twenty-first century immigration remains 
“how to integrate immigrants and their children so that they become full members of 
the societies where they now live”449. Alba and Foner emphasize that integration is 
“complicated by the widespread resistance to immigrants and their children” that is 
professed by journalists and politicians and measured in opinion polls450. Immigration 
alters societies, but mostly for the better; this is why integration is a two-way street: 
immigrants and hosts act in concert to forge new social identities451.  
The goal of integration is for immigrants to truly become part of their new societies. 
Integrated immigrants participate in elections and lead, work and manage, and live in 
integrated spaces. Segregated immigration communities stifle integration leaving 
immigrants behind in their new societies452. As Alba and Foner write while immigration 
segregation “is most severe in the United States, where large enclaves have developed in 
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which immigrants and other poor minorities live,” Western Europe has a harder time 
with integrating Muslims453. These problems with integration lead to radicalization as 
migrants who are alienated from their new communities may adopt extremist 
ideologies. Alba and Foner find that in Western Europe, “Islam has become an 
oppositional identity for some Muslims…, or a way of marking their rejection of the 
European mainstream, which they perceive as condemning them to positions of 
inferiority”454. 
Unfortunately, Adida, Laitin and Valfort discover, through a series of game theoretic 
experiments, that Muslims and “rooted French” are locked in an equilibrium of 
discrimination in France. Extremist Muslims reinforce the Islamophobia of rooted 
French through their behaviors and rooted French people’s discrimination against 
Muslims in the labor market and in wider society pushes Muslims away from 
mainstream society. This leads Muslims to retrench themselves in ethnic enclaves. 
Breaking this equilibrium will take both new French policies and perhaps a renewed 
desire on the part of Muslims to assimilate—the authors suggest that French Muslim 
parents consider giving their children less “Muslim-sounding” names to guard against 
resume discrimination455. Along the same lines, Khosrokhavar calls for France to be 
more flexible to the “theological and psychological” needs of religious minorities, to 
adopt policies more like the integrationist ones espoused by the United States and Great 
Britain456. 
As Christian Joppke clarifies, “The very fact that Islam is an issue in Europe but not in 
the United States casts doubt on the often-made argument that there is something 
inherent in Islam that makes it incompatible with western ways”457. Joppke instead 
points to, “persistent socioeconomic marginalization of the children and grandchildren 
of Muslim immigrants” in Europe. This, he argues, is more an issue of integration issue 
than one of religious conflict, but “it has often found a religious expression in that global 
Islam provides an idiom of protest and identity for excluded Muslim ethnics”458.  
Ultimately, Europeans have failed to make Muslim newcomers into prosperous 
members of their societies as seen in France’s banlieus and “in the decrepit industrial 
towns of northern England”459. 
Paul Collier observes that, “left to the decentralized decisions of potential migrants, 
migration accelerates until low-income countries are substantially depopulated”460. For 
this reason, Collier holds that “Migration cannot be left to the decisions of individual 
migrants; it must be managed by governments”461. He believes that a “fit-for-purpose” 
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migration system would work hard at integrating migrants into their host societies. 
Under such a system, governments would strictly enforce laws against discrimination 
and racism, require migrants to disperse geographically as Canada does, work hard to 
integrate schools (as America did in the 1970s), and require migrants to adopt some 
aspects of host-country identity462. While progressives seek to combine multiculturalism 
with rapid migration and generous social welfare, Collier believes that such 
combinations are likely unsustainable463.  
Daniel Rauhut theorizes that how hosts and migrants view nationality affects whether 
migrants successfully integrate. He builds a theory of immigrant integration supported 
by findings that integration of newcomers is a two-way street and that informal 
institutions (such as religions and cultures) play a large role in integration. Rauhut 
conceives of a process whereby immigrants are more likely to integrate into societies 
where hosts and migrants view nationality similarly. The best scenario is when migrants 
and hosts both see nationality as being based on socialization and language, the worst is 
where both see ethnicity, religion or history as the basis for nationality. If nationality is 
viewed inflexibility, as something you either have or you don’t and that can’t be 
changed, then integration of newcomers into the national society is not possible464. 
There is hope. Leo Lucassen finds that the “problematic migrants” of Western Europe 
are actually integrating faster than did groups that came to Europe in previous 
decades465. Further, the idea that a second-generation of disaffected Muslims are not 
culturally destined to radicalize in Europe. “As the situation of the second generation of 
Algerians in France shows, their worrisome prospects are not so much explained by 
their Islamic culture, which most of them denounce,” Lucassen reports, “but by their 
exclusion and isolation from mainstream French society”466. All the more reason to 
focus on the benefits of integration. Additionally, Michael Minkenberg finds that 
Europe’s radical right has had little effect on integration policies, which have actually 
expanded in Australia, Denmark, Germany and the Netherlands (but contracted in 
Belgium and France)467. 
Doug Saunders counsels that segregation is not always a bad thing. In a defense of 
arrival cities, Saunders highlights that these places are not the dens of extremism that 
others make them out to be. He states that, “there is no correlation between ethnic 
concentration and terrorism—that is, it is just as likely to arise, if not more so, in places 
other than arrival cities.” Moreover, he cites anecdotally that “there are strong 
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suggestions that the tight-knit networks of arrival-city culture deter the worst forms of 
extremism”468.  
This view does not contradict a proposal calling for more integration. Immigrant 
enclaves can be empowering platforms for social mobility or ghettoized traps. By 
integrating migrant populations, places of arrival will look more like the former than the 
latter. Ultimately, as Tim Marshall puts it, “we need to find a way for newcomers to join 
the host community, not seek to undermine its values”469. 
Enforce Human Rights: A recommitment to enforcing human rights will reinforce 
democracy, integration and liberalism, which could help both hosts and migrants. 
Human rights, as enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, conceive of 
human beings that are free, treated equally and worthy of dignity. Pride in one’s nation  
need not contradict a commitment to such rights. For instance, the treatment of 
Muslims in Xinjiang is a grave violation of human rights that the Chinese government 
justifies on nationalistic grounds470. Such a justification rings hollow when viewed from 
the outside, just like justifications for child separation in America for reasons of 
immigrant deterrence rang hollow to many observers471. Committing to a world where 
human rights are taken more seriously, benefits citizens and migrants alike; the post-
War world has been one of great economic growth and movement due to the rise of 
liberal democracies and the enshrinement of human rights. The rights of current 
citizens need not be uprooted by migrants under such a scheme. Countries can still have 
discretion to control migration, but would do so within a human rights framework. 
Shaping Migration as a Win-Win: Migration is too often problematized today; but 
governments and publics can once again view it as a mutually beneficial process. 
Migrants, as seen in America, Russia, Japan and elsewhere, take on jobs that hosts don’t 
want to work in. High-skilled migrants add to the economy. Migrants bring new foods 
and cultures to their adopted communities. Previous chapters discussed tensions 
between natives and migrants (Ch. 3) and between human rights and security (Ch. 1). 
Integrating and tolerating migrants can be a win for both migrants and their hosts. 
Balancing migration with membership rights is key. As Song proposes, a system of 
“closed borders and open doors” could provide the optimal balance between practicality 
and universalism472. 
International Policy Proposals 
Coordinated Burden-Sharing: Europe’s reaction to migration is instructive.  The 
Schengen Agreement of 1985 set a new migration regime: countries dropped border 
checks “in exchange for common visa requirements to control the movement of third-
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country nationals.” The Dublin Convention of 1990 required asylum-seekers to apply in 
the first “safe country” they set foot in, which reduced the likelihood of people “asylum 
shopping”473. Angela Merkel suspended these rules in Germany to allow for the entry of 
more refugees. The purpose of the Dublin system was to share the burden of migrant 
acceptance across the Continent. Merkel’s welcoming of refugees has undone an 
arrangement that had already been fraying474.  
Khaled Koser emphasizes the importance of burden-sharing in reforming the current 
refugee system475. He observes that, “control measures such as border fences, biometric 
testing and visas are, in isolation, unlikely to reduce irregular migration in the long-
term. They probably need to be combined with more proactive measures that address 
the causes of irregular migration, including achieving development targets to increase 
security and improve livelihoods in origin countries, as well as expanding opportunities 
to move legally”476. 
The current system is clearly too ad hoc. All countries want to accept highly-skilled, rich 
migrants, but few want lower-skilled, poorer ones who could be migrating in great 
numbers in the near-future. A more coherent system wherein rich countries share the 
burden of accepting migrants is necessary. Indeed, as climate change makes more of the 
earth uninhabitable, countries will have to build capacities to help migrants and 
internally displaced residents. Island and coastal nations may yield huge migrant out-
flows and nearby countries may have to take in millions of newcomers. Without a 
coherent system of acceptance, great upheaval and human misery could take place 
similar to other great movements of people such as the Cultural Revolution in China and 
the Partition of India and Pakistan. 
Rather than ad hoc acceptance of migrants to Europe and other places, a centralized 
organization that balances the needs of migrants with the ability of destination countries 
to provide is needed. Even the European Union, supposedly a supranational, 
cosmopolitan body, has found it difficult to justify accommodating the new mass of 
migrants. Were it not for Angela Merkel’s leadership on this issue, migrants might 
interminably be boxed in by border fences—and, in many cases, they are still stuck in 
refugee limbo. Coordinated burden-sharing is absolutely critical for absorbing migrants 
effectively into new societies, the next proposal offers one method for equitably 
distributing migrants. 
A Refugee Clearinghouse: The world needs to create a refugee clearinghouse 
organization that coordinates where political and economic refugees are placed 
throughout the world. Canada, for instance, has plenty of land, a tolerant population 
and some desire for new immigrants while geographically smaller, more nationalistic 
European countries have struggled mightily with who to accept and how many. A 
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refugee clearinghouse would place more people in states that seek migrants and level 
the burden of refugee acceptance.  
Under the current system, countries like Germany and Turkey have willingly taken on 
much greater refugee numbers than others. These countries will have to deal with the 
consequences of potentially overburdened government services and labor markets 
which could lead to radicalization and terrorism. Distributing refugees more evenly in 
countries throughout the world—including in those countries that seek to sidestep 
asylum seekers—would reduce the likelihood of terrorism and make for a more 
equitable world community. 
A refugee clearinghouse, established by an international treaty and run by the United 
Nations, could solve a few issues. First, it would create a more coherent system for the 
acceptance of refugees. Second, it could match refugees with countries that either need 
their skills or that already have Diaspora communities for those refugees to join. Finally, 
it would lighten the load on arrival nations that feel strained by migration by sharing the 
burden of refugee acceptance worldwide.  
Expanding on this proposal, James Hollifield calls for a truly international migration 
regime, controlled by the United Nations, to better manage world movements. However, 
he feels that differences between developed and developing countries would likely 
prevent such a regime being agreed-upon477. Peter Schuck writes that a solution to the 
issue of mass refugee movements involves formalized burden-sharing through a vehicle 
like the refugee clearinghouse proposed here. Like Hollifield, Schuck does not have high 
hopes for the adoption of his proposal in a world controlled by states. Still, he believes 
that “a quota system that distributes refugee burdens among the wealthier states with a 
market option that can redistribute protection resources to other states that can more 
effectively use them to harbor more refugees” makes for a better system than the current 
one478. 
Leaving labor, education and family reunification-motivated migration to states, while 
better coordinating refugee distribution sets the right balance. Refugees’ rights are 
derived through international treaties, while states have plentiful laws about other 
forms of migrants. A refugee clearinghouse, established by an international treaty, could 
be an achievable strong step toward a more egalitarian and sustainable migration 
system and I believe powerful, refugee-accepting countries would be in favor of such a 
plan. A refugee clearinghouse would provide a good framework for a more extensive, 
coordinated migrant burden-sharing scheme. 
Reducing Inequality to Stem Radicalization and Rapid Migration: So far we have 
focused on supply-side proposals, but solving the demand-side of the equation is equally 
important. Global inequality drives large migration patterns, which in some cases yield 
radicalization. Reducing inequality worldwide, then, is a critical step toward solving the 
issues outlined in this book. 
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As Collier underlines, “Mass international migration is a response to extreme global 
inequality”479. Collier predicts that migration will diminish as low-income countries 
catch up to high-income countries480. But, Collier warns that this will only happen if 
migration policies effectively set ceilings for migrant numbers and selection criteria. 
Without such policies, “migration will continue to accelerate” and “high-income 
countries could become postnational, multicultural societies.” Multiculturalism is 
certainly a positive in many contexts, but it has stretched the social fabric to a breaking 
point in some states. Further, accelerated migration could cause “an exodus” of talented 
people with means from the poorest countries, which will leave them in worse shape 
than before481. 
Khosrokhavar observes that, “Globalization has gone hand in hand with a profound 
feeling of oppression and frustration, which is no longer kept in check by ideologies, as 
it was during the Cold War. If citizenship is defined as social and economic integration 
into a society, then the affliction of some while others prosper in a globalized world 
devoid of true global citizenship will continue to haunt all citizens in the form of 
radicalized terrorism”482. As Michael Marmot relates in The Health Gap, “Poverty and 
inequality are deeply disempowering. People with little control over their lives do not 
feel able to make healthy choices”483. People living in segregated and unequal spaces 
also may not be able to shake off calls to extremism or crime. Reducing inequality, 
which continues to rise during the pandemic484, is critical to establishing social 
justice485. Social justice will quell grievances and reduce radicalization.  
Ayelet Shachar argues that birthright citizenship is the true impediment to solving 
global inequality. Citizenship in rich countries bestows enormous benefits on those with 
the good fortune of being born in them or of having the right parents. Shachar proposes 
a jus nexi, or proximity-based, method of attaining citizenship. Such a method would 
grant greater rights to long-time residents (who might not have papers) and fewer rights 
to those who collect passports or who don’t have genuine connections to the countries 
that grant them citizenship486. This model provides the basis for a more inclusive form 
of citizenship that could reduce radicalization. 
In sum, reducing global inequality is extremely important in the quest for a world where 
migrants and hosts live together more peacefully. Additionally, reducing inequality will 
reduce the need for migration, which will help stabilize all countries. The next proposal 
relatedly seeks to help poor countries. 
Failed State Stabilization and Liberalization: A common response to those who seek to 
help migrants is to flip the issue and ask why we don’t just stabilize the countries they 
came from. Stabilizing countries such as Syria, Libya and Somalia is surely more 
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difficult than accommodating the migrants who come from them. World powers have 
spent a lot of blood and treasure in trying to stabilize failing states. That said, the effort 
to improve conditions in failing states and to liberalize autocracies is surely a critical 
component in stifling radicalization and moderating migrant movements. Both types of 
states are potential incubators for terrorism and both types of states push out large 
numbers of their own people487. Working toward bettering conditions in authoritarian 
and fragile states, while no easy feat, would limit the supply of migrants and terrorists. 
Additionally, stable countries like Saudi Arabia that export and create disproportionate 
numbers of terrorists need to be pressured to better their human rights records, 
liberalize politically wherever possible and tone down extremist rhetoric.   
Resolution of Middle East vs. West conflicts: Critical criminologists explain the forms 
radicalization takes by examining the wider world the radicals live in. In this case, 
migrants and hosts live in a world where Western countries have repeatedly engaged 
militarily in the Middle East, North Africa and Africa in recent years. The list includes 
interventions and drone strikes in Afghanistan, Syria, Iraq, Somalia, Gaza, Yemen, Mali 
and Pakistan. While isolationism and internationalism require a balance, these conflicts 
clearly lend fuel to the fires of radicalization and explain why so many host-migrant 
conflicts have centered on Islam. The Abraham Accords as well as reductions in 
American troop numbers in the Middle East could improve relations between Muslim 
and Christian countries in the future. That said, root conditions in the Mideast need 
reform including liberalizing authoritarian governments, opening economies, improving 
education systems, fighting for gender equality and resolving the status of Palestinians 
and Kurds. An avenue to improve the conditions of people in all states is explored in the 
next section. 
Global Citizenship Rights: The concept of universal, egalitarian human rights needs to 
be entrenched into a world system where citizenship rights create gross inequalities. 
Reece Jones calls for an opening of borders combined with “a global minimum wage, 
global standards for working conditions, global safety nets for the poor, and global 
environmental standards”488. Shachar’s jus nexi rights to citizenship and Jacqueline 
Stevens’ concept of a world where people freely traverse de-nationalized state units489, 
could be part of this notion of global citizenship. Of course, such a system, though 
morally attractive is not likely to take hold in the near- or medium-term. 
Nations and nationalism, and their concomitant justifications for ownership and 
exclusion, are the great barriers to a more just land distribution and system of human 
migration. Global citizenship rights, based on cosmopolitanism: an ideology that views 
humans as part of one family, would alleviate the pressures that many who lost the 
birthright lottery feel. Partitioning lands may make sense from the view of elites or 
religious groups but unified, federated, and confederated lands are needed to take 
humanity from a world of “others” to one where we are one family united in the goals of 
helping one another and preserving the land we have. Global or regional citizenship 
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would be part of this scheme. This goal is certainly Utopian and long-term but it serves 
as a template to judge policies against and as a metric for measuring progress.  
Reforming International Organizations: The United Nations delivers a good platform 
for international discussion and provides aid to hundreds of millions of people490, but it 
is politicized and does not accurately represent humanity491. More objective 
international bodies that better represent the world’s people by representing people not 
states would create for a fairer world system. Truly representative international bodies 
could work towards resolving land disputes, reforming the United Nations and 
establishing coordinated migrant-sharing schemes. Together, these goals would reduce 
radicalization. 
Conclusion 
Fareed Zakaria avers that despite the pandemic, globalization is not going anywhere any 
time soon. Trade, movement and international communication have continued even 
during the covid-19 crisis492. In a globalized world, migration and the radicalization that 
sometimes comes with it needs to be dealt with. 
International solutions abound; including some that propose new state systems. Reece 
Jones concludes that, “the thousands of deaths at borders and the callous and inhumane 
treatment of migrants create an opening to question the underlying logic of the state 
system that is predicated on violent exclusion at borders”493. While “breaking borders” 
has been attached to the actions of the Islamic State494, Jones writes that the fight 
against colonialism and discrimination has for generations been a fight against 
“artificial boundar[ies]” meant to hem people in495. Ben Barber calls for a Global 
Parliament of Mayors that would connect the world’s cities and usher in a world order 
centered on metropolises496.  
Solutions involving land rights-changes, such as inheritance or ownership reforms could 
also reduce conflict and radicalization by shifting the spoils. Jones proposes that, “There 
certainly needs to be a rethinking of the right of property owners to exploit the resources 
on their property without limits.” This could mean that property eventually goes back to 
the commons497. Jacqueline Stevens’ arguments against inheritance follow the same line 
of thought498. Of course, changes in how land is viewed or in how the world state system 
is organized will take generations to take hold. 
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As De Conink, et al. summarize, “there are no simple solutions [to issues of migration 
and refugees] because the refugee situation is a complex matter, perceptions of it are 
fraught with emotions, and it cannot be met with coldly ‘rational’ decisions, while 
involving both national and international rules. The actors in this complex interplay are 
not only the people on the move, governments, and NGOs, but also often ruthless 
refugee smugglers”499. James Hollifield similarly frames the issues discussed here as 
complicated and hard to control; he asks, “Will this increase in migration be a virtuous 
or a vicious cycle? Will it be destabilizing, leading the international system into greater 
anarchy, disorder and war, or will it lead to greater openness, wealth and human 
development?” Hollifield answers that, “Much will depend on how migration is 
managed by the more powerful liberal states, because they will set the trend for the rest 
of the globe. To avoid a domestic political backlash against immigration, the rights of 
migrants must be respected and states must cooperate in building an international 
migration regime”500.  
To conclude, the issues of migration and radicalization are not necessarily connected—
in the sense that migration does not strictly lead to terrorism or the reverse—but they do 
affect one another. Migration can lead to nativist terrorism and migrants can become 
terrorists for various reasons.  
In an age where common ground needs to be reached, the resurgence of nationalism 
recently observed in the West that has accompanied an almost unprecedented migration 
is disquieting. Solutions from the left and right have become troublingly similar, as 
Micklethwait and Wooldridge iterate: “nationalist arguments for self-sufficiency and 
socialist ones for a big state have begun to blend”501. Solving the world’s big geopolitical 
problems, which have been increasingly ignored, will break any perceived link between 
migrants and terrorists; restricting migration with no international plan for 
accommodation, as has occurred during the covid-19 pandemic, will only make matters 
worse. Yuval Harari observes that nationalism has no answers for the great problems of 
our future: technological disruption, climate change and nuclear war. “To have effective 
policies,” Harari argues, “we must deglobalize the ecology, the economy, and the march 
of science or we must globalize our politics”502. 
 
Radicalization, rather than ready-made terrorists moving for the express purpose of 
committing attacks, should be the concern of nations accepting new migrants. This 
phenomenon has been studied in the context of Western and non-Western societies as 
well as in their prisons. Still, of course, only a tiny proportion of migrants to any 
Western country (even in the oft-bandied case of Moroccans in Belgium’s Molenbeek) 
turn to extremist beliefs and only a small portion of extremists go the extra step of 
carrying out violence. As deradicalization programs have shown in Saudi Arabia and 
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elsewhere, radicals can be “reprogrammed” given proper education and vocational 
training503.  
In 21 Lessons for the 21st Century, Yuval Harari writes that, “the debate about 
immigration should not be conducted as an uncompromising struggle over some 
nonnegotiable moral imperative. Rather, it must be a discussion between two legitimate 
political positions, with the ultimate choice decided through standard democratic 
procedures.” Harari does not know how to solve the age-old issue of hosts seeking to 
maintain their cultures while immigrants bring new ones, but he does warn that 
radicalization should not be a reason for unwinding democracy. “It would be extremely 
unfortunate if the European experiment in freedom and tolerance unraveled due to an 
overblown fear of terrorists,” Harari counsels504. After a time of pandemic when we have 
lost so much, it would be a tragedy to lose our values over the unfounded fears of radical 
migrants.  
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